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RUSSIA *and* GERMANY *at* Brest-Litovsk

By JUDAH L. MAGNES

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RUSSIA *and* GERMANY *at* Brest-Litovsk

A Documentary History *of the* Peace Negotiations

By JUDAH L. MAGNES

New York
The Rand School of Social Science

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To the Reader:

With the following documentary account of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Negotiations, hitherto an unwritten chapter in the history of the Russian Revolution, the Department of Labor Research begins the publication of a series of monographs on economic and political questions which it is hoped will prove valuable contributions to the literature of the Socialist and Labor movements.

The American Labor Year Book, which the Department is publishing, will be continued as a part of the series. The 1919 issue (Vol. III) is now being prepared for the press and should be ready for distribution by the end of the Summer.

Organizations and individuals interested in the work of the Department should address

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PREFACE

An attempt is made in this book to give an impartial, documentary account of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and their general background in Russia, Germany, and other belligerent countries. There is no pretense at literary style, and between many of the items listed there is no connection other than that of similar dates. The general division into thirteen chapters is largely arbitrary and the account often jumps without warning from one land to another. Yet the story has essential unity; and, quite apart from whatever value it may have as a collection of documents, for me, at least, it possesses the fascination of a mighty drama.

The account lays no claim whatever to completeness. It is only raw material for a structure, or, at best, the rough frame-work. The justification for publishing it is, that there seems to be no other collection of similar documents bearing upon one of the great episodes of the great war.

The material was in hand, for the most part, a year ago. It was collected at a period of the war when the censorship on news and on European publications was especially severe. The fortunate possessor of a *Manchester Guardian* was besieged by inquiries as to how he got it. It was a period when the arrival from time to time of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* at the New York Public Library was not talked about, for fear the subscription might be cancelled.

The main sources of the material were: *The New York Times, The Times' Current History, The Manchester Guardian, The London Times,* the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* the *New Yorker Volkszeitung,* the *New Europe;* publications of the *World Peace Foundation* and the *American Association for International Conciliation,* and, in establishing the chronology and in verifying statements, the *London Nation,* the *New Statesman,* and the *Cambridge Magazine,* were often helpful. The speech of Trotzky on February 14, was taken from his recently published,

"From October to Brest-Litovsk," and Lenin's speech of March 14, was taken from the booklet, "The Soviets at Work."

No guarantee can be given for the correctness of any document, inasmuch as I have not had the originals before me. Moreover the translations are of very uneven quality. It was simple enough to translate a German text now and again, but it was not so simple to choose between two or more poor English translations of a text, or to "English" an English translation a bit without at the same time changing the text of a document.

A sincere effort has been made to be entirely objective and impartial, insofar as this is at all possible in a work dealing with history and with politics. No judgments are expressed and no conclusions are drawn, despite the temptation at almost every step. Men and peoples follow each other on and off this great stage and speak but for a moment. Yet for all the brevity of their lines, their voices are authentic, and it does not seem an altogether impossible task to evaluate personalities and events. Some day the original documents will be available and "scientific" judgments will be possible. It is hoped that the material here presented may be of some aid in establishing truth.

J. L. Magnes.

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I. THE SOVIET PEACE PROPOSALS

1 **November 6-7.** The Kerensky Government was overthrown by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. In a proclamation addressed to the army, to all Soviets and to the garrison and proletariat of Petrograd, the Committee proclaimed its authority, "until the creation of a Government by the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates." The Committee considered the first point in the "program of the new authority" to be "the offer of an immediate democratic peace." The proclamation closed with the words: "Soldiers! for Peace, for Bread, for Land, and for the Power of the People!"

2 **November 7-8.** The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets began its sessions on November 7, and on the following day it proclaimed that "All power lies in the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates."

The Congress addressed an appeal to the workmen, soldiers and peasants of Russia, declaring that

> it will propose to all peoples an immediate democratic peace and an armistice, to come into force at once at all points. . . . The Congress calls the soldiers in the trenches to vigilance and firmness, and it is persuaded that the Revolutionary Army will be able to protect the Revolution against all Imperialist efforts until the moment when the new Government shall have obtained the democratic peace which it will propose direct to all peoples. . . .

3 **November 10.** The Congress passed its first peace resolutions, suggesting an immediate armistice of three months and proposing that the representatives of "all the nations of the war or its victims" participate in the negotiations,

after which a Conference of all the nations of the world should be called to give final sanction to the peace terms thus drafted.

> The Government considers a peace to be democratic and equitable which is aspired to by a majority of the working classes of all the belligerent countries. . . . It should be an immediate peace, without annexation, (that is to say, without usurpation of foreign territory, and without violent conquest of nationalities,) and without indemnities. . . .
>
> If any population be kept by force under the control of any state, and if, contrary to its will expressed in the press or in national assembly, or to decisions of parties, or in opposition to rebellions and uprisings against an oppressor, the population is refused the right of universal suffrage, of driving out an army of occupation and organizing its own political regime, such a state of things is annexation or violent usurpation. The Government considers that the active prolongation of the war in order to partition weak nationalities, which have been conquered, among rich and powerful nations, is a great crime against humanity.

4 November 11. The first peace proclamation of the Soviet Government was published in *Izvestia,* the official organ of the Petrograd Soviet:

> Immediate democratic peace, this is one of the great world problems of the Russian revolution. But only a Workmen's and Peasants' Government is capable of realizing this program, since only such a government expresses the will of the whole Russian people and will inflexibly carry out that will. Thus, for the first time in the course of the seven months of the Revolution, the fate of the masses of the people is in their own hands. . . .
>
> It has established the question of peace on simple, unshakable ground. It raises high the red flag of international Socialism, and demands peace without annexations or contributions, in principle condemning all annexations, no matter when they were made. . . .
>
> It demands an immediate truce on all fronts, announces its willingness to consider calmly and ob-

jectively all peace proposals, and sets a period of three months for the consideration of these proposals.

While demanding a truce on all fronts, the Workmen's and Peasants' Government spurns the base insinuation that it is striving after a separate peace. It is not at all seeking to break with its Allies, but it has taken a defensive position, thanks to which in all Allied countries the true workmen's democracy will have the decisive voice.

And the fact that, in Russia, power and the negotiation of peace are in the hands not of a traitor, but of the real representatives of the workmen, soldiers and peasants, will strengthen the movement in favor of peace in Allied countries also as well as in Germany and Austria. This open advance with the demand for peace, with its condemnation of secret diplomacy, will find an echo not only in the world's proletariat, but also among the great masses of the countries forced and dragged into the war—Poland, Roumania, Bulgaria, Belgium and the Colonies.

By this means the Governments of the warring imperialistic countries are placed in a position in which the beginning of immediate peace negotiations will be irresistibly forced upon them. . . .

5 **November 20.** Leon Trotzky, Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, sent to the Entente and American Embassies at Petrograd a Note, announcing that "the Congress of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates of All the Russias, instituted on November 8 a new Government of the Republic of All the Russias," and that the Congress had approved "proposals for a truce and for a democratic peace without annexation and without indemnities, based on the principle of the independence of nations and of their right to determine for themselves the nature of their own development." Trotzky asked further that his Note be considered "in the light of an official proposal for an immediate truce upon all the fronts, and to take immediate steps to set on foot negotiations for peace." He added that his Government "is addressing the same proposal to all the nations and their Governments."

6 On the same day a general notice of the armistice offer was sent to Russian representatives abroad, and instruc-

tions were issued to Dukhonin, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, for the Council of People's Commissars by Lenin, Trotzky, Krylenko, Bonch-Bruevitch and Gorbunov, informing him of their "obligation to offer to all the peoples and their respective governments an immediate armistice on all fronts, with the purpose of immediately opening *pourparlers* for the conclusion of a democratic peace . . . an armistice to all the nations involved in the war, to the Allies and also to the nations at war with us." They ordered him upon receipt of the message to "approach the commanding authorities of the enemy armies with an offer of a cessation of all hostile activities for the purpose of opening peace *pourparlers.* In charging you with the conduct of these preliminary peace *pourparlers* the Soviet . . . orders you . . . to sign the preliminary act only after approval by the Council of the People's Commissars."

7 The Ukrainian Rada adopted on the same day, the text of a general proclamation known as the "Universal."

> Ukrainian People and Peoples of the Ukraine! . . .
>
> We, the Ukrainian Central Rada, by your will, for the purpose of maintaining order, for the sake of creating order in our country, and for the sake of saving the whole of Russia, announce that henceforth Ukrainia becomes the Ukrainian People's Republic. Without separating from the Russian Republic and while preserving its unity, we take our stand firmly on our lands, in order that with our strength we may help the whole of Russia, and the whole Russian Republic may become a Federation of free and equal Peoples. . . . Until the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly meets, the whole power of establishing order in our lands, of issuing laws and of governing, rests in us, the Ukrainian Central Rada and in our Government—the General Secretariat of the Ukraine.

After outlining the frontiers of the National Ukrainian Republic, the "Universal" abolishes "the existing rights of ownership to the lands of large proprietors and other lands not worked by the owners. . . ."

It fixes an eight-hour working day in factories and workshops, and it establishes state control of production.

It insists upon "peace as soon as possible," making reso-

lute efforts to compel "both Allies and enemies to enter immediately upon peace negotiations."

It abolishes the death penalty, grants a full amnesty to all political prisoners, and guarantees "all the liberties won by the Russian Revolution," namely,

> freedom of the press, of speech, of religion, of assembly, of union, of strikes, inviolability of person and of habitation, the right and the possibility of using local dialects in dealing with all authorities. . . . We announce to the Great Russian, Jewish, Polish and other peoples of the Ukraine, that we recognize national personal autonomy for the security of their rights, and freedom of self-government in questions of their national life. . . . The working out of these reforms must be effected at the Ukrainian and All-Russian Constituent Assemblies. The date for the election of the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly is fixed for January 9, 1918, and the date of its summoning, January 22, 1918. . . .

8 **November 22.** A statement was issued for the Soviet by Lenin, President, and Krylenko, People's Commissar of War, to "all Committees of regiments, divisions, corps, armies; to all the soldiers of the revolutionary army; and to all the sailors of the revolutionary navy," informing them that Dukhonin had refused to obey the instructions of the Government, that he had been deposed, and that Krylenko had been appointed the new Commander-in-Chief. The soldiers were told that "the question of peace is now in your hands. You must not permit the counter-revolutionary generals to destroy the great work of peace. . . . Let the regiments which are on the frontal positions elect immediately plenipotentiaries who shall formally begin the peace *pourparlers* with the enemy. . . . Only the Council of the People's Commissars has the right to sign the final agreement of armistice. . . . Have watchfulness, tenacity, energy, and the will for peace will win."

The same message declared that the preliminary *pourparlers* had actually "been in progress since 4:30 A. M. today."

9 **November 23.** The People's Commissars at Petrograd issued a decree confirming the right to freedom and self-

determination on the part of the various nationalities of Russia and expressly stating that "this right of the Russian peoples to their self-determination is to be extended even as far as separation and the formation of independent States."

On the same day Trotzky began the publication of the diplomatic documents (the "secret treaties") which he found in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office.

The previous day he had announced to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets that "All the secret treaties of Russia are now in my hands. These documents which are more cynical in their provisions than we had supposed will soon be published. German diplomacy will prove to have been no less cynical than that of the Allies. . . . An appeal to all nations is being printed and will be distributed everywhere with the decree. We do not imitate Kerensky who addressed supplications to the Allies. His letter will be published. We confront all the Governments with facts showing that we wish to end the war. We sweep all secret treaties into the dust bin."

Accompanying the first publication, he issued a statement outlining the attitude of the Soviet Government to secret diplomacy, which, he declared,

> is a necessary weapon in the hands of a propertied minority, which is compelled to deceive the majority in order to make the latter serve its interests. Imperialism, with its world-wide plans of annexation and its rapacious alliances and arrangements, has developed to the highest extent the system of secret diplomacy. . . . The Russian people, as well as the peoples of Europe and of the whole world, must know the documentary proof about those plots which were hatched in secret by financiers and industrialists, together with their parliamentary and diplomatic agents. . . . To abolish secret diplomacy is the first condition of an honorable, popular, and really democratic foreign policy. . . . For this reason, while openly offering to all the belligerent peoples and their governments an immediate armistice, we publish simultaneously those treaties and agreements which have lost all their obligatory force for the Russian workmen, soldiers and peasants. . . . When the German proletariat, by revo-

lutionary means, gets access to the secrets of its Government chancellories, it will produce documents from them of just the same nature as those which we are now publishing. It is to be hoped that this will happen as soon as possible. . . . We desire a speedy peace so that the peoples may honorably live and work together. We desire a speedy dethronement of the supremacy of capital. In revealing to the whole world the work of the governing classes as it is expressed in the secret documents of diplomacy, we turn to the workers with that appeal which will always form the basis of our foreign policy: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!"

II. THE ATTITUDE OF THE BELLIGERENTS

11 On the same day the English Government through Lord Robert Cecil made a hostile reply to the Russian proposal for an armistice.

> The action just taken by the extremists in Petrograd . . . would of course be a direct breach of the agreement of September 5, 1914, and . . . if approved and adopted by the Russian nation would put them practically outside the pale of the ordinary councils of Europe. But I do not believe that the Russian people will confirm this action or approve a proclamation . . . to open all along the line peace negotiations with the enemy across the trenches. . . . There is no intention of recognizing such a Government.

12 The British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, while awaiting final instructions from his Government, published a declaration in which he said that Trotzky's note had been delivered to the representatives of the Allied Powers 19 hours after the order had been given to Commander-in-Chief Dukhonin to offer an armistice. "The Allied Governments thus find themselves in the presence of a *fait accompli* on a subject concerning which they have not been consulted. It is furthermore impossible for the Embassy to reply to the notes of a Government which his own Government has not recognized."

13 November 25. Trotzky sent a Note to the diplomatic representatives of neutral powers in Petrograd, informing them of the proposed armistice and adding that "the consummation of an immediate peace is demanded in all countries, both belligerent and neutral. The Russian Government counts on the firm support of workmen in all countries in the struggle for peace."

14 November 27. At a meeting of Ambassadors at the United States Embassy, Petrograd, it was decided to ignore Trotzky's note which "will be met with a *fin de non recevoir.*" Nevertheless, it was decided to address a protest to General Dukhonin, who had already been deposed as

Russian Commander-in-Chief. The Entente protest was filed by General Lavergne, head of the French mission at the Russian Staff Headquarters:

> The Premier and War Minister of France have charged me to make the following declaration to you: "France does not recognize the power of the People's Commissars. Trusting in the patriotism of the Russian High Command it counts upon the firm resolution of the military leaders to repel every criminal *pourparler* and to keep the Russian army facing the common enemy." Besides, I am charged to call your attention to the fact that the question of an armistice is a governmental question, whose discussion cannot be taken up without previous consent of the Allied Governments. No Government has the right to discuss separately the question of an armistice or of peace.

15 The protest of the United States was made separately to General Dukhonin by Major Kerth, Military Attaché at Petrograd. The failure to join the protest entered by the other Allied Ministers was due, according to a Petrograd despatch of December 2, "to the fact that it was based upon the London agreement against a separate peace to which America is not a signatory." Major Kerth's protest was as follows:

> Acting by virtue of instructions received from my Government and transmitted through the Ambassador of the United States at Petrograd, I have the honor to bring to your knowledge the fact that the United States, an ally of Russia, pursuing with her the war which is the struggle of democracy against autocracy, protests energetically and categorically against any separate armistice that might be concluded by Russia.

16 **November 28.** The Russian Government sent out a wireless "TO ALL" signed by Trotzky and Lenin, and "declaring its willingness to enter into peace negotiations with the belligerent powers."

17 Krylenko ordered "firing to cease immediately and fraternization to begin on all fronts. Great vigilance is neces-

sary regarding the enemy. . . . Our army is starving. It is without clothes and boots. . . . In a short time we shall obtain a general peace."

He announced that "our envoys have returned, bringing an official reply from the German Commander-in-Chief, signifying his assent to the proposal to inaugurate negotiations for an armistice on all fronts. The first meeting of the negotiators is fixed for December 2."

18 **November 29.** The German Chancellor, von Hertling, declared in his first speech before the German Reichstag, "that in the proposals of the Russian Government, which have so far become known, a discussable basis for the opening of negotiations may be found, and that I am prepared to enter into such negotiations as soon as the Russian Government sends authorized representatives for this purpose. . . . As regards the countries of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, which were formerly under the sovereignty of the Czar, we consider that the peoples living in those countries have the right to determine their own fate."

19 Count Czernin, Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Government, wired the Russian Government that "the guiding lines announced by the Russian Government for negotiations for an armistice and a treaty of peace, counter proposals to which are awaited by the Russian Government, are, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, a suitable basis for entering into these negotiations . . . regarding an immediate armistice and general peace."

20 The first plenary session of the Interallied Conference was held in Paris. Sixteen nations were represented by their Premiers or High Commissioners. Despite the overthrow of the Kerensky Government, Russia was represented by two appointees of that Government: Sevástopoulo, Councillor of the Embassy at Paris, and Maklakov, "Ambassador to France (by special invitation and unofficially, as he has not yet presented his letters)."

21 **November 30.** Maklakov was dismissed by Trotzky as Russian Ambassador to France because he attended the session of the Inter-Allied Conference.

22 The German Foreign Secretary, von Kuehlmann, in addressing the Main Committee of the Reichstag, said:

> Russia has set the world ablaze. . . . Russia has swept away the culprits, and she is laboring to find through an armistice and peace an opportunity for her internal reconstruction. . . . The principles announced to the world by the present rulers in Petrograd appear to be entirely acceptable as a basis for the reorganization of affairs in the East—a reorganization which, while fully taking into account the right of nations to determine their own destinies, is calculated permanently to safeguard the essential interests of the two great neighboring nations, Germany and Russia.

23 Trotzky informed the representatives of the Allied Governments in Petrograd "that the German High Command in reply to the formal proposal of the People's Commissars has agreed to open negotiations on all fronts . . . that military operations on the Russian front have been stopped, and asks the diplomatic representatives of the Allies in Russia to state in reply whether they desire to participate in the negotiations which will be opened on Sunday evening, December 2, at 5 o'clock."

24 On the same day Trotzky issued a warning respecting the letters addressed by the heads of the French and American military missions at Russian headquarters to General Dukhonin, who had protested against Russia's concluding either a separate peace or armistice: "The Government cannot permit Allied diplomatic and military agents to interfere in the internal affairs of our country and attempt to incite civil war."

25 On the same day, addressing the Petrograd Soviet, Trotzky announced Austria-Hungary's acceptance of the offer of an armistice. He said:

> In no case shall we allow a wrong interpretation of our principles for a general peace. We shall confront our enemies with questions which will admit of no ambiguous answers. Every word spoken by us or by them will be written down and sent by wireless to

all nations, who will be the judges of our negotiations. Under the influence of the lower classes, the German and Austrian Governments have agreed to place themselves in the dock. Be assured, comrades, that the prosecutor in the person of the Russian Revolutionary Delegation will speak with thunderous accusation against the diplomacy of all Imperialists. It is all the same to us how the Allied and enemy Imperialists treat us. We shall carry on our independent class policy, whatever they do.

III. NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PRELIMINARY TRUCE AND ARMISTICE

26 The preliminary negotiations for a formal truce were begun on November 29.

Second Lieutenant Senneur, Army Doctor Sagalovitch and Volunteer Meren, envoys of the Committee of the Russian 5th Army before Dvinsk, were empowered to open negotiations, and at 5 A. M. they crossed the German lines blindfolded. The report rendered to Commander-in-Chief Krylenko continues:

> We handed over our written authorization from the People's Commissars to two officers of the German General Staff who had been sent for the purpose. The negotiations were conducted in the French language. Our proposal to carry on negotiations for an armistice on all the fronts of belligerent countries, in order later to make peace, was immediately handed over to the staff of the division, whence it was sent by direct wire to the staff commander of the German armies (Hindenburg). . . . At midnight a written answer to our proposal was given to us by General von Hofmeister: . . . 'The chief of the German eastern front is authorized by the German Commander-in-Chief to carry on negotiations for an armistice. The chief of the Russian armies is requested to appoint a commission with written authority to be sent to the headquarters of the commander of the German East front (Brest-Litovsk). On his side the German commander will name a commission with special authorization. The day and hour of the meeting are to be fixed by the Russian Commander-in-Chief. . . . The time appointed is mid-day of December 2.' At the same time we were informed that no firing would occur unless prompted, and that enemy fraternization would be stopped. We were blindfolded again and conducted to our lines.

27 December 1. A Delegation of Russian officers and soldiers called at the headquarters of the Austro-German com-

mand at Czernowitz where they were in consultation one and one-half hours.

The situation during these days is thus described in an official Vienna communication of December 3:

> During the last few days an armistice has been announced on many sectors of the Russian front, from division to division and from corps to corps. In the Pripet region the Russian army concluded an official armistice with the opposing command of the allied [Central] troops.

28 Trotzky informed the American Military Attaché, General Judson, who visited him unofficially on Dec. 1, that every stage of the negotiations would be made public, that every detail would be discussed in the Soviet, and that "the Allies, if they thought it advisable, might intervene at a later stage of the negotiations."

29 **December 2.** On the morning of Sunday, December 2, the Russian Delegation, which consisted of Kamenev, Sokolnikov, Mme. Bizenko, Captain Metislavsky and a workman, a soldier, a sailor and a peasant, together with two military experts of the General Staff, arrived at Dvinsk on their way to Brest-Litovsk, and addressed the Extraordinary Congress of the Fifth Army before Dvinsk.

> They were received with rounds of applause which developed into a long ovation. The Congress gave a solemn promise in the name of the army that it would destroy all the wasp nests of the counter-revolution.

At 5:30 P. M. they were received in the neutral zone by the German Delegates.

30 **December 3.** A temporary truce for 48 hours (up to December 5) was signed at Brest-Litovsk between Russia and Germany. This was to be regarded as "merely a preliminary arrangement" in order to permit the formal negotiations for a general armistice to be begun without interference.

31 The formal negotiations for a general armistice were opened at Brest-Litovsk in the presence of representatives of Russia, and of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and

Bulgaria. The Delegation of the Central Powers was exclusively military and was under the leadership of General Hoffmann. An account of the negotiations is given in the official Russian Report.

The Russian Delegates opened with a declaration concerning their peace aims, with a view to which the armistice had been proposed.

> The Central Delegates replied that their credentials authorized them solely to begin negotiations for an armistice and not for peace; that they were soldiers and could add nothing to the political declarations of Count Czernin and Baron von Kuehlmann; nor were Russia's Delegates authorized to speak for Russia's Allies. The Russian Delegates, taking due note of this evasive declaration, proposed that they should immediately address to all countries involved in the war, including Germany and her Allies and all States not represented at the Conference, a proposal to take part in the drawing up of an armistice on all fronts.

The Central Delegation again replied evasively that they had no such authority. They accepted the proposal of the Russian Delegation that they ask their Governments for such additional powers. This power was not accorded them.

32 **December 4.** At the second day's sitting, the Russian Delegation submitted their armistice proposals whose principal points were:

a. An armistice of six months' duration.

b. Evacuation by the German troops of the islands of the Moon Sound in the Gulf of Riga.

c. Interdiction against sending German forces from the Eastern front to other fronts, or even their transference to rest quarters.

The Central Delegation regarded these conditions as "in part quite astonishingly far-reaching in view of the Russian military situation." The Central Delegation proposed an armistice:

a. Of 28 days' duration, which is to be automatically prolonged save upon seven days' notice.

b. Along the whole front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, the Riga Islands not to be evacuated.

c. Without acceptance of the interdiction against transference of troops, since "such demands could be addressed only to a conquered country."

33 At this point attention should be called to President Wilson's address to Congress on this day, asking for a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary. He made here his first reference to the Russian revolutionary peace formula which had been current since April, 1917:

> You catch with me the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula, No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities.
>
> Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to the right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray, and the people of every country their agents could reach, in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson and the people of the world put in control of their own destinies.
>
> But the fact that a wrong use has been made of a just idea is no reason why a right use should not be made of it. It ought to be brought under the patronage of its real friends.

34 **December 5.** At the third day's sitting the Russian Delegation made the categorical declaration that they "were treating for an armistice on all fronts with the view to the conclusion of a general peace on the basis established by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets."

Although authorized to negotiate at the present only with the Russian Delegation, in view of the absence of the Allies of Russia from the Conference, the Central Delegation promised "to transmit to their respective Governments

the proposal made by the Russian Delegation to invite all the belligerent countries to take part in the negotiations."

Under the circumstances, "the Russian Delegation refused to sign at this stage of the negotiations a formal armistice."

It was thereupon agreed:

a. To interrupt the negotiations for an armistice for one week to December 12, and

b. To suspend hostilities (*Waffenruhe*) for ten days beginning on December 7 and ending December 17 at noon.

c. During the truce troops numbering a division or more may be moved only if orders therefor had been given prior to December 5.

35 **December 6.** Some of the Russian Delegates returned to Petrograd. The remaining members of the Russian Delegation and representatives of the Quadruple Powers "held Committee sittings at which the drawing up of protocols in respect of the previous sittings and the preliminary work for the future full sittings was concluded."

36 Trotzky sent a note to all the Allied Embassies and Legations in Petrograd, informing them of the course of the negotiations up to that date and stating that the negotiations had been interrupted for a week,

> with the purpose of providing the opportunity during this period of informing the peoples and Governments of the Allied countries of the existence of such negotiations and of their tendency. . . . As a result a period of over one month will exist between the first peace decree of the Soviets on November 8 and the moment of the continuation of the peace negotiations on December 12. This period is even for the present disturbed state of international communications amply sufficient to afford the Allied Governments the opportunity to define their attitude towards the peace negotiations—that is, their willingness or their refusal to take part in the negotiations for an armistice and peace. In case of a refusal they must declare clearly

and definitely before all mankind the aims for which the peoples of Europe may have to lose their blood during a fourth year of war.

37 *Pravda,* a leading Bolshevik organ, declared that the Soviet Government may have to resort to a repudiation of Russia's debts as a means of forcing the Allies to participate in the coming negotiations.

38 December 7. The independence of Finland was proclaimed. This was unanimously confirmed by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets on January 9.

39 The Ukrainian Parliament authorized the sending of Delegations to Brest-Litovsk and Roumania. It also called upon all belligerents to participate in the peace negotiations and it notified neutrals that it had taken these steps. It also declared that it was preparing a peace program from the point of view of the recognition of the Ukraine as a part of the Russian Federative Republic.

40 It was announced from Petrograd that on that day for the first time since the war not a shot had been fired on the Russian front from the Black Sea to the Baltic.

41 It was announced from Jassy that the Roumanian troops had decided to associate themselves with the Russians in the proposed armistice, and on December 8 a truce agreement with Roumania was signed by General Tcherbatchev at Focsani.

IV. THE FORMAL ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

42 **December 11.** The Russian Delegation, consisting of thirteen members—including General Skalok, five representatives of the Russian armies of all the Eastern fronts, the naval representative, Altflater, and five political Delegates—started for Brest-Litovsk.

43 **December 12.** Trotzky issued a declaration,

> throwing the responsibility for Russia concluding a separate armistice on the Governments which refuse to present conditions for an armistice and peace. A separate armistice is not yet a separate peace, but it means the danger of a separate peace. Only the peoples themselves can avert this danger.

Trotzky added that in the negotiations the Commissars do not consider themselves bound by a single one of the old treaties. As the basis of peace negotiations he put forward:

1. No forcible annexations.
2. The right of all peoples to decide by referendum whether they will belong to one or another State as a whole, or whether they will retain their independence. Before such decisions, refugees should be enabled to return and foreign troops be removed. This principle was applicable to colonies as well as to parent States.

44 **December 13.** The negotiations for an armistice to replace the existing truce were begun at Brest-Litovsk.

At the first day's sittings three questions were considered:

1. Troop transfers—concerning which the Germans insisted upon their own view.
2. Naval matters in relation to which the Germans made concessions.
3. Conditions for fraternization between the two armies.

45 **December 14.** The conditions and draft of an armistice treaty were finally formulated, the Russian Delegates, how-

ever, desiring to obtain supplementary instructions on some points from their Government.

46 On this day Lloyd George made a number of references to Russia in an address before Grey's Inn Benchers:

> Russia threatens to retire out of the war and leave the French Democracy, whose loyalty to the word they passed to Russia brought on them the horrors of this war, to shift for themselves. I do not wish to minimize in the least the gravity of this decision. Had Russia been in a condition to exert her strength this year we might now be in a position to impose fair and rational terms of peace. By her retirement she strengthens the Hohenzollerns and weakens the forces of democracy. Her action will not lead, as she imagines, to universal peace. It will simply prolong the world's agony, and inevitably put her in bondage to the military dominance of Prussia. . . . If the Russian democracy has decided to abandon the struggle against military autocracy, the American democracy is taking it up. . . . The Russians are a great-hearted people, and valiantly have they fought in this war, but they have always been—certainly throughout this war —the worst organized State in Europe.

47 **December 15.** The armistice between Russia and all the Central Powers was signed. It is to begin at noon on Monday, December 17, and remains in force until January 14, 1918. Unless seven days' notice is given it continues in force automatically.

The agreement contains ten articles together with a supplement:

Article I gives the duration of the agreement.

Article II extends it to all the land and air forces of the common fronts. The contracting parties "undertake that until January 14, 1918, they will not put into operation the removal of troops from the front between the Black Sea and the Baltic, that is to say, such removals as had not been commenced before the time when the armistice agreement was signed."

Article III specifies how the lines of demarcation and the neutral zones between the two sides shall be determined.

Article IV provides the conditions under which, "for the development and strengthening of friendly

relations between the nations of the contracting parties, organized intercourse between troops shall be permitted." Intercourse is permitted for *pourparlers* and to armistice commissions; also at the two or three intercourse centers on every sector of a Russian division, "there must not be present at any one time more than 25 unarmed persons from each side. The exchange of views and newspapers is to be permitted. Open letters may be handed in for despatch. The sale and exchange of wares of everyday use is to be permitted at the intercourse centers."

Article V extends the armistice to all of the naval and aerial forces in the Black Sea and in the eastern Baltic and other waters, and it provides for the regulation of trade and mercantile shipping.

Article VI seeks "to prevent unrest and accidents at the front" by regulating infantry exercise, artillery practice, land mining, captive ballooning, work on positions.

Articles VII and *VIII* provide for armistice commissions to meet in eight places along the whole front for the purpose of carrying out the stipulations of the armistice.

Article IX provides that "the contracting parties, immediately upon signing this treaty, for the armistice, will commence negotiations for peace."

Article X reads: "Based upon the principle of the freedom and independence and territorial inviolability of the neutral portion of the Persian Empire, the Turkish and Russian High Administrations are both prepared to withdraw their troops from Persia. They will immediately enter into communication with the Persian Government in order to arrange details for their evacuation and also for the guaranteeing of the above-mentioned principle and for the establishment of other necessary measures."

A Supplement to the armistice agreement provides for the immediate exchange of civil prisoners and of prisoners of war unfit for further military service . . . the sending back to their homes of women and of chil-

dren under 14 years of age . . . and the amelioration of the condition of prisoners of war on both sides. . . . In furtherance of negotiations for peace and in order to heal civilization of the wounds caused by the war, measures will be devised for the re-establishment of cultural and economic relations between the contracting parties. . . . For the settlement of details a mixed commission is to meet shortly in Petrograd.

48 **December 17.** Trotzky is reported to have "notified the Allied Embassies that the armistice has reached definite results and that peace negotiations will begin, and asking them to participate, or to state whether they wish peace or not."

49 The Petrograd Telegraph Agency issued a declaration to "the Socialists of all countries, especially the Socialists of Germany" who "must understand that between the program of the Russian workmen and peasants and the program of the German capitalists, landowners and generals there is an irreconcilable contradiction . . . the workers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey must substitute for the Imperialist program of their ruling classes their own revolutionary program of solidarity and collaboration between the workers of all countries."

50 The Soviet Government delivered an ultimatum to the Ukrainian Rada stating that "in case a satisfactory reply has not been received within twenty-four hours, the Council of the People's Commissars will consider the Rada in a state of war against the influence of the Soviets in Russia and in the Ukraine." In the ultimatum the "independent national rights of all the nationalities that were oppressed by the Czarist Great Russian bourgeoisie, even to the point of recognizing the right of these nationalities to separate themselves from Russia," are once more confirmed. Nevertheless, the Rada is accused "under cover of phrases and declarations regarding national independence," of having given itself over to a "systematic bourgeois policy" and of giving assistance to the "counter-revolutionary forces of the Cadets and of Kaledin." This ultimatum was ignored at Kiev, and war between the two Republics was formally begun on December 18.

V. NEGOTIATIONS FOR A GENERAL EUROPEAN PEACE

51 Von Kuehlmann and Czernin notified Trotzky that they would arrive in Brest on December 18 to begin negotiations for a general European peace. Czernin added that the meeting place for a general European Conference would also be discussed.

52 **December 18.** A Preliminary Conference was held between the representatives of Russia and of the Central Powers to consider who would participate in the forthcoming formal negotiations and what would be the basis of the negotiations. The Germans considered it necessary to know the replies of the Allies before opening formal negotiations. The Germans were reported as "disposed to accept the principle of no annexations or indemnities, but they have made express reservations with regard to the right of nationalities to dispose of themselves."

53 **December 20.** Lloyd George in discussing the military situation before the House of Commons said:

> It would be idle to pretend that the hopes we had formed at the beginning of the year have been realized, and our disappointment is attributable entirely, in my judgment, to the Russian collapse. The Russian army has been practically quiescent throughout the year. . . . The Russian situation has changed within the last few weeks. Russia was at any rate before nominally at war with Germany. Her army occupied a very long line of trenches, and that compelled the Germans and the Austrians to keep in front of that army a very considerable number of troops.
>
> There is an armistice and peace is being negotiated. It is perfectly true that there are conditions which impose upon Germany the obligation not to move any troops from the eastern front to the west. Well, we have heard of scraps of paper before. . . .
>
> Since Russia has entered into separate negotiations she of course must alone be responsible for the terms in respect of her own territories. . . .

54 **December 22.** The formal negotiations for a general peace were begun. The meeting was attended by the following Delegates:

Germany—Foreign Minister von Kuehlmann, Chairman, and von Rosenberg, Baron von Hock, General Hoffmann, Major Brinckmann.

Austria-Hungary—Foreign Minister Czernin, Chairman, and von Merey, Freiherr von Wisser, Count Collerda, Count Osaky, Field Marshal von Cziezericz, Lieutenant Polarny, Major von Gluise.

Bulgaria—Minister of Justice Popov, Chairman, and Gossev, Postmaster General Stoyanovich, Colonel Ganchev, Dr. Anastasov.

Turkey—Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Nezim Bey, Chairman, and the Ambassador to Germany, Hakki Pasha, Under Foreign Secretary Hekmit Bey, General Zekki (Izzet) Pasha.

Russia—Joffe, Chairman, and Kamenev, Mme. Bizenko, Petrovsky, Karaghan, Lubinski, Weltman, Pavlovich, Admiral Altvater, General Tumorrl, Colonel Zeplett, Captain Lipsky.

After introductory remarks by Prince Leopold of Bavaria and Hakki Pasha, v. Kuehlmann was unanimously chosen first President of the negotiations. He declared among other things that

> there can be no question of preparing an instrument of peace elaborated in its smallest details. What I have in mind is fixing the most important principles and conditions on which neighbourly intercourse, especially in cultural and economic respects, can speedily be re-established, and deciding upon the best means to heal the wounds caused by the war. . . . Our negotiations . . . must take into account on the one hand what has become historical in order not to lose our footing on the firm ground of facts; but on the other hand they must also be inspired by that new great leading motive of peace that has brought us here together.

The Russian Delegation demanded and obtained publicity for the sittings and the right to publish protocols. After additional rules of order were adopted, Joffe declared that the Russian Delegation based itself upon the clearly ex-

pressed will of the people of Russia to attain as soon as possible a general and just peace. He appealed to the resolutions of the All-Russian Congress of Workmen and Soldiers' Deputies and the All-Russian Peasants' Congress, and he declared the war a crime "if continued for the sake of annexations." Starting from these principles, the Russian Delegation proposed that peace negotiations be based upon the following six points:

1. No forcible union of territories conquered during the war shall be permitted. Troops occupying such territories shall be withdrawn within the shortest period.

2. The political independence of peoples that have lost their independence during the war shall be restored to its fullest extent.

3. National groups which before the war were not politically independent shall be guaranteed the possibility of deciding by referendum the question of belonging to one State or another, or enjoying their political independence. This referendum must be arranged in such a manner that complete independence of voting is guaranteed for the entire population of the region in question, including emigrants and refugees.

4. In regard to territory of mixed nationality, the right of a minority shall be protected by special laws giving it independence of national culture, and, if practical, autonomous administration.

5. None of the belligerent countries shall be obliged to pay another country any so-called war costs. Contributions already levied are to be paid back. Regarding the indemnification of losses suffered by private persons in consequence of the war, these shall be met out of a special fund to which belligerents shall proportionately contribute.

6. Colonial questions shall be decided in conformity with the principles laid down in points 1 to 4.

The Russian Delegation also regards as intolerable any restriction of the liberty of weaker nations by the stronger, such as through an economic boycott, the subjection of one country to another by the imposition of

commercial treaties, and separate customs conventions, hindering the freedom of commerce with a third country.

After this declaration v. Kuehlmann stated that the Central Delegations required an interval to consider their reply.

55 December 25. Count Czernin, who presided, declared in the name of the Delegates of the Quadruple Alliance that

> the main lines of the Russian proposals form a discussable basis for . . . an immediate general peace without forcible acquisitions of territory and without war indemnities. . . . The statesmen of the Allied [Central] Governments, in their programs, have repeatedly emphasized that the Allies [Central] would not prolong the war a day in order to make conquests. . . . They solemnly declare their determination to sign without delay a peace that will end this war on the foregoing basis without exception and with the same just conditions for all belligerent powers.

Czernin expressly pointed out, however, that this acceptance of the Russian terms was to be binding upon the Central Powers only on condition that

> all the powers now participating in the war must, within a suitable period, without exception and without any reserve, bind themselves to the most precise adherence to the terms binding every other nation. . . . For, it would not do for the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance negotiating with Russia, one-sidedly to tie themselves to these conditions without a guarantee that Russia's Allies will recognize and carry out these conditions honestly and without reserve as regards the Quadruple Alliance as well.

Having made this prior condition, Czernin proceeded to reply to the six terms of the Russian proposal:

> 1. It is not the intention of the Allied [Central] Governments to appropriate forcibly the territories which are at present occupied. The question of the troops in occupied territories must be settled in the sense of the withdrawal of troops from specifically designated places. If no such agreement can be reached

beforehand there must be stipulations in the peace treaty regarding the evacuation of such places.

2. It is not the intention of the Allies [Central] to deprive of its political independence any of the nations which have lost it in the course of this war.

3. The question of the State allegiance of national groups which possess no State independence cannot, in the opinion of the Quadruple Alliance, be solved internationally, but is, if required, to be solved by every State independently with its peoples in a constitutional manner.

4. Likewise, in accordance with declarations of statesmen of the Quadruple Alliance, the protection of the right of minorities forms an essential and component part of the constitutional right of peoples to self-determination. The Allied (Central) Governments also grant validity to this principle everywhere, in so far as it is practically realizable.

5. The Allied [Central] Powers have frequently emphasized the possibility that both sides might renounce not only indemnification for war costs, but also indemnification for war damages. In these circumstances, every belligerent power would have only to make indemnification for expenditures for its nationals who have become prisoners of war, as well as for damage done in its own territory by illegal acts of force committed against civilian nationals belonging to the enemy. The Russian Government's proposal for the creation of a special fund for this purpose could be taken into consideration only if the other belligerent powers were to join in the peace negotiations within a suitable period.

6. Of the four Allied [Central] Powers Germany alone possesses colonies. The German Delegation, in complete accord with the Russian proposals regarding colonies, adds that the return of the German colonies taken by force during the war constitutes an essential part of the German demands from which Germany will never desist; just as the Russian demand for the evacuation of territory occupied by an adversary corresponds with Germany's intentions.

As to self-determination for the German colonies now proposed by the Russian Delegation, Czernin de-

> cleared that "the nature of the German colonial territories" makes that "at present impossible." Moreover, the natives have given "proof of their attachment and their resolve by all means to preserve allegiance to Germany, proof which, by its significance and weight, is far superior to any expression of popular will."

Finally, the principles to govern the economic relations between nations, as proposed by the Russian Delegation,

> are approved wholly by the Delegations of the Allied [Central] Powers, who always have denied any economic restrictions and who see in the re-establishment of regulated economic relations, which are in accord with the interests of all peoples concerned, one of the most important conditions for bringing about friendly relations between the powers now engaged in war.

Having heard the reply of the Central Delegations, the Russian Delegation, through Chairman Joffe,

> expresses its satisfaction that . . . Germany and her Allies so far from having plans of territorial annexation and conquest, do not aim at the destruction of the political independence of any people whatsoever. The abolition of annexation is the logical consequence of the general principle of the right of peoples to regulate their own destinies. This right is recognized in existing constitutions only in a minor degree, and consequently to speak of constitutional channels as the sure means to achieve this right is to nullify this principle. It must be said that the four Allied (Central) Powers, while they agree not to apply the right of the strongest in the territories occupied during the war, do nothing for small nationalities in their own territory. The war cannot come to an end without the restoration of independence to small nationalities. The Russian Delegation as heretofore insists on the rights of these nationalities being protected in the peace treaty. Historical prescription does not justify one people's subservience to another. The Russian Delegation further attaches importance to the indemnification from an international fund of private persons who have suffered from acts of war. The Russian Delegation sees no contradiction with its principles . . . in the annulment of the Entente regime insti-

tuted during the war in the German colonies, as showing that the peoples who have taken part in the war are entitled to express a will of their own. Any difficulties arising therefrom can be adjusted by Commissions to be officially appointed. Seeing that the declaration of Germany and her Allies admits the possibility of peace *pourparlers,* the Russian Delegation declares at the same time that, in spite of the differences already mentioned, the main points of the Allies' [Central] declaration are not aggressive and it enters into *pourparlers* for general peace between belligerents.

The Russian Delegation proposes the suspension of hostilities during a period of ten days, beginning at 10 P. M. on December 23, 1917, to 10 P. M. on January 4, 1918, so that the peoples, whose Governments have not joined in the *pourparlers,* may have the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the new principle of peace. After this period, the *pourparlers* will be resumed, even if other peoples do not take part in them.

The next plenary sitting of the Delegations for the discussion of the terms of a general peace between all belligerents was then fixed for Friday, January 9, 1918, at 9 A. M.—five days after the expiration of the period fixed for the suspension of hostilities and for communicating the "new principle of peace" to all the belligerents.

Before the adjournment of the Conference on December 25, Czernin asked the Russian Delegation to present its answer in writing, and he proposed an immediate start with negotiations on those special points which in any case would have to be settled between the Russian Government and the Governments of the Central Powers. The head of the Russian Delegation expressed his readiness immediately to enter upon the discussion of those specific points, which even in the event of general European peace negotiations, would have to form the subject of special discussions between Russia and the Quadruple Allies. Upon motion of von Kuehlmann, it was unanimously decided, with a view to avoiding all loss of time, and having regard to the importance of the task to be fulfilled, to begin these special negotiations on the next day, Wednesday morning, December 26.

December 26-28. The available record of these sessions is somewhat confused. It would appear that on Decem-

ber 26 the Russian Delegation presented a draft of two Articles of an agreement concerning the treatment of occupied territories as follows:

> I. In full accord with the public declarations of both contracting parties that they cherish no bellicose plans, and that they desire to conclude peace without forcible annexations, Russia will withdraw her troops from all parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Persia, occupied by her, while the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance will withdraw theirs from Poland, Lithuania, Courland and other regions of Russia.
>
> II. In accordance with the principles of the Russian Government, which has declared the right of all peoples living in Russia to self-determination, including even separation from Russia, the populations in these districts will be given an opportunity within the shortest possible period of deciding entirely and freely the question of their union with one or the other Empire, or of their formation into separate States. In this connection the presence of any troops, apart from the national or local militia in the territories which are voting, is not permissible. Until this question is decided the government of these regions will remain in the hands of representatives of the local population elected democratically. The date of evacuation and other circumstances and the commencement of the demobilization of the army is to be fixed by a special military commission.

57 We have not found a record of the discussion following this proposed draft. The German Delegation proposed as a substitute the first two Articles of a preliminary peace treaty. At the same time, they brought forward the draft of the remaining Articles of a complete preliminary peace treaty containing, in all, sixteen Articles:

> *Article I.* "Russia and Germany are to declare the state of war at an end. Both nations are resolved to live together in the future in peace and friendship. On the condition of complete reciprocity, *vis-à-vis* her allies, Germany would be ready as soon as peace is concluded with Russia and the demobilization of the Russian armies has been accomplished, to evacuate

her present positions in occupied Russian territory in so far as no different inferences result from Article II."

Article II. "The Russian Government having, in accordance with its principles, proclaimed for all peoples without exception living within the Russian Empire the right of self-determination, including complete separation, takes cognizance of the decisions expressing the will of the people demanding full State independence and separation from the Russian Empire, for Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and portions of Esthonia and Livonia. The Russian Government recognizes that in the present circumstances these manifestations must be regarded as the expression of the will of the people, and is ready to draw conclusions therefrom. As in those districts to which the foregoing stipulations apply, the question of evacuation is not such as is provided for in Article I, a special commission shall discuss and fix the time and other details in conformity and in accordance with the Russian idea of the necessary ratification—by a plebiscite on broad lines and without any military pressure whatever—of the already existing proclamations of separation."

Article III concerns treaties and agreements in force before the war.

Articles IV, V, VI and VII. No discrimination against the subjects, merchant ships or goods of either party; no economic war; no burdensome import duties; the exchange of goods to be organized through mixed commissions; new commercial treaty of navigation to replace treaty of 1894-1904; most favored nation rights in commerce and navigation for twenty years.

Article VIII. "Russia agrees that the administration of the mouth of the Danube be entrusted to a European Danube Commission, with a membership from the countries bordering upon the Danube and the Black Sea. Above Braila the administration is to be in the hands of the countries bordering upon the river."

Article IX. "Military laws limiting the private rights of Germans in Russia and of Russians in Germany are abolished."

Article X. "The contracting parties are not to demand the payment of war expenditures nor for dam-

ages suffered during the war, this provision including requisitions."

Article XI. "Each party is to pay for damage done within its own limits during the war by acts against international law with regard to the subjects of other parties, in particular their diplomatic and consular representatives, as affecting their life, health, or property. The amount is to be fixed by mixed commissions with neutral chairmen."

Article XII. "Prisoners of war who are invalids are to be immediately repatriated. The exchange of other prisoners is to be made as soon as possible, the dates to be fixed by a German-Russian commission."

Article XIII. "Civilian subjects interned or exiled are to be immediately released and sent home without cost to them."

Article XIV provides for the emigration to Germany of Russian subjects of German descent.

Article XV. The return by each party of merchant ships.

Article XVI. "Diplomatic and consular relations are to be resumed as soon as possible."

In the discussions of December 26, 27, 28, of which we have but a scant record, substantial agreement seems to have been arrived at on all points with the exception of the crucial Articles I and II, which form the basis of all the further negotiations. In relation to these two Articles, the Russian Delegation defined its position as follows:

Our standpoint is, that only such manifestation of will can be regarded as *de facto* the expression of the will of the people as results from a free vote taken in the districts in question with the complete absence of foreign troops. We therefore must insist upon a clearer and more precise formulation of this point. We, however, consent to a special commission being appointed to examine the technique of such a referendum and fix the definite date for evacuation. In view of the course which the negotiations have hitherto taken, it can be stated with satisfaction that as regards the settlement of the most important questions the views of the represented powers tally on many points,

while as regards others they approach each other, so that regarding the latter points also, the hope of arriving at an agreement is well founded.

58 On December 28 at the third and last sitting before adjournment to January 9, Popov, Bulgarian Minister of Justice, referred "to the significance of the peace negotiations as promising a basis for a new era in the development of international law." He then asked Joffe, leader of the Russian Delegation, to preside over the session. Hakki Pasha pointed out that the approaching practical solution of the different questions raised during three and a half years of war "was greatly due to the Russian Delegation, which had shown sincerity, justice and common sense, and proved to be good diplomats and statesmen." Joffe, in closing the sitting, "expressed the opinion that the negotiations had well begun and allowed the expectation of a speedy termination to a devastating war."

VI. THE INTERVAL TO PERMIT ALLIED PARTICIPATION

59 **December 27.** Trotzky informed the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets that he would officially ask the Entente Powers whether they intended to support the Russian or the German peace proposals, or whether they would propose some alternative terms. If the Entente Allies refused to join in the negotiations within ten days, Russia would be forced to conclude a separate peace.

60 **December 28.** M. Pichon, in his first speech as Foreign Minister, said in the French Chamber:

> Germany is trying to involve us in her Maximalist negotiations. After suffering as we have, we cannot accept peace based on the *status quo*. By agreement with our Allies, we are ready to discuss direct propositions regarding peace, but this is indirect.
>
> Russia may treat for a separate peace with our enemies or not. In either case the war will continue for us. An Ally has failed us. . . . But another Ally has come from the other end of the world. . . .
>
> The secret treaties published by the Bolsheviki had not compromised France. . . .
>
> All the Allies through their representatives made the same declaration at Petrograd, that on the day when a regularly constituted government founded on the national will existed in Russia, we would be ready to examine with it our war aims, and the conditions of a just and durable peace. The Allies' representatives are all unable to recognize a Government which concluded an armistice without consulting its Allies, opened negotiations for an immediate peace, summoning all belligerents to reply immediately whether they accepted these negotiations, and threatened to declare void all foreign financial obligations created by previous Governments. Trotzky declared he did not need to be recognized by capitalistic Governments and that he was addressing the people directly, proposing a democratic peace. . . .

> By the acts of the Bolsheviki, Russia is completely disorganized. . . . Amid the general disorganization, we ought to unite with them [the sane elements of Russia], whether they be Socialists, Liberals or Revolutionaries. . . . We are not intervening in the internal policy of Russia, but we are taking the necessary measures to safeguard the considerable interests in the country to which we have been attached by alliance for a quarter of a century. In conformity with the principles of the Maximalists, we are replying favorably to the populations which wish to maintain relations with us. We are not working for the break-up of Russia, but we wish to serve a policy which will regenerate Russia.

61 **December 29.** The Petrograd Telegraph Agency issued the following message to the "Peoples and Governments of Allied countries: The Peace *pourparlers* at Brest-Litovsk . . . have been interrupted for ten days until January 8 in order to give a last chance to the Allied countries to take part in the further *pourparlers* and thus so safeguard themselves from all consequences of a separate peace between Russia and enemy countries."

62 **January 1, 1918.** A U. S. Government wireless picked up "Russian peace terms, in which she is asking the Entente to join." A detailed account of the Russian peace terms is given. "The Russian Delegation makes known its determination to append their signatures to these conditions for peace, which they claim will end the war upon the foundation of the principles of just conditions for all peoples in like manner without exception."

63 **January 2.** The Central Executive Committee of Soviets met to consider the situation.

After Kamenev, one of the Brest-Litovsk Delegates, had reported on the peace *pourparlers*, representatives from all the fronts were summoned by telegraph to Petrograd. Without concealing the distressing situation on the fronts, they declared that the front would defend the Russian revolution, but that it demands bread and boots.

Trotzky, in the name of the Commissars, denounced Germany's "hypocritical peace proposal" and he declared that if Poles and Letts and other nationalities were not given

the right of self-determination, it would become urgently necessary courageously to defend the revolution.

After Trotzky's speech a joint Assembly was held of the Central Executive of the Soviets, the Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, the Petrograd Soviet, and the Congress of the whole Army, which had been appointed to consider the question of demobilization.

The Assembly passed the following resolution:

> This Assembly confirms the fact that the program proclaimed by the representatives of the Quadruple Alliance at Brest-Litovsk recognizes in principle the conclusion of peace without annexations or indemnities. This recognition established a basis for further *pourparlers* with a view to a general and democratic peace.
>
> However, already in this declaration, the representatives of the German Government refused to admit the free right of the oppressed nations and colonies, seized before the beginning of war in 1914, to dispose of their own destiny. Already this restriction, which was immediately reported by the Russian Delegation, signified that the dominant parties in Germany, compelled by the pressure of the popular movement to grant concessions to the principles of a democratic peace, nevertheless are trying to distort this idea in the sense of their old annexationist policy.
>
> The Austro-German Delegation, in setting out the practical conditions of peace in the East, alters still further the idea of a just democratic peace. This declaration is made in view of the fact that the German and Austrian Governments refuse to guarantee immediately and irrevocably the removal of their troops in the occupied countries of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and parts of Livonia and Esthonia. In fact, a free affirmation of their will by the populations of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and all other countries occupied by the troops of other States is impossible until the moment of the return of the native population to the places they have evacuated.
>
> The allegation of the German Delegation that the will of the people of these countries has already been manifested is devoid of all foundation. Under martial

law and under the yoke of the military censorship the peoples of the occupied countries could not express their will. The documents on which the German Government at best could base their allegation only prove a manifestation of the will of a few isolated and privileged groups, but in no way the will of the masses in these territories.

We now declare that the Russian Revolution remains faithful to the policy of internationalism. We defend the right of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland to dispose of their own destiny, really, freely. Never will we recognize the justice of imposing the will of a foreign nation on any other nation whatsoever.

This joint session insists that the peace *pourparlers* shall be communicated later to the neutral States, and instructs the Soviets and Commissars to take measures to realize this.

We say to the peoples of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey: "Under your pressure your Governments have been obliged to accept our motto of no annexations and no indemnities, but recently they have been trying to carry out their old policy of evasions. Remember that the conclusion of an immediate democratic peace will depend actually and above all on you. All the peoples of Europe look to you. Exhausted and bled by a war such as there has never been before, you will not permit the German and Austrian Imperialists to make war against revolutionary Russia for the subjection of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Livonia."

Chairman Joffe of the Russian Delegation, under instructions of the Central Executive, telegraphed on January 2 to General Hoffmann "that the Government of the Russian Republic considers it necessary to conduct the further negotiations regarding peace on neutral territory and proposes on its part to transfer the negotiations to Stockholm." Articles I and II of the German draft of a treaty were declared to be in direct conflict with the principle of the self-determination of nations insisted upon by the Russian Republic.

64 On the same day *Izvestia,* the official Soviet organ, denounced the Germans as "wolves in sheeps' clothing."

65 The same day also a pamphlet was circulated within the German lines declaring that the German peace conditions show their promises of a democratic peace to be "unconscionable lies." After describing the actions of the Germans in Poland and Lithuania in recruiting forced labor and shooting hunger strikers, the pamphlet continues: "The German Government only found support in Courland from the hated slave-owners, the German Barons, who have their prototypes in the Polish landowners." The pamphlet declares that Germany desires to bring the peoples on Russia's western frontier beyond the range of the Russian Revolution in order to subjugate them with German capital, impose an Austrian monarchy on Poland, and make Lithuania and Courland German duchies. It concludes: "On such a basis the Russian Workmen's Government can never enter negotiations."

66 On this day also the Ambassador of the United States at Petrograd, David R. Francis, issued to Colonel Raymond Robins of the Red Cross Mission, the following "Suggested Communication to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs":

> At the hour the Russian people shall require assistance from the United States to repel the action of Germany and her allies you may be assured that I will recommend to the American Government that it render them all aid and assistance within its power. If upon the termination of the present armistice Russia fails to conclude a democratic peace through the fault of the Central Powers, and is compelled to continue the war, I shall urge upon my Government the fullest assistance to Russia possible, including the shipment of supplies and munitions for the Russian armies, the extension of credits, the giving of such advice and technical assistance as may be welcome to the Russian people in the service of the common purpose to obtain through the defeat of the German autocracy the effective guarantee of a lasting and democratic peace.
>
> I am not authorized to speak for my Government on the question of recognition, but that is a question which will of necessity be decided by actual future events. I may add, however, that if the Russian armies now under command of the People's Commissars commence and seriously conduct hostilities

against the forces of Germany and her allies, I will recommend to my Government the formal recognition of the *de facto* Government of the People's Commissars. . . .

"The circumstances of the preparation, O. K.-ing and initialing of this document," Colonel Robins stated before the U. S. Senate Committee on March 10, 1919, were as follows:

For some days I had been working under the verbal instructions of the Ambassador of the United States, in conferences with Lenin and Trotzky and other officers of the Soviet Government, seeking to prevent the signing of a German peace at Brest-Litovsk. To provide against the possibility of error in statement and subsequent refutation of my authorization to represent the Ambassador in the manner indicated by his verbal instructions, this document was prepared by me and submitted to him as a correct statement of his verbal instructions to me and was O. K.'d by him.

Document, filed as "Robins Document No. 2," is an actual copy of an original in my possession, the notations on this document being in the handwriting of the American Ambassador, written therein in my presence in his private office in the American Embassy at Petrograd on the evening of the 2d of January, 1918.

The document is as follows:

(Note in lead pencil "To Colonel Robins: This is substance of cable I shall send to Department on being advised by you that peace negotiations are terminated and Soviet Government decided to prosecute war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.—D. R. F.")

'From sources which I regard as reliable I have received information to the effect that Bolshevist leaders fear complete failure of peace negotiations because of probable demands by Germany of impossible terms.

'Desire for peace is so fundamental and widespread that it is impossible to foretell the results of the abrupt termination of these negotiations, with only alternatives a disgraceful peace or continuance of war.

'Bolshevist leaders will welcome information as to what assistance may be expected from our Government if continuance of war is decided upon. Assurances of American support in such event may decidedly influence their decision.

'Under these circumstances and notwithstanding previous cables I have considered it my duty to instruct General Judson to informally communicate to the Bolshevist leaders the assurance that in case the present armistice is terminated and Russia continues the war against the Central Powers I will recommend to the American Government that it render all aid and assistance possible. I have also told Robins of Red Cross to continue his relations with Bolshevist Government, which are necessary for the present.

'Present situation is so uncertain and liable to sudden change that immediate action upon my own responsibility is necessary, otherwise the opportunity for all action may be lost.

'Nothing that I shall do will in any event give formal recognition to the Bolshevist Government until I have explicit instructions, but the necessity for informal intercourse in the present hour is so vital that I should be remiss if I failed to take the responsibility of action.'

This document was prepared by me and submitted to the Ambassador and O. K.'d by him, for the same reasons and purposes stated in the circumstances of Document 1.

67 In accordance with Petrograd despatches, this attitude of the Russians came as a great surprise to the Germans. On January 2, Kaiser Wilhelm received in joint audience Chancellor von Hertling, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, General von Ludendorff, Finance Minister von Roedern and Foreign Secretary von Kuehlmann. Furthermore, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrath, under the presidency of Count von Dancl, discussed the Russian situation at the Chancellor's palace. Von Hertling had a long talk also with Admiral von Tirpitz, former Minister of Marine; and Kaiser Karl of Austria-Hungary received in audience Professor Kucharzevski, the Polish Premier.

68 Von Hertling addressed the Main Committee of the Reichstag and stated that the German Government must return a negative reply to the Russian proposal to transfer the conference to Stockholm. Further, he declared, that von Kuehlmann, who had left again for Brest-Litovsk, had been instructed to inform the Russian Delegates that Articles I and II of the draft of a treaty as proposed by the Russians could not be accepted by Germany.

69 The Council of the People's Commissars at Petrograd tried to enter into fresh negotiations with the Ukrainian Rada, sending a formal document signed by Gubunov, Secretary, suggesting *pourparlers* at Smolensk or Vitebsk; but like the ultimatum of December 17 this was ignored.

70 A note was issued at Petrograd giving the text of von Kuehlmann's answer to the Russian Peace Delegation which had protested against the refusal of passports to German Independent Socialists for a visit to Russia. Von Kuehlmann said that "the discussion of unofficial questions could not assist in achieving a treaty of peace and a suspension of hostilities. The attitude of the German Government could not be interpreted as a lack of desire for universal peace, but as arising out of a desire on its part to avoid pitfalls which might arise on the way to peace."

71 **January 5.** Mr. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, in outlining before British Labor leaders "the character and purpose of our war aims and peace conditions," said as to Russia:

> I will not attempt to deal with the question of the Russian territories now in German occupation. The Russian policy since the Revolution has passed so rapidly through so many phases that it is difficult to speak without some suspension of judgment as to what the situation will be when the final terms of European peace come to be discussed. . . . The present rulers of Russia are now engaged without any reference to the countries whom Russia brought into the war, in separate negotiations with their common enemy. I am indulging in no reproaches; I am merely stating facts with a view to making it clear why Britain cannot be held accountable for decisions taken in her absence, and concerning which she has not been consulted or

her aid invoked. No one who knows Prussia and her designs upon Russia can for a moment doubt her ultimate intention. Whatever phrases she may use to delude Russia she does not mean to surrender one of the fair provinces or cities of Russia now occupied by her forces. Under one name or another—and the name hardly matters—these Russian provinces will henceforth be in reality part of the dominions of Prussia. They will be ruled by the Prussian sword in the interests of Prussian autocracy, and the rest of the people of Russia will be partly enticed by specious phrases and partly bullied by the threat of continued war against an impotent army into a condition of complete economic and ultimate political enslavement to Germany. We all deplore the prospect. The democracy of this country means to stand to the last by the democracy of France and Italy and all our other Allies. We shall be proud to fight to the end side by side by the new democracy of Russia, so will America and so will France and Italy. But if the present rulers of Russia take action which is independent of their Allies, we have no means of intervening to arrest the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country. Russia can be saved only by her own people.

72 The Delegations of the Quadruple Alliance circulated by wireless a "mutual decision," declaring that on December 25 they had outlined "certain guiding principles for the conclusion of an immediate general peace. In order, however, to avoid any one-sided commitment they expressly made the validity of these guiding principles an obligation upon all powers engaged in the war without exception. . . . The Russian Delegation then fixed the term of ten days within which other belligerents should . . . decide as to whether they would join in peace negotiations or not. The Delegations of the Allied [Central] Powers now place on record the fact that the ten days' term agreed upon lapsed on January 4, and that no declaration regarding the participation in these peace negotiations has so far been received from any of the other belligerents."

73 **January 6.** The French Government recognized the independence of the Finnish Republic.

74 Meanwhile at Petrograd and Odessa joint commissions were meeting to consider the cessation of naval warfare, conditions in the Black Sea, the future of the Dardanelles, the naval position in the White Sea and on the Murman Coast. The head of the German Naval Commission was Baron Kaiserling.

Another Russo-German Commission began its sessions at Petrograd on December 31 to consider the exchange of prisoners and the resumption of commercial relations. The head of the German Delegation was Count Mirbach, and the head of the Russian Delegation was Radek, who at the outset declared that "a successful start with our humanitarian work will be made infinitely more difficult" because of information that German Social Democrats and Independents had been jailed and because many Russian citizens—Poles and Letts among them—"have been deprived of their liberty by the German Government for conducting peace propaganda." Radek declared that "the situation in regard to peace conditions created by the Germans did not at present permit the discussion of economic relations except in so far as an improvement in the condition of prisoners of war was concerned." Accordingly but three committees were chosen to deal respectively with telegraphs, posts and railways. The Russian Delegation demanded the right to send any publications they desired to prisoners of war in Germany and to Socialists of the Central Powers. Considerable difference of opinion seems to have characterized most of the deliberations of the Commission.

VII. THE SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS—RUSSIA'S STAND FOR NO ANNEXATIONS AND FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

75 **January 7.** The Russian Delegation, headed now by Trotzky, reached an agreement at Brest-Litovsk with a Delegation of the Ukrainian Rada who had stated a few days before that "their Government is preparing to conduct their own international relations. They declare their wish for a speedy democratic peace and say they hope to be able to act together with the Bolshevik representatives at the peace negotiations."

76 **January 8.** A "preliminary discussion" took place between the Chairmen of the various Delegations, Trotzky, von Kuehlmann, Czernin and Talaat Pasha. Trotzky, speaking for more than an hour, declared that he had not come as the representative of a defeated nation. He was there to act as a true revolutionary.

> We shall contend for a free, independent Russia and for the future of the great masses of the workers. . . . The working democracies of the Central Powers . . . will not suffer Young Russia to be wiped off the face of the earth and enslaved by conquering imperialists.

He insisted upon a transfer of the negotiations to Stockholm. Questions of procedure were also discussed. After a half hour's pause for deliberation, the Germans declared their willingness to go on with the negotiations.

77 President Wilson addressed Congress and made the proceedings at Brest-Litovsk the occasion for outlining his own "program of the world's peace . . . the only possible program," based upon his fourteen points:

> Gentlemen of the Congress:
>
> Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible basis of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-

Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers, to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement. The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace, but also an equally definite program for the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was added. That program proposed no concessions at all, either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the population with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied—every province, every city, every point of vantage—as a permanent addition to their territories and their power. It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own peoples' thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective Parliaments or for the minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and

of the Balkan States, which have felt obliged to become their associates in this war? The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held with open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of the 9th of July last, the spirit and intention of the liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

But whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definite terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain. There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her

allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for the definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power apparently is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe. They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no

secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular Governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealings by the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program, and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. . . .

6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere

welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. . . .

78 **January 9.** The plenary session of the Delegations at Brest-Litovsk that had been adjourned from December 25 was opened by Talaat Pasha, who gave over the chairmanship to von Kuehlmann. The Ukrainian representatives also participated. Among the Russians were Trotzky, Mme. Bizenko, Joffe, Kamenev, Petrovsky and three counsellors.

Von Kuehlmann made an extended statement. He first gave a review of the negotiations from the original Russian offer of peace on November 22, 1917, up to the wireless declaration of the Central Powers on January 5 that no answer had been received from any of the Entente belligerents concerning participation in the peace negotiations. He added:

> Their non-participation in those conditions has the result, in keeping with the contents of the declaration and the expiration of the period fixed, that the document (of December 25) has become void.

As to the transfer of negotiations to Stockholm or some other neutral country he

> would like to express at once the determined and unalterable decision of the four Allied [Central] Powers that they are not in a position to continue in any other place the negotiations for a preliminary peace which have been commenced here. . . . They were, out of courtesy, quite willing to undertake the formal final negotiations and the signature of the preliminaries at a place to be agreed upon with the Russian Delegation and to enter upon a discussion regarding the selection of this place.

Moreover, in the interval between negotiations, much had happened, "to cause doubt as to the candid intentions of the Russian Government to arrive at the conclusion of a

rapid peace with the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance." He referred here to the Petrograd Telegraph Agency report—"invented in every particular"—of the reply of Chairman Joffe in the sitting of December 28. Nevertheless

> in so far as a conclusion may be drawn from the negotiations which preceded the interval in our labors, I do not think the difficulties of a material nature are so great as to justify the wrecking of our peace efforts and therewith presumably the recommencement of war in the East with its incalculable consequences.

Czernin then said that the reasons for the refusal to transfer negotiations at the present time were of a twofold nature. First, both parties have direct wires and

> a daily exchange of views takes place by you with Petrograd and Kiev and by us with our official centers. . . . Even more important is the second point. You, gentlemen, had sent us an invitation for general peace negotiations. We have accepted it and we have come to an agreement regarding the basis for a general peace. On this basis you have put to your Allies a ten days' ultimatum. Your Allies have not answered you, and today it is no longer a question of negotiations for bringing about a general peace, but rather of a separate peace between Russia and the Quadruple Alliance. The transfer of negotiations to a neutral country would give . . . the longed-for opportunity . . . to the Governments of France and England, before as well as behind the scenes, to do everything possible to prevent the realization of this separate peace. We refuse to give the Western Powers this opportunity. But we are prepared to undertake the official final negotiations and the signature of the peace treaty at a place yet to be determined. As regards the territorial part of the negotiations, in which no agreement has as yet been arrived at . . . all four Allies [Central] are completely agreed to conduct the negotiations to the end upon the basis explained by Dr. von Kuehlmann and myself and agreed upon with the Russians. If the Russian Delegation is not animated by the same intentions . . . responsibility for war will fall exclusively on the Russian Delegation.

Talaat Pasha for Turkey and Minister of Justice Popov for Bulgaria associated themselves with these remarks.

Thereupon General Hoffmann of the German Delegation made the following declaration:

> There are lying before me a number of wireless messages and appeals signed by the representatives of the Russian Government and by the Russian main army administration, which are partly abuse of German army institutions and partly appeals of a revolutionary character to our troops. These wireless messages and appeals without doubt transgress the spirit of the armistice concluded between the two armies. In the name of the German army administration I protest most emphatically against the form and contents of these wireless messages and appeals.

Field Marshal von Cziezericz, Colonel Ganchev and General Izzet Pasha joined in this protest in the name of the Austro-Hungarian, the Bulgarian and the Ottoman army administrations.

Upon motion of Trotzky the sitting was then adjourned until the next day.

79 Announcement was made in Paris of the appointment of General Tabouille, Chief of the French Military Mission to the Southwestern front, as Representative of France to the Ukrainian Republic. It was also reported that the French Government had made a loan to the Ukrainian Government, some reports placing the figure at 180,000,000 francs. The French mint was also reported to have printed a large quantity of Ukrainian paper money. General Vinnechenko, President of the Ukrainian Secretariat, in the course of a long report to the Rada, is said to have declared that France, the United States, Great Britain, Belgium and Roumania were interested greatly in the organization of the Ukrainian Republic. He added:

> As circumspect people they hesitate to recognize the Republic completely. But when they find it expedient they will extend us their hands which we will accept if we think it necessary. . . .
>
> One constantly hears that the regeneration of the Moscovite monarchy is impossible. Perhaps the Ukraine, therefore, will appear as an oasis of revolutionary achievement.

As an indication of the hopes placed upon the Ukrainians at this period in Allied countries, it may not be out of

place to refer to an editorial in the *New York Times* of January 4, headed, "The Ukrainians to the Rescue."

> The Ukrainians, not the Bolsheviki, have saved Russia for the time being from the calamity of a separate peace with Germany. . . . The intervention of the Ukrainians put a stop to the infamous proceedings and for the moment there is some hope that separate peace negotiations will not be resumed on the original Bolshevist basis. . . .

80 **January 10.** The sitting was begun by a statement from Trotzky. Answering von Kuehlmann, he declared that the report of the sitting of December 28 as published by the semi-official German Wolff Bureau was accurate and that the Russian Delegation was ignorant of any real or fictitious telegrams of the Petrograd Agency. Answering General Hoffmann's protest against Russian wireless appeals of a revolutionary character to the German troops, he stated that neither the conditions of the armistice nor the character of the peace negotiations limited freedom of press or speech.

He then reaffirmed Russia's refusal to accept the German view of self-determination for the people of occupied territories,

> by which the will of the people was in reality replaced by the will of a privileged group acting under the control of the authorities administering the occupied territories. . . . We confirm . . . our former resolution . . . to continue the peace negotiations regardless of the adhesion or otherwise of the Entente Governments therein. Taking cognisance of the declaration of the Quadruple [Central] Powers that the bases for a general peace as formulated on December 25 have become null and void—the Entente Powers not having adhered thereto in the course of the ten days' suspension of negotiations—we now declare for our part that without taking into account any delays whatever, we shall continue to defend the principles of a democratic peace as proclaimed by us.

As to the transfer of the Conference to a neutral country he explained that by this proposal they sought to place both sides in analogous positions.

> We share the view of the President of the German Delegation that the atmosphere in which the negotia-

tions are conducted is of the greatest importance. . . . For the Russian Delegation to stay in the fortress of Brest-Litovsk at the headquarters of the enemy armies under the control of the German authorities creates all the disadvantages of an artificial isolation in no way compensated for by the enjoyment of a direct telegraph wire. This isolation . . . is at the same time causing alarm and uneasiness to the public opinion of our country. . . . All these considerations acquired the more importance as, precisely during the recent sittings, there had arisen profound divergences of view on the subject of the political future of the Polish, Lithuanian, Lettish and other peoples. Therefore we consider it very undesirable to continue these labors in conditions which might justify the allegation that we are taking part in the settlement of the future of existing peoples isolated from all sources of information regarding the public opinion of the world and without any guarantee that our opinions and declarations reach the peoples of the Quadruple Alliance.

Replying to the fears of Count Czernin concerning possible intrigues of Entente agents in a neutral country, the Russian Delegation pointed out that the Russian revolutionary power had sufficiently shown its independence in regard to diplomatic intrigues tending to the oppression of the laboring masses.

We replied and we continue to reply by severe repression to all counter-revolutionary manœuvres and intrigues of the Allied diplomatic agents in Russia, seeking to render abortive the cause of peace. We do not believe that Allied diplomacy can operate on neutral territory with greater success than at Petrograd. The sincerity of our aspirations for peace is sufficiently proved by our attitude in regard to the right of free development for Finland, Armenia and the Ukraine. The opposing side has, therefore, only to show an analogous attitude to the regions occupied by it. We cannot pass over in silence the argument advanced yesterday by the Chancellor of the German Empire, namely, his statement with regard to the powerful position (*Machtstellung*) of Germany. The Russian Delegation cannot deny that its country, owing to the policy of the classes until recently in power, has been

weakened. But the position of a country in the world is determined not only by its present status, by its technical apparatus, but by its internal resources which, once recalled to life, manifest their power sooner or later. Our Government has placed at the head of its program the word "Peace," but it has engaged itself at the same time before its people to sign only a democratic and just peace.

The Russian Delegation then spoke of the sympathies of the Russian people for the working people of Germany and her Allies, and showed that years of war had not hardened the hearts of the Russian soldiers who, moved by the sentiment of fraternity, had stretched out their hands to the peoples on the other side of the trenches. The refusal of the Delegations of the Central Powers to transfer the Conference to a neutral country is only explicable by the desire of their Governments and their powerful annexationists for a peace, based not on principles tending to the reconciliation of all nations, but on the war map. But war maps disappear while peoples remain.

An ultimatum was delivered to us—*pourparlers* at Brest-Litovsk or no *pourparlers*. This ultimatum is a proof that the elements of the Quadruple Alliance which pursue a policy of annexation, regard as more favorable to that policy a rupture of *pourparlers* on technical grounds than a settlement of the political future of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and Armenia. A rupture of *pourparlers* on technical grounds would make it more difficult for the working masses of Germany and her Allies to understand the causes of the dispute, and would facilitate the efforts of the semi-official annexationist agitators who are seeking to make the German people believe that behind the open and frank policy of Russia is to be found a British or other stage manager. In view of these considerations, we think it necessary to declare that we accept the ultimatum handed to us. We remain, therefore, here at Brest-Litovsk, so that the slightest possibility of peace may not be left unexhausted. Notwithstanding the extraordinary attitude of the Delegates of the Quadruple Alliance, we think it our duty to the peoples and armies of all countries, to make a fresh effort to establish clearly and distinctly here at the Headquarters

of the Eastern front, whether immediate peace with the Quadruple Alliance is possible without violence to the Poles, Lithuanians, Letts, Esthonians, Armenians and other nationalities to whom the Russian Revolution, as far as it is concerned, assures the full right to free development without reservation, without restriction, without *arrière pensée.*

The Ukrainian delegate, Holubovich, then announced that the Ukrainian Republic, having resumed its international existence, which it lost 250 years ago, had decided to adopt an independent attitude towards the negotiations and that the General Secretariat had instructed him to hand the following note to the Powers represented at the Conference:

> The Ukrainian People's Republic brings the following to the knowledge of all belligerents and neutral States: The Central Rada on November 20 proclaimed a People's Republic, and by this act an international status was determined. Striving for the creation of a Confederation of all the Republics which have arisen in the territory of the former Russian Empire, the Ukrainian People's Republic, through its General Secretariat, proceeds to enter into independent relations, pending the formation of a Federal Government in Russia and until the relations of the Ukraine with the future Federation are established.

Von Kuehlmann, with the assent of the meeting, declared that the question of separate representation for the Ukraine would first be discussed at private conferences between the Delegations of Austria-Hungary and Germany on the one hand, and of Russia on the other, and that further consideration would be reserved for a plenary sitting of all the Delegations.

It was then agreed by the Delegates of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary to form a Committee to discuss political and territorial questions, as also a second Committee of experts for the preliminary discussion of economic and legal questions.

81 A meeting of the Committee on Political and Territorial Questions was forthwith held. The Ukrainian question was taken up. Holubovitch elaborated the Ukrainian peace policy, and presented a Note containing nine clauses:

> The General Secretariat declares in the name of the Ukrainian People's Republic as follows:

1. The whole of the democracy of the Ukrainian State strives for the termination of the war in the whole world, for peace between all nations at present at war, a general peace.
2. The peace to be concluded between all the Powers must be democratic, and must guarantee to every nationality or people, even the very smallest nation of any State, the complete, unlimited right of national self-determination.
3. In order to render possible a real expression of will on the part of the peoples, corresponding guarantees must be created.
4. Accordingly, annexation of any kind, that is to say, any forcible annexation or cession of any part of a country whatever without the agreement of its population, is inadmissible.
5. Equally inadmissible, from the standpoint of the interests of the working classes, is any war indemnity of any kind, no matter what form may be given to such indemnity.
6. Small nations and states which have suffered considerable damage or ravages owing to the war must be given material assistance in accordance with rules which will have to be worked out during the Peace Congresses.
7. The Ukrainian People's Republic, which at the present moment is holding the Ukrainian front on its territory, and which is appearing independently in international affairs, through its Government, charged with the protection of the Ukrainian national interests, must, like the other Powers, be enabled to participate in all peace negotiations, Conferences, and Congresses.
8. The power of the Council of the National Commissars does not extend over the whole of Russia, and does not apply to the Ukrainian People's Republic. Therefore the peace, which may eventually result from the negotiations with the Powers waging war against Russia, can only then be binding for Ukrainia when the conditions of such a peace are accepted and signed by the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic.
9. In the name of the whole of Russia only such a Government (and indeed exclusively a Federal Government) can conclude peace, which has been recognized by all

the Republics and organized States of Russia. If, however, it should not be possible to form such a Government in the near future, such a peace can only be concluded by the united representatives of these Republics and territories.

Strictly adhering to the principle of a democratic peace, the General Secretariat strives at the same time for the quickest possible realization of this general peace, and attaches the greatest importance to all attempts which may bring its realization nearer. The General Secretariat therefore considers it necessary to maintain representation at the Conference in Brest-Litovsk, hoping at the same time that the final solution of the problem of peace will be found at an International Congress, to the preparation of which the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic invites all belligerents.

Von Kuehlmann proposed that the Ukrainian Note be placed on the records of the Conference as "an important historical document." He added that the Allies [Central] welcomed the Ukrainian representatives, but reserved their attitude toward their proposals. He then asked the Chairman of the Russian Delegation whether his Delegation intended in the future to represent the affairs of all Russia.

Trotzky replied that his Delegation was in full accord with the fundamental recognition of the right of self-determination for every nation, even to complete severance, and he saw no obstacle to the participation of the Ukrainian Delegation in the negotiations acting as an independent body which had been recognized by the Russian Delegation.

82 A number of "peace riots" took place in Germany. On that day the Independent Socialist group in the Reichstag issued a manifesto of protest and appeal to the working class:

. . . We have reached a turning point in history. The war aims of the Government have been openly laid down at Brest-Litovsk. We were assured over and over again in the past that the German Government wanted only to protect the frontiers of the Empire and that it did not intend to make annexations. No thinking person can believe this assertion any longer.

Germany wants the annexation of Russian territory. . . . If Germany should have success in making a peace

of conquests against the Russian people, it would be a misfortune for Russia, the Poles, Lithuanians and Letts. But it would be an even greater misfortune for us ourselves. The result would be a postponement of general peace, new threats and a desire for revenge, increased armaments and intensified reaction in our land. This calamity must be prevented.

The manifesto then goes on to describe the almost insuperable difficulties in the way of those who desire to advocate a democratic peace. Peace meetings are suppressed, many persons are kept from speaking and many are thrown into prison, or placed under military control. Factories are being militarized, houses searched, and severe punishments meted out by administrative order on the part of the police and judiciary. On the other hand, the annexationist parties are given every right and privilege to advocate their *Machtpolitik*. One of these political parties is about to get up "storm-petitions" on behalf of their annexationist program.

> If the workers now neglect to emphasize their position, that will most likely be regarded as approval of this agitation. Or, as though the masses of the German people were not yet weary of this terrible war. Or, that they are ready to give their support to a continuation of this horrible struggle upon an even vaster scale. In reality the masses of the people think and feel quite differently. . . .
>
> Men and women of the working class! No time is to be lost. After all the horrors and sufferings of the past there is threatening a new and more horrible calamity for our people and all mankind. Only a peace without annexations and indemnities and upon the basis of the self-determination of peoples can save us. It is now time to lift your voices for such a peace. Now you must speak.

83 **January 11.** Commander-in-Chief Krylenko issued a recruiting appeal on behalf of the People's Revolutionary Guard. After declaring that peace is in danger he proceeds:

> The Russian Republic and its Soviets are surrounded on all sides by enemies. The American and French financiers are lending money to provide war material

for General Kaledin. The German bourgeoisie is quite prepared to use them as allies for the stifling of the Russian Revolution.

These are conditions which raise for the Russian peasants and workmen the whole question of all the conquests achieved by the Revolution and of a holy war against the Russian bourgeoisie and that of Germany, France and Great Britain. . . .

It may be that a holy war of the Revolution at the front as well as behind the lines stands before us as a terrible and unavoidable fate. . . . A People's Revolutionary Guard must be organized. . . .

Comrades, the people of Italy, Spain, France, Austria and Switzerland look to you with hope and await the call to battle against their bourgeoisie. The soldiers will not march against Revolutionary Russia. . . .

84 The French Minister for Foreign Affairs gave the decision of the Allies in relation to the invitation to participate in the negotiations:

> I telegraphed to our Allies and inquired whether they did not think it opportune to agree to make identical combined statements. They finally decided unanimously that it was preferable to keep to separate declarations, leaving to each country full latitude as to form, since there was no disagreement as to substance.

85 **January 11-12.** The Committee on Political and Territorial Questions held three long sittings at Brest. The attempt was made at these sittings to arrive at a text for Articles I and II of the proposed treaty of peace.

It was agreed that the first point of Article I should be a declaration that the state of war between the belligerents had been terminated.

Point 2 of the German draft of Article I reading: "Both nations are resolved to live together in future in peace and friendship," was objected to by Trotzky, who considered this to be a decorative phrase which does not describe the sense of the relations which, in the future, will exist between the Russian and the German peoples, and the peoples of Austria-Hungary. He hoped quite other things

would influence the relations between the peoples. After discussion, it was decided to return to this point later.

It was agreed that Point 3 of Article I should establish the principle of the evacuation by both parties of occupied territory on a basis of full reciprocity, so that the evacuation of the Russian territories by Germany and Austria-Hungary should be linked with the evacuation by Russia of the occupied regions of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia. At a further stage in the discussion Persia was stricken out in this context as not being a belligerent party. Trotzky proposed to insert at the end of Article I the following sentence: "Russia undertakes to remove as speedily as possible her troops from the occupied territory of neutral Persia." He added that he had no other ground for the proposed alteration than the desire to emphasize the crying wrong committed by the former Russian Government against a neutral country. Von Kuehlmann then said that he was all the more glad to hear this declaration, as the liveliest sympathies were entertained by Germany for the old Persian *Kultur* and for the Persian nation, and they wished for nothing more than that in the future the Persians, free from oppression, should be able to devote themselves to their national *Kultur*.

Point 4 of Article I was to deal with the date for the evacuation of the occupied districts. The Germans proposed that the evacuation take place after the conclusion of peace, when Russia would have demobilized. Otherwise, there was the danger that Russia, before demobilizing, might be able to carry out offensive operations owing to future changes in the governmental system and intentions. Trotzky then expressed a wish that the evacuation be carried out simultaneously with the demobilization of both parties. As to this, a further agreement could be reached. Von Kuehlmann pointed out that, according to the Russian proposal, the evacuation of the occupied districts would be prolonged until the conclusion of a general peace among all belligerents. The discussion on this point was here broken off.

The draft of the text of Article II of the proposed treaty of peace was then taken up. It was to contain provisions as to which parts of the occupied territories should be evacuated and as to the method by which the principle of self-determination should be applied.

Von Kuehlmann gave the German view in the following statement:

> In accordance with the definition of the word evacuation, it can only extend to those regions which are still parts of the State territory of that Power with which peace is concluded. It does not extend to such regions which, on the conclusion of peace, no longer form part of this State territory. It would, therefore, be a matter for investigation as to whether and what portions of the former Russia could, on the conclusion of peace, be regarded as still belonging to Russian territory. The Russian Government, in accordance with its principles, had proclaimed for all peoples without exception living in Russia the right of self-determination, even going as far as complete separation. We maintain that, in the exercise of this right of self-determination in part of the regions now occupied by us, the *de facto* plenipotentiary bodies representing the peoples in question have already exercised the right of self-determination in the sense of separation from Russia, so that in our view these regions can no longer be considered as belonging to the Russian empire as hitherto constituted.

The Russian view was presented by Trotzky in the following statement:

> We fully maintain our declaration that peoples inhabiting Russian territory have the right of self-determination without outside influence, even to the point of separation. We cannot, however, recognize the application of this principle otherwise than in regard to peoples themselves, and not in regard to certain privileged parts of them. We must reject the view of the President of the German Delegation—that the will of the occupied districts has been expressed by *de facto* plenipotentiary bodies—because these *de facto* plenipotentiary bodies could not appeal to the principles proclaimed by us.

Following on these statements of principle, a lengthy debate arose on the question as to what conditions and at what time a new State arises by the separation of its component parts from an existing State.

In summing up the views of the Central Empires, von Kuehlmann said:

> Our view is that State individuality emerges and is in a position to make legally binding declarations as to the bases of its existence, as soon as any representative body qualified to represent and to act as a mouthpiece announces, as the expression of the undoubted will of the overwhelming majority of the people in question, a decision to be independent and to exercise the right of self-determination. Our view appears to me to approach considerably nearer the character and fundamental correctness of the right of self-determination than the view laid down here by the representatives of the Russian Delegation. The latter have not yet told us how a body can arise or be created which, in a national entity not yet formed, is to organize a vote on a broad basis; yet it is this which, in the opinion of the Russian Chairman, is the prerequisite condition for the emergence of such a legal entity.

Von Kuehlmann referred to the examples of Finland and the Ukraine, which had constituted themselves in the sense of the principles enunciated by Germany and whose independence the Petrograd Government had recognized, although these new States had not arisen according to the principles now presented by the Russian Delegation.

Trotzky adhered to his own view, and commented upon the examples cited by the German Government:

> Finland is not occupied by foreign troops. The will of the Finnish people had expressed itself in a fashion and a manner which could and must be designated as democratic. Not the slightest objection could be raised on the Russian side to the express will of the Finnish people actually being put into effect. Regarding the Ukraine, the process of such democratic self-determination had not yet been carried through there. But as the Ukraine, on the other hand, was not occupied by foreign troops and the Russians were also of opinion that the evacuation of Ukrainian territory by Russian troops could not produce difficulties of any kind, especially as this was purely a technical and not a political question, the Russian Delegates saw no hindrance of any kind to the self-determination of the Ukrainian people leading to the recognition of the independent Ukrainian Republic.

The outcome of the statements of the two sides on this point was summed up by von Kuehlmann as follows:

> M. Trotzky proposes the establishment of representative bodies which should be entrusted with organizing and fixing the methods of procedure under which popular votes or popular manifestations, which were, for the time being, purely theoretically conceded by us, shall follow on a broader basis; while we adopt and must adopt the standpoint that, in the absence of other representative bodies, the existing bodies which have become historical, are the presumptive expression of the people's will, especially in the vital question of a nation's will to be a nation.

In the subsequent debate on the character and significance of the representative bodies operating in occupied territories, von Kuehlmann and Czernin said that their impression was that in the December negotiations the Russian Delegation was inclined to recognize the existing representative bodies in the occupied territories as *de facto* representative bodies.

Joffe, who had been the leader of the Russian Delegation in the December negotiations, replied that he had always accentuated the necessity of carrying out the popular vote with no occupying troops present, but he did not desire to deny having declared in conversation that in one or two parts of Russia the existing organs might play a certain part in establishing the necessary popular vote. Trotzky hereupon remarked that expressions of will by such existing Diets of course possessed great political importance, and he did not want to exclude from an expression of their will that part of the country's population represented in these Diets.

Von Kuehlmann then said it would seem from Trotzky's statement that the latter was ready to recognize the existing organs of popular representation in occupied territories as provisional organs, if these parts of the country were not militarily occupied, and that he would also attribute to them competency to carry out the referendum demanded by him.

Trotzky hereupon declared that the utterances of Diets, municipal bodies and similar organs might be regarded as expressions of will of a certain influential part of the pop-

ulation, but that such expressions only constituted a ground for the assumption that the people in question was not satisfied with its political position. The conclusion followed that a referendum must be taken, for which, however, the preliminary condition was the creation of a body which could guarantee a free vote of the population. Trotzky further asserted that there was a contradiction between the declaration of the Central Powers on December 25 and the formulation of Articles I and II on December 27. This was shown clearly in the comment of the German press.

Von Kuehlmann in reply said that both documents were emanations of the same spirit and policy as was announced by the Chancellor in his program speech (November 29) in the Reichstag. This speech in effect already contained the Allies' [Central] declaration of December 25, and thus also indicated that German policy intended to direct its relations towards Poland, Lithuania and Courland with due consideration for the people's right of self-determination. He contended further that those parts of Russia, striving for severance (according to declarations of the will of the institutions already existing), were even now justified in making agreements on all questions, including intended frontier rectifications.

Trotzky could not but see in this conception an undermining of the principle of self-determination. He asked why these organs of the peoples in question had not been invited to the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, if they ought to have the right of disposal even over portions of their territory. Such participation of representatives of these peoples in the negotiations was naturally not thought of, because these nations were regarded not as subjects but as objects of the negotiations.

Von Kuehlmann replied:

> The previous speaker has complained that we have here no representatives of the nations under discussion. If, by that, he wished to express the opinion that, in his view, these national entities have now been created and can in the exercise of the right of self-determination undertake foreign relations, I on my part am ready fully to recognize this admission of the Russian Delegation and discuss the idea whether and in what form it would be possible for representatives of the nations in question to take part in our negotiations.

Thereupon Trotzky, having regard to these extraordinarily important declarations of the representatives of the Central Powers, moved the adjournment to enable the Russian Delegation to consult their Government.

86 January 12. Upon the adjournment of the Committee on Political and Territorial Questions on Saturday, January 12, a plenary sitting of all the Delegations was held under the chairmanship of Count Czernin, who in the name of the Delegations of the four Central Powers made the following declaration:

> We recognize the Ukrainian Delegation as an independent Delegation of plenipotentiaries representing the independent Ukrainian Republic. The formal recognition of the Ukrainian Republic as an independent State by the four Allied [Central] Powers is reserved for the peace treaty.

Trotzky then said:

> Such conflicts as have occurred between the Russian Government and the General Sekretariat of the Ukraine had and have no connection with the question of the self-determination of the Ukrainian nation. They arose through the Ukrainian opposition to the policy of the Soviet and the Peoples' Commissars as regards the self-determination of the Ukraine, now actually expressed there in the form of the People's Republic. This can give no scope for a conflict of opinion between the two sister-Republics. Considering the fact that there are no troops of occupation in the Ukraine, that the political life there is carried on freely, that there are neither medieval organs there which desire to represent the country nor ministries which are appointed from above on the ground of power and position and which act within the limitations prescribed for them from above, considering that everywhere in the territory of the Ukraine freely elected Soviets are in existence, that in the election of all organs of self-government the principle of a general, equal, direct and secret suffrage is applied, there is and can be no doubt that the power of self-determination of the Ukraine, within the geographical limits and political forms corresponding to the will of the Ukrainian State, will find its consummation. In view of the foregoing, which is in accord with the dec-

laration made during the sitting of January 10, the Russian Delegation sees no hindrance of any sort to the independent participation of the Delegation of the General Sekretariat in the peace negotiations.

Holubovitch, the Ukrainian Secretary of State, accepted the statements of Czernin and Trotzky and announced that his Delegation would participate in the peace negotiations on that basis.

General Hoffmann, the German Military Delegate, then protested against the Russian wireless statements issued during the recess upon Trotzky's instructions, as transgressing the spirit of the armistice. Trotzky desired to know in what particular the spirit of the armistice had been transgressed by the communications, to which General Hoffmann replied:

> At the head of the armistice treaty stood the words "to bring about a lasting peace." Your Russian propaganda transgressed this intention because it did not strive after a lasting peace, but wished to carry revolution and civil war into the countries of the Central Powers.

Trotzky answered Hoffmann, pointing out that all the German newspapers were being freely admitted into Russia, even newspapers which were supporting the views of the extreme Russian reactionaries. Complete equality had been observed in this respect, and it had nothing to do with the armistice treaty. Hoffmann retorted that his protest was not directed against the Russian press, but against official Government statements and statements which bore the signature of Ensign Krylenko, Commander-in-Chief of the Bolshevist forces. Trotzky replied that the terms of the armistice treaty contained and could contain no restrictions on the expression of opinion on the part of citizens of the Russian Republic or their governing officials. Von Kuehlmann interrupted Trotzky, saying, "Non-interference in Russian affairs is the fixed principle of the German Government, which has the right to demand complete reciprocity in this respect." Answering von Kuehlmann, Trotzky replied: "On the contrary, the Russians will recognize it as a step forward if the Germans freely and frankly express their views regarding internal conditions in Russia in so far as they think this necessary."

87 Upon the adjournment of the plenary sitting of the Delegations, the meeting of the Committee of German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian representatives to discuss the regulation of Territorial and Political Questions was resumed on the same day.

Von Kuehlmann, after summarizing the result of the previous deliberations, remarked:

> We expressed the view that the peoples dwelling on the western frontier of the former Russian Empire had already expressed their will in a manner that was adequate and that was for us authoritative. On the suggestion of the Chairman of the Russian Delegation, we also declared it an idea quite open to discussion whether and under what conditions these new States might participate in the peace negotiations. We have not yet, however, been clearly informed by the Russian Delegation whether, to use an expression employed by the Russian Delegation, they can participate as subjects at the discussion, or whether, until further notice, they are to be regarded as objects of statesmanship. I should be grateful if the Russian Delegation would answer this question in a manner excluding all doubt.

Trotzky thereupon asked the delegates to hear Kamenev, who proposed for the Russian Delegation that to avoid all misunderstandings, both parties should put in writing their views as unfolded during the discussion. The Russian Delegation thereupon presented a written statement containing three main divisions, and in the third division the four chief issues of the negotiations were formulated. The Russian Delegation proposed that the joint replies to these four points "shall constitute in the treaty of peace the paragraphs that are to take the place of Article II of the German draft of December 28, 1917."

The document presented by Kamenev for the Russian Delegation reads:

> As during occupation, nowhere, either in Poland, Lithuania or Courland, could there be constituted, or could there exist any democratically elected organs which could lay claim with any right whatever to be considered as expressing the will of large circles of

the population as regards . . . any effort to attain complete State independence, the Russian Delegation declares:

A. From the fact that the occupied territories belong to the former Russian Empire, the Russian Government draws no conclusions which would impose any constitutional obligation on the population of these regions in relation to the Russian Government. The old frontiers of the former Russian Empire, frontiers formed by acts of violence and crimes against peoples, especially against the Polish people, have, together with Czarism, vanished. The new frontiers of the Fraternal League of the Peoples of the Russian Republic and of the peoples which desire to remain outside its borders, must be formed by free resolution of the peoples concerned.

B. The main task of the present negotiations for the Russian Government does not consist, therefore, in defending in any way whatever a further forcible retention of the territories mentioned within the borders of the Russian Empire, but in safeguarding real freedom of self-determination as to the internal State organization and the international position of such territories. The Russian Republic will feel itself secure against being dragged into any territorial disputes and conflicts, only when it is convinced that the line which separates it from its neighbors has been formed by the free will of the peoples themselves and not by violence from above, which could only suppress that will for a short time.

C. Our task thus understood presupposes a previous understanding on the part of Germany and Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other, of four main points:

1. The *extent of territory* over which any population will be called upon to exercise the right of self-determination.

The right to territory and self-determination belongs to nations and not, as provided by Article II of the German draft of December 28, to occupied parts thereof.

Accordingly, the Russian Government, on its own initiative, grants the right of self-determination simul-

taneously to those parts of nations both outside [and within] the occupied regions. Russia binds herself not to compel these territories, either directly or indirectly, to accept this or any other State organization, or to restrict their independence through tariffs or military conventions that might be concluded before the final constitution of these regions on the basis of their right to self-determination.

The Governments of Germany and of Austria-Hungary, on their part, categorically confirm the absence of any claims whatever either to the annexation of the territories of the former Russian Empire now occupied by the armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary or to so-called frontier rectifications at the cost of these regions. They further undertake not to compel these regions to accept this or that State form, or to restrict their independence by any tariff or military convention which might be concluded before the constitution of these regions on the basis of the political right to self-determination of the nations inhabiting them.

2. The general *political prerequisites* governing the solution of the question of the political destinies of the territories and nations concerned.

The solution of the question regarding the fate of regions determining their own lot must take place under conditions of full political freedom and without external pressure.

The voting must, therefore, take place after the withdrawal of foreign armies and the return of the fugitives and of the population removed since the beginning of the war.

The date for the withdrawal of the armies will be determined by a special commission in accordance with the situation as regards transport and food supplies.

After the termination of the world war the protection of law and order in regions undergoing the process of self-determination devolves on the national armies and local militia.

Fugitives and those removed by the occupying authorities since the beginning of the war will be given full freedom and the material possibility of returning.

3. The *transitional régime* that shall exist until the moment of the final political constitution of these territories.

From the moment of the signing of peace until the final political constitution of the territories named, their internal administration and the direction of their local affairs, finances, etc., pass into the hands of the temporary organ formed by agreement between political parties which have proved their vitality in the midst of their people before and during the war.

The main task of these temporary organs consists, simultaneously with the maintenance of the normal course of social and economic life, in the organization of a plebiscite.

4. The way in which the population of these territories will be required to make their will known.

The final solution of the question of the State position of the territories in question and the form of their State organization will follow by means of a *general referendum.*

After declaring that the joint replies to the above four points shall constitute Article II of the Treaty of Peace, the document concludes as follows:

> With a view to expediting the work of the Peace Conference, the Russian Delegation considers it extraordinarily important to receive from the German and Austro-Hungarian Delegations a complete and exact reply to all the questions which are raised in this declaration. As regards other questions, they might be so treated as to be answered in connection with the exact reply to these points.

The reply to the Russian proposals was made by General Hoffmann and von Kuehlmann. General Hoffmann said:

> I must first protest against the tone of these proposals. The Russian Delegation talks to us as if it stood victorious in our countries and could dictate conditions to us. I would like to point out that the facts are just the reverse and that the victorious German army stands in your territory. I would then like to state that the Russian Delegation demands for the occupied territories the application of the right of self-determination of peoples in a manner and to an extent which its Government does not apply to its own coun-

try. Its Government is founded purely on power, and indeed, on power which ruthlessly suppresses by force all who think otherwise. Every one with different views is regarded as a counter-revolutionary and bourgeois, and simply declared an outlaw.

I shall only substantiate my view by two examples. During the night of December 30 the first White Russian Congress at Minsk, which desired to put into force the right of the White Russian people to self-determination, was broken up by Maximalists with bayonets and machine guns. When the Ukrainians claimed their right of self-determination, the Petrograd Government sent an ultimatum and endeavored to carry through their will by force of arms. As far as I can make out from wireless messages here before me, civil war is still in progress. Thus do the Maximalists apply in practice the right of peoples to self-determination. The German Supreme Army Command must therefore decline to interfere in the occupied territories.

As far as we are concerned, the peoples of the occupied territories have already clearly and unmistakably expressed the wish for severance from Russia. Among the most important decisions of the population, I should like to point out the following: On September 21, 1917, the Courland Diet, which described itself expressly as representing the entire population of Courland, requested the protection of the German Empire. On December 11, 1917, the Lithuanian Diet, which is recognized by Lithuanians at home and abroad as the sole authorized representative of the Lithuanian people, proclaimed its desire for severance from all constitutional connections which had hitherto existed with other peoples. On December 27, the Municipal Council of Riga made a similar request of the German Empire. This request was supported by the Riga Chamber of Commerce, the great Guilds, representatives of the rural population, and seventy Riga societies. Finally, in December, 1917, representatives of the Orders of Knighthood, the rural, urban, and ecclesiastical communities on the Islands of Oesel, Dagö and Moon in various declarations severed themselves from their previous connections.

For technical administrative reasons, too, the Supreme German Army Command must refuse to evacuate Courland, Lithuania, Riga and the Islands of the Riga Gulf. None of these regions has administrative organs, legal or judicial organs, railways, telegraphs or posts. All is in German possession, under German management. They are also unable, within measureable time, owing to lack of the appropriate organs, to establish their own militia or soldiery.

After General Hoffmann had concluded, von Kuehlmann said:

I should like to point out that it is impossible for us to take up any attitude whatever regarding the written declaration just read by the Russian Delegation. I must reserve a further statement of our position on all points. But, speaking personally, I should like to say, that the *modus procedendi* proposed by the Russian Delegation, that the Delegations should each present declarations in writing, will neither be conducive to the acceleration of the negotiations nor, if the documents resemble those presented today, will it contribute in the least to placing in an especially rosy light the prospects for the negotiations which we are now conducting. Personally, I am of opinion that it would have been better to continue in the manner begun yesterday until the whole material had been dealt with and, after the conclusion of the oral discussion, lay down in writing the result of such discussion, if necessary. As, however, the Russian Delegation, by its proposal of today, thinks otherwise, I propose to adjourn for the purpose of consulting our Allies.

Trotzky then said:

Of course, it is not our object to put difficulties in the way of progress by raising technical points. If the other side maintains that the time has not come to present a written statement, then our proposals of today would come up for oral discussion and we would reserve the right to return, in the course of the further negotiations, to our declaration as such, or to single points thereof, without in any way desiring to force a similar treatment of the subject matter upon the other side.

Von Kuehlmann replied:

> I cannot accept that proposal. It would be highly undesirable to have written and worked out propositions on the one side with no corresponding formulation from the other side. I must, therefore, adhere to my opinion that before taking up any attitude on the new situation, a fresh consultation with our Allies is necessary.

The sitting was thereupon adjourned without a fixed date for the next meeting.

88 January 14. The Committee on Political and Territorial Questions held its fourth sitting January 14. Von Kuehlmann presented a written reply to the formulated proposals of the Russian Delegation. He expressed the view that if they really wished to reach a peaceful settlement, it would be advisable in future to talk matters over and then entrust their draft on paper to an editorial committee consisting of one representative from each side.

The text of the reply of the Central Powers was as follows:

> The proposals of the Russian Delegation . . . diverge to such a degree from the views of the Central Powers that in their present form they must be characterized as inacceptable. . . . They do not possess the character of an attitude of compromise for which the Central Powers have striven, but rather a one-sided Russian demand which precludes all consideration of the justice of the views of the opposing side. In spite of that, the Central Powers are prepared again to give a clearly formulated expression of their opinions. . . .
>
> One portion of the territories occupied by the Central Powers is dealt with in Article I of the German draft . . . and requires no further discussion.
>
> The machinery by which State-life should be granted was [thought of in Article II as] purely temporary and had four stages:
>
> (a) The period of time between the conclusion of peace with Russia and the termination of Russian demobilization.
>
> (b) The period of time between a Russian and a general peace.

(c) The period of time for the transition stage of the new peoples.

(d) The finally definitive stage which the new States require for the complete installation of their State organization.

It must be repeatedly pointed out that for the Central Powers, as distinct from the case of Russia, the conclusion of peace with Russia has no connection whatever with a general peace, and that the Central Powers are compelled to continue the war against other enemies. . . .

Of great importance for the question of the individuality of a State is the decision come to by the Supreme Court . . . in Washington in the year 1808 in which it was stated, "that the sovereign right of the United States of North America must be recognized as having fully and completely existed from the day of the announcement of its independence, that is to say, as from the 4th of July, 1776, quite independently of its recognition on the part of England in the Treaty of the year 1783." (Droit International Codifié, page 160.) . . .

It might be asked from what system of law the present Russian Government deduces its right and duty to assure real freedom of self-determination to these territories to the uttermost, that is to say, even, under certain circumstances, to a continuation of the war. If the fact that the occupied territories belonged to the former Russian Empire imposes no duty at all upon the population of these territories towards the Russian Republic, then it is not obvious, without further explanation, on what the Russian Republic intends to base its rights and duties as regards that population. If, however, one takes the stand, as the Russian Delegation has done, that the Russian Republic has such a right, then indeed, (1) the extent of the territory, (2) the political provisions for the exercise of the right of self-determination, (3) the transitional regime, and (4) the form of expression of the will of the people, are the four points on which an endeavor to reach an adjustment must be made.

1. *Extent of Occupied Territory*

The assertion that the right of self-determination is an attribute of nations as a whole and not of parts of nations is not our conception of the right of self-determination. Parts of nations can justly conclude independence and separation. It is by no means assumed, however, that the limits of occupation are to be taken as a standard for the fixing of the boundaries of such parts. Courland, Lithuania and Poland constitute, also, national units from an historical point of view. Germany and Austria-Hungary have no intention of incorporating the territories now occupied by them into their respective countries. They do not intend to compel the territories in dispute to accept this or that form of State, but they reserve for themselves and for the peoples of the occupied territories a free hand for the conclusion of treaties of every kind.

2. *Political Provisions for Self-Determination*

As to the Russian declarations in this respect, they pass over the fundamental difference which the constituted Delegations are repeatedly pointing out. The withdrawal of the armies is impossible as long as the world war lasts. However, in the event of military conditions permitting, the endeavor may be made to bring about a reduction of the occupying troops to such a number as is absolutely necessary for the maintenance of order and the technical requirements of the country. The setting up of a national gendarmerie may be striven for.

As regards the return to their homes of the refugees and those persons evacuated during the course of the war, a benevolent examination of the matter may take place from time to time. This question could, as it is not of outstanding political importance, be entrusted to a special commission.

3. *Transitional Régime*

The Russian proposal is not sufficiently clear in its details and necessitates further explanation. It is, however, admitted without further argument that, with the progressive approach of a general peace, the chosen

representatives of the people of the country will co-operate, to an ever increasing extent, in administrative tasks.

4. *Referendum*

The Allied [Central] Delegations are prepared to agree in principle that a people's vote on broad lines be sanctioned on the basis of citizenship. The setting up of a referendum appears to be impracticable. In the opinion of the Allied [Central] Delegations, it would suffice, if a vote on a wide basis were taken from an elected and supplemented representative body. It may also be pointed out that the setting up, within the former Russian Empire, of States recognized by the Government of the People's Commissars, such, for instance, as the Ukraine and Finland, was brought about, not in the way of a referendum, but by resolutions of a national assembly elected on a wide basis.

Inspired by the desire to endeavor to come to an understanding with the Russian Government, the Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary have made these far-reaching proposals, and at the same time add thereto that they represent the most extreme limits within which they still hope to come to a peaceful understanding. In developing these fundamental principles, they have been permeated, as in duty bound, by the intention of not allowing any weakening in their defensive capacity so long as the wretched war continues, and also by the intention, that certain peoples on territory adjacent to their own shall finally and independently be placed in a position to decide their own future without thereby falling into a state of extreme need, misery and desperation. An understanding between Russia and the Central Empires on these difficult questions, however, is only possible if Russia shows an earnest desire to reach an understanding, and if she will endeavor, instead of attempting to advance one-sided, dictatorial aims, to see the question from the point of view of the opposite side, and find a way such as can alone lead to a peaceful result. Only under the condition that such intentions are shown, can the Delegations of the Allied [Central] Powers still hope for a peaceful adjustment of the conflict.

Upon the conclusion of the reading of this reply, Trotzky took the floor. He declared that the reply of the Central Powers had removed the doubts which had arisen in the Russian Delegation by reason of the speech made by General Hoffmann at the previous sitting. It was now clear, from what Secretary of State von Kuehlmann had read, that all points of the negotiations rested exclusively on the political will of the German Government alone.

When General Hoffmann pointed out that the Russian Government based its position on power, and that it made use of force against all those whose opinions differed from its own, and that it stigmatized them as counter-revolutionaries and bourgeois, it must be noticed that the Russian Government *was* based upon power. Throughout the whole of history, no other kind of government had been known. So long as society consisted of struggling classes, the power of government would be based upon strength, and these governments would maintain their dominion by force. He must, however, protest categorically against the assertion that his own Government outlawed everyone who differed from it. That which the Governments of other countries objected to in the doings of the Russian Government, was the way in which it made use of its power and in which it did not allow itself to be deterred.

When the Roumanian Government had endeavored to make use of force on Russian territory against revolutionary soldiers and workmen, he and his friends proposed from Brest-Litovsk to the Petrograd Government that the Roumanian Ambassador and all his staff, as well as the Roumanian military mission, should be arrested. And the reply was received that such a course had already been taken.

As regards the two instances which General Hoffmann has adduced, they by no means represent our policy on national questions. We have had sent to us the result of investigations regarding the White Russian Congress. This Congress was composed of representatives of White Russian agrarians, and it had made an attempt to take possession of all those points of support which must be the property of the White Russian people, and if it met with resistance, such resistance orig-

inated with the soldiers, amongst whom were represented Great Russians, White Russians and Little Russians. I have already stated in my formal declaration that those conflicts which arose between ourselves and the Ukraine, and which, to my regret, are not yet completely overcome, have in no way restricted the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination; and they have not prevented us from recognizing the independence of the Ukrainian Republic.

Trotzky then spoke of the destiny of the occupied territories, and he said that the views uttered by the German Delegation could only tend to strengthen the views of the Russian Delegation concerning the very subordinate rôle played by legal philosophy in deciding the destiny of peoples. This applies equally to the legal philosophy of the American Supreme Court. Anyone who has carefully read the history of the decisions of that Court knows that it has frequently modified the interpretation of its legal philosophy according to the necessity, or otherwise, for the extension of United States territory. After declaring that the interest of the Russian Delegation in the destiny of the occupied territories was due to their interest in the principle of the right of self-determination for peoples, Trotzky closed with the observation that the Russian Delegation reserved to itself the right to make a more precise statement regarding the nature of the declarations which had been read out that day.

Von Kuehlmann then spoke as follows:

As regards the speech of General Hoffmann, may I, on behalf of myself and of General Hoffmann, reserve the right to return to this question? The political competence of the German Empire has been correctly characterized by the previous speaker with the precise knowledge of international conditions which he possesses. The Imperial Chancellor, the sole responsible Imperial Minister, has imparted instructions with regard to the whole field of foreign policy. Moreover, it goes without saying, by reason of the close relations in which I am bound to General Hoffmann, that between our respective conceptions no divergence exists. The fundamental difference between our conception and that of the Russian Delegation is, that contrary to it we wish to see arise in those regions, without

break or violent transition, an orderly State, and that we decline to act, out of pure excess of life, on the theory of creating a vacuum, so as to allow of the establishment of a State within this vacuum in no more clearly defined manner than has so far been put forward.

M. Trotzky's depreciatory estimate of the decision of the American Supreme Court surprises me. To me, the history of the founding of that great Republic and a decision of its Supreme Court is, however, not without importance for forming an opinion in the controversies pending between us. . . .

I now propose that in future we observe the method of procedure as proposed by the Russian Delegation, so that we may really enter upon a detailed discussion of the four points given in our reply. I hope that in a few days we shall have progressed so far and with a feeling of complete responsibility, as to be able to say whether the difficulties can be overcome, or whether the attempt made here must be abandoned.

Trotzky then declared that in his opinion they could now pass on to the discussion of the two documents which had been put forward. He must, however, once more emphasize his disagreement with the view of von Kuehlmann, that, in the event of the army of occupation withdrawing, it would leave a vacuum. The peoples who inhabited Poland, Lithuania and Courland would by no means find themselves in a difficult political situation if the army of occupation left them to their own devices. In so far as technical difficulties were concerned, such as not having their own railways, posts, etc., an agreement on such questions could always be arrived at, even without the control of an army of occupation. But Secretary of State von Kuehlmann had pointed out that besides technical grounds, questions of security, which had been brought forward, played a very important rôle in the regions referred to.

Von Kuehlmann then moved that the discussion of the four points proposed by the Russian Delegation should now commence in businesslike manner, and that these points should be taken in the order suggested by the Russian Delegation. After Trotzky had agreed to this proposal, the next sitting was fixed for the following day.

89 **January 15.** The fifth sitting of the Committee on Political and Territorial Relations was held on January 15.

It took up first the suggestions in the German document of January 14 concerning the period of time which was to elapse between the conclusion of peace with Russia and the final organization of those new States which were to be created by the exercise of the right of self-determination by the peoples of occupied territories. Trotzky's view was that there were not sufficient reasons for binding the fate of the regions in question with the course of the world war. He held that the fate of the occupied regions should be dependent upon the conclusion of peace on the Eastern front alone. Von Kuehlmann replied that it had already been a conciliatory act on the part of the Central Powers to propose Article I of the Austro-German draft of the peace treaty. In this Article they declared themselves ready "to evacuate their present positions in occupied Russian territory in so far as no different inferences result from Article II" as soon as the demobilization of the Russian armies had been accomplished and without regard to the continuance of the world war on other fronts. Further conciliation on this last point was not impossible should an agreement be reached on other points. As, however, there was a considerably greater possibility, or probability, of fighting again beginning on the Eastern front in the event of war continuing on the other fronts than there would be after the conclusion of a general peace, he must say that it was impossible to contemplate evacuation of the regions mentioned in Article II of the German draft (Poland, Lithuania, Courland and portions of Esthonia and Livonia), except in relation to the conclusion of a general peace on all fronts. So long as the war in general lasted, the Central Powers could not give any further safeguard than that provided in Article II of the German draft, which provides that "a special commission shall discuss and fix the time and other details in conformity and accordance with the Russian idea of the necessary ratification—by plebiscite on broad lines and without any military pressure whatever—of the already existing proclamations of separation."

To this statement, Trotzky replied:

> The replies to our questions appear to be essentially contradictory, and indicate the handing over to the

occupying Power of the full and unlimited right, based exclusively on physical force, to decide arbitrarily the destiny of the occupied territories, and to dispose of such and such bodies without taking into account the moment of their appearance, their social basis and what their real political weight may be.

If, however, the Governments of either side continue, at least in the peace *pourparlers*, to characterize these bodies as free representatives of the will of peoples which have already freely decided their own destiny, we consider it desirable in the highest degree to invite these bodies to collaborate with us. We are ready to accept the proposal, twice defeated by the other side, to invite here the representatives of such bodies. These representatives will come here as public criers of these peoples. We must then come to an understanding on whether these peoples are firm units or whether their representatives come here as private individuals. In the latter case, they have nothing to do at the *pourparlers*.

If these preliminary conditions are accepted by the President of the German Delegation, then I consent immediately to begin discussions with our own representatives on the question as to whether the Russian Delegation desires to admit representatives of these countries, and if so, in what form. We cannot decide or regard as decided a question which is for the moment the principal subject of our diversities of opinion. The will of the people must everywhere be expressed by the people, and not by economically privileged groups. It would be a complete abrogation of the principles which are the essence of our program if, directly or indirectly, we should seek a pretext to tell the masses in Poland and Lithuania and the Letts that we were ready to admit a representation of the upper and privileged classes of their country and their peoples.

The sitting was adjourned, and on its resumption von Kuehlmann said:

This morning we concluded our discussions regarding the period of time to elapse between the Russian demobilization and the final organization of the new States, and we must note with regret that despite the

entirely convincing reasons brought forward by us, there has been no inclination on the other side to accept our point of view in any way. I should like to postpone question (1) that of "the extent of territory over which any population will be called upon to exercise the right of self-determination." I think the question of territories will be the least disputed of all. Referring to question (2) the "general political prerequisites governing the solution of the question of the political destinies of the territories and nations concerned," in the nature of the case, this, too, in great part, is a military question. A certain number of armed and disciplined forces is necessary to maintain discipline and public order. Some organized military forces are required to keep the economic machinery of the country going. We will give a binding promise that these organized forces shall indulge in no political activity, and exercise no political pressure. We therefore maintain that the presence of these forces is in no way prejudicial to the freedom of the vote.

Trotzky reverted to the question of the evacuation of the occupied regions, and, being requested by von Kuehlmann to speak to the point, namely, the question under what conditions the vote should be held, declared that he must have complete clearness on the evacuation question.

Von Kuehlmann replied that he could give no guarantee that, within the period actually in question for the voting, military considerations would make a complete evacuation of the region possible. It was clear that the minimum program of the Central Powers had been drawn up with the most careful regard to military necessities.

Trotzky declared he could not answer these questions in this form, but must confine himself to stating that the presence of organized troops in these regions would, in the Russian view, very grievously prejudice the significance of the vote. The return of fugitives and the evacuated population was closely connected with the questions just discussed. In his view, a vote could be taken when a majority of these people had returned home. The formula used in the Austro-German document (of January 14) appeared to him too restrictive.

Von Kuehlmann admitted in principle that the fugitives would be justified in returning home, but it was the

task of the administrative authorities to decide whether, and if so, what exceptions should be made to this general rule. In order to facilitate a survey of the subject, he asked Trotzky to let them have the material in the Russian Government's possession bearing on it.

Trotzky expressed his readiness to do this, and the sitting thereupon closed.

90 The British Labor Party issued, the same day, an address to the Peoples of Russia and of Central Europe:

> We have reached a crisis in the war. The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk have been interrupted because the Germans have refused to admit the principle of self-determination of peoples and the doctrine of no annexations. In thus acting, the Central Powers are speaking clearly in the name of a militarist State.
>
> In this crisis the British people must speak, because the Russians can only succeed in their great and perilous task if supported by the people everywhere. The British people must proclaim to Russia and the Central Powers that its aim is identical with Russia's; that we, too, see no solution for the evils of militarism except self-determination and no indemnities.
>
> In applying this Russian principle to our own case, we are conscious of the problems raised, but we do not shrink therefrom. The British people accepts the principle of no annexations for the British Empire. This applies in our case to the Middle East, Africa and India. . . .
>
> We adjure the peoples of Central Europe to declare themselves or make their Governments speak for them in answer to Russia and ourselves. We call on them to renounce annexations in Europe with the same good faith in which we are renouncing them in Asia. We call on them to give the same self-determination to the French, Alsatian, Italian, Polish and Danish members of their States as Russia has given to Finland, Courland, Lithuania and Russian Poland.
>
> The family interests of dynasties or the desire of the German, Austrian, and Magyar governing classes to dominate other classes and nationalities must no more be suffered to prevent self-determination in Central

Europe, and thereby imperil it in Europe as a whole, than the interests of British imperialism or British capitalism must be suffered to do so elsewhere.

Peoples of Central Europe, this catastrophe of the human race, this fatal schism in the civilized world, can only be ended by the defeat of militarism on both sides, and by the victory on both sides of moral and intellectual fair dealing. If the world is to be saved, it must be saved by good faith and reciprocity on the part of all. Do not fail us now. Do not let your Governments drive the British people, as they are driving the Russian people, into the terrible choice between continuing the war and abandoning the only principles that can save the world.

If this choice is forced upon us, we shall choose as Russia chose. We shall continue, but the responsibility will be yours.

91 **January 16.** The following morning the Delegations of the four Allied [Central] Powers assembled for private discussion. Von Kuehlmann reviewed at length the negotiations with the Russian representatives during the past few days for the adjustment of political and territorial questions. The leaders of the Allied [Central] Delegations expressed their thanks and approval to von Kuehlmann.

92 In the afternoon, at the residence of Count Czernin, a private meeting of the Central Delegation with the Ukrainian Delegation took place. The discussion, lasting an hour and a half, led to the settlement in principle of questions concerning the future political relations between the Central Powers and the Ukraine. The resumption of these private discussions was arranged for the next day, January 17, when economic questions were to be considered. After the anticipated early conclusion of this private preparatory exchange of ideas, discussions of greater detail were to be initiated.

93 **January 17.** The confidential discussions between the German and Austro-Hungarian Delegations and the Ukrainian Delegation were resumed.

Czernin called special attention to the general principle, valid for the Brest negotiations and recognized by the

Ukrainian Delegation, that the intervention of one party in the internal affairs of the other party was quite out of the question. On the other hand, both parties agreed that peace was to be assured through the discussion of the various political and cultural questions interesting both parties. In this regard Count Czernin, by way of example, referred to the necessity of assuring the destiny of that Polish minority which may belong to the future Ukrainian State. His statements were greeted with approval by the Ukrainian Delegation, which was prepared to enter upon further negotiations upon this basis.

During the subsequent discussions concerning economic relations it appeared that no differences existed in the fundamental conceptions of both parties such as might prevent an agreement. The discussions even extended to concrete questions, such as the exchange of commodities. Further discussion on these questions was entrusted to a special commission which was to complete its labors with the greatest possible speed.

94 January 18. The sittings of the Committee on Political and Territorial Relations were resumed.

Von Kuehlmann referred to the question of the return of fugitives and the evacuated population of the occupied territories. He declared that the Central Powers were agreed in principle, and that the practical carrying out of this repatriation should be referred to that commission which was considering the exchange of civilian prisoners. Answering the question if it would be possible for the Russian Government to give such emigrants certificates showing that before their evacuation they had lived in the regions in question, Trotzky declared that these refugees had been grouped in Russia in accordance with their former places of residence, and that it would doubtless be possible to give them proper certificates.

The Committee then took up question (4), that of the method of voting on the future State organizations in the occupied territories.

The German Delegation pointed out that the Russian proposal for a referendum was not justified by the political development of the population of these regions, and that it would be more proper to enlarge the existing representative

bodies through elections upon a broad basis in order that through this enlargement they might actually become the representatives of the entire population.

In answer to this, Trotzky remarked that the Russian Delegation did not share the opinions just expressed concerning the intelligence and education of the populations in question, and that they persisted in their proposal that the future State organization of these territories be decided by referendum.

In his reply, von Kuehlmann pointed to the endeavor of the Central Powers to accord to the broad masses of the population of these regions an ever increasing political influence. What must under all circumstances be conceded was the maintenance of order during the period of transition. What must be hindered is the spread of the revolution to these regions, which were already sufficiently devastated by the war.

The further discussion of this question was postponed.

Point No. 1 of the Russian Document of January 12 concerning the extent of territory over which any population will be called upon to exercise the right of self-determination was then taken up again. Upon the invitation of the chairman, General Hoffmann spread out a map and drew with his finger a line from the shore of the Gulf of Finland east of Moon Sound and then on to Valk, Dvinsk and Brest-Litovsk. When the Russians referred to the occupied territories south of Brest-Litovsk, General Hoffmann replied, "We will speak about them to the Ukrainian Republic."

Thereupon Trotzky replied that, "the process of the self-determination of the Ukraine had not yet progressed so far that the question of determining the boundaries between us and the new Republic can be regarded as finally settled. I remarked at the time that this need create no difficulties in the discussions, since, according to our principles, the boundaries are to be determined by the will of the masses of the populations interested, and in every individual instance it would require an agreement between us and the Ukrainian Delegation. This applies in the fullest measure also to those occupied territories south of Brest-Litovsk." Answering Czernin's query as to whether the question of the occupied regions south of

Brest-Litovsk should be discussed with the Russian Government or, as the Ukrainian Delegation wished, only with the Ukraine, Trotzky replied that the right of the Ukrainian Delegation to consider this question in a one-sided and independent manner could not be recognized. Czernin declared that he would speak on the question further after the problem of competency between the Russian and the Ukrainian Delegations had been clarified.

Referring further to questions of territory, von Kuehlmann asked for a statement regarding the relations between the Caucasus and the Petrograd Government. Trotzky made the following statement: "The army of the Caucasus is completely under the command of officers who are unqualifiedly devoted to the Soviet of People's Commissars. That was confirmed about two weeks ago at the Congress of Delegates at the Caucasian front."

Von Kuehlmann asked further if the affairs of the Aland Islands were to be dealt with by the Soviet Government or if the Republic of Finland was now to deal with the international aspects of these affairs. Trotzky made the following statement: "The proclamation of the independence of the Finnish State has thus far brought about no changes in the question of the Aland Islands."

Trotzky reserved any expression of opinion on the merits of this question and, addressing the meeting, declared:

> The position of the Austro-Germans is now absolutely clear. Germany and Austria seek to cut off more than 150,000 square versts from the former Polish Kingdom of Lithuania, also the area populated by the Ukrainians and White Russians, and, further, they want to cut into the territory of the Letts and separate the islands populated by the Esthonians from the same peoples on the mainland. Within this territory Germany and Austria wish to retain their reign of military occupation, not only after the conclusion of peace with Russia, but after the conclusion of a general peace. At the same time the Central Powers not only refuse to give any explanation regarding the terms of evacuation, but also refuse to obligate themselves regarding the evacuation.
>
> The internal life of these provinces lies, therefore, for an indefinite period in the hands of these powers.

> Under such conditions any indefinite guarantees regarding an expression of will by the Poles, Letts and Lithuanians are only of an illusory character. Practically it means that the Governments of Austria and Germany take into their own hands the destiny of these nations.

Trotzky declared that he was glad now that the Central Powers were speaking frankly, stating that General Hoffmann's conditions proved that their real aims were built on a basis quite different from that of the principles recognized on December 25, and that real or lasting peace was only possible on the actual application of self-determination.

"It is clear," Trotzky declared, "that the decision could have been reached long ago regarding peace aims if the Central Powers had not stated their aims differently from those expressed by General Hoffmann."

Von Kuehlmann replied to Trotzky, declaring that General Hoffmann's aims were in principle the same as those advanced at Christmas. Throughout the negotiations, he said, the Germans had kept in view the ethnological boundaries, but also the actual boundaries of the old Russian Empire. The Central Powers intended to permit free self-determination, and he scoffed at the theory that the presence of troops would prevent this. Regarding evacuation, von Kuehlmann said that this must be taken up with the newly born self-determined Governments.

"If General Hoffmann expresses these terms more strongly," said von Kuehlmann, "it is because a soldier always uses stronger language than diplomats. But it must not be deduced from this that there is any dissention between us regarding the principles, which are a well thought-out whole."

At the close of the sitting, Trotzky explained that because of inner political reasons (the Russian Constituent Assembly had opened at Petrograd on that very day) he would be compelled to return to Petrograd for about a week. Moreover, the sittings of the Committee had led to a full discussion of all questions in detail. He therefore proposed that the deliberations of the Committee be adjourned until the 29th of January. With his departure, the leadership of the Russian Delegation would be turned

over to Joffe. The Delegations of the Central Powers consented to this request, declaring, however, that it would be much pleasanter if they could continue the negotiations without interruption, as the former recess had brought about many misunderstandings; and they expressed the hope that after Trotzky's return a complete agreement would be arrived at.

95 January 18-19. The Constituent Assembly which had been elected, according to the Soviet Government, "from the old election lists" and which was "the expression of the old regime, when authority belonged to the bourgeoisie," attempted to meet at Petrograd. The Soviet Government laid before the Constituent Assembly a draft of a fundamental law whose main provision was that "power must lie exclusively in the hands of the working classes and their representatives, the Soviets." The Constituent Assembly refused to adopt this document, and, as a consequence, on January 19, the Soviet Government issued a decree outlining its attitude toward the Constituent Assembly and closing with the words, "The Central Executive Committee therefore orders the Constituent Assembly dissolved."

VIII. THE SECOND INTERVAL

96 **January 19.** "Peace strikes" began to spread throughout Austria-Hungary, particularly in Vienna and Budapest. Newspapers stopped appearing and industry was brought to a standstill and lighting works interfered with. Deputations of workers were received by various ministers. It was made clear in every instance that the strikes were being carried on in order to secure Governmental declarations that the Brest negotiations would not be permitted to break down over territorial issues. The Austrian Prime Minister, von Seydler, informed the deputation calling upon him that

> it was his Majesty's wish to end the war at the earliest possible moment by an honorable peace. . . . If for the present, however, only a separate peace with Russia is practicable, the responsibility rests solely with the Entente Powers, which have rejected repeatedly our peace offers.

Premier Wekerle in the Hungarian Parliament declared that the Government adhered to the principle of peace without annexations and indemnities, and that this view was shared by every organ of the monarchy, above all by the King.

97 **January 20-21.** The first official sittings of the Russo-German Legal Commission were held. Articles for the Treaty of Peace on the following points were discussed and formulated:

1. The ending of belligerency.
2. The renewal of diplomatic and consular relations.
3. War damages.
4. The renewal of State treaties.

On the same days the Russo-German Economic Commission continued its discussions, referring to sub-commissions preliminary work for further deliberations.

98 **January 21.** Trotzky arrived at Petrograd. He said that the German terms preponderatingly favored annexations,

their object being to strangle Russia economically and politically. The Austrian Delegates had played no very active rôle in the negotiations, merely assenting to every German proposal.

99 Karakhan, Secretary of the Russian Delegation at Brest, announced that the Russian Delegation had made an official protest to the heads of the German and Austrian Delegations regarding the omission from the official German reports of the declaration of Trotzky at the last sitting of the Brest Conference, that after a fortnight's negotiations Germany and Austria were insisting upon terms contrary to the principles acknowledged on December 25 respecting peace without annexations and indemnities.

100 January 22. The Russian Government issued two wireless communications "TO ALL" with the object of showing that by von Kuehlmann's declaration that the Central Powers cannot remove their armies from the occupied regions until the conclusion of a general peace, the peoples of Germany and Austria-Hungary were being deceived.

One communication asserts that the annexationists have been sufficiently powerful to impose their will upon the evasive diplomats of the von Hertling-von Kuehlmann school, but that the Governments of the Central Powers did not dare divulge this to their own peoples. It continues:

> This object is monstrous, the annexation of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Riga, parts of Livonia, Moon Sound and the Islands, with the purpose of the complete economic and political subjugation of Russia, while the rôle of the Austrian representatives at Brest-Litovsk has been limited to humble approval. Austrian statesmen are appeasing their restless workmen by affirming that the Central Powers are striving for a democratic peace, but to have such a program and to talk at the same time of a democratic peace surpasses even the limits permitted to diplomacy.

The second wireless "TO ALL" emphasizes the absolute refusal to give any sort of guarantee for the evacuation of occupied territories.

> In such circumstances the words self-determination sound like a mockery of principles and of the peoples

concerned. . . . The revolution cannot live in an atmosphere of deceit and falsehood. The revolution may not at a given moment be in a position to repudiate the annexationists, but it will never humiliate itself so as to call black white and will not cover up brutal annexationist pretensions with the fig leaf of democracy. The significance of the Brest-Litovsk *pourparlers* is that they have stripped from German imperialism its false cloak temporarily borrowed from the democratic wardrobe, and exposed the cruel reality of the annexationism of owners and capitalists. There is nothing more to be demanded from the *pourparlers*.

101 **January 24.** Two addresses were delivered, both of them dealing with the Brest negotiations and with President Wilson's fourteen points. The one was delivered by the German Chancellor, von Hertling, before the Main Committee of the German Reichstag and the other by Count Czernin, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Austrian Parliamentary Delegation.

Some extracts from Hertling's address referring to the Brest negotiations follow:

> The negotiations are progressing slowly. They are exceedingly difficult. . . . Indeed many times there were reasons to doubt whether the Russian Delegation were in earnest with their peace negotiations, and all sorts of wireless messages, which are going around the world with remarkably strange contents, tended to strengthen this doubt. Nevertheless, I hold firmly to the hope that we shall come to a favorable conclusion in the near future with the Russian Delegation at Brest-Litovsk.
>
> Our negotiations with the Ukrainian representatives are in a more favorable position. Here too difficulties have yet to be overcome. . . . We hope shortly to reach conclusions with the Ukraine which will be in the interests of both parties and will be economically advantageous.

Referring to Points I and VI of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, Chancellor Hertling said:

> I. The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk are being conducted with full publicity. This proves that we are

quite ready to accept this proposal and declare publicity of negotiations to be a general political principle.

VI. Evacuation of Russian territory. Now that the Entente has refused within the period agreed upon by Russia and the Quadruple Alliance to join in the negotiations, I must in the name of the latter decline to allow any subsequent interference. We are dealing here with questions which concern only Russia and the four Allied [Central] Powers. I adhere to the hope that with recognition of self-determination for the peoples on the western frontier of the former Russian Empire, good relations will be established both with these peoples and with the rest of Russia, for whom we wish most earnestly a return of order and peace and of conditions guaranteeing the welfare of the country.

102 Over two-thirds of Foreign Minister Czernin's lengthy speech has to do with the proceedings at Brest-Litovsk. He describes in detail the difficulties of the negotiations. They are due in the first instance to the fact that the negotiations

> have taken place in full view. . . . Our task is to build a new world. . . . Various phases of all past peace negotiations which we know of have developed more or less behind closed doors and their results were told to the world only after the negotiations had been completed. . . . But when these various phases and these details are each day telegraphed to the world, it it quite easily understood that they . . . excite public opinion. We were completely aware of the disadvantages of this procedure. Still we immediately gave way to the desire of the Russian Government for publicity because we wished to show ourselves friendly and because we have nothing to hide. . . . But the other fact consequent upon this complete publicity of the negotiations is, that the great public, the country behind the front, and, above all, the leaders, must keep their nerves steady.

After declaring that "the basis upon which Austria-Hungary treats . . . is that of no contributions nor annexations. . . . I declare once more that I demand not a square meter nor a penny from Russia," he went on to describe

the two greatest difficulties which contain reasons why the negotiations are not progressing as rapidly as we all should like.

The first difficulty is that we are not treating with one Russian peace-maker, but with various newly-created Russian Governments which have not clearly defined among themselves their spheres of competency. . . . first, that part of Russia led by Petrograd, second, our own new neighboring State, great Ukrainia, third, Finland, and fourth, Caucasus. . . .

What interests us especially and chiefly is the newly-created great State which will be our neighbour in the future, Ukrainia. We have got very far in our negotiations with this Delegation. We have agreed on the above-mentioned basis of no annexations or compensations and have agreed what and how commercial relations with the newly-created Republic are to be re-established. But . . . I confess I do not know what the situation is to-day, for yesterday my representative at Brest-Litovsk received two telegrams to the effect that M. Joffe, the President of the Russian Delegation had sent to the Delegations of the Quadruple Alliance a circular Note declaring that the Government of The Republic of Workmen and Peasants of the Ukraine, which sits at Kharkov, in no case recognizes the Secretariat-General of the Kiev Rada as representing the entire Ukrainian people, because the Central Rada represents only the capitalist classes and cannot consequently speak in the name of the Ukrainian people. The Note also states that the Kharkov Rada does not recognize any agreements which might eventually be concluded by the Central Rada without its consent and announces that the Kharkov Rada is sending two Delegates of the Central Committee of all the Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers and Peasants in the Ukraine . . . (who) recognize the People's Commissars as the organ of all the Soviets of Russia and as having the right to speak in the name of the entire Russian Federation. . . . President Joffe adds in his communication that his Delegation is ready to co-operate to the fullest extent with the new Ukrainian Delegation. . . .

We want nothing at all of Poland. . . . Poland's people shall choose their own destiny, free and un-

influenced. I consider the form of the popular decision of this question as not especially important. . . . I should have liked to see the Polish Government take part in the negotiations, for, according to my opinion, Poland is an independent State. The St. Petersburg Government, however, thinks that the present Polish Government is not entitled to speak in the name of the country and it has failed to recognize it as a competent representative of the country. . . .

The second difficulty . . . is the difference of opinion between our German ally and the St. Petersburg Government in the interpretation of the right of the Russian nations to determine their own destinies, that is, in those territories occupied by German troops.

Count Czernin then explained the German and the Russian views as they had developed during the discussions at Brest, first as to the representative character of the existing legislative and communal bodies in the occupied provinces, and second, as to the conditions (with or without the presence of German troops) under which a plebiscite should take place. "In both questions," he declared, "we must find a compromise."

After discussing President Wilson's Fourteen Points and after declaring, "I desire peace with St. Petersburg also because it makes general peace nearer," he reverted in detail to the impending peace with the Ukraine—"the wheat peace."

The question is not one—I repeat it the tenth time—of imperialist or annexationist plans and intentions, but of assuring our population a finally deserved reward for steadily holding out and giving it those foodstuffs which it will gladly accept. . . .

If you want to spoil peace and refuse grain shipments, then it is logical to force my hand by speeches, resolutions, strikes and demonstrations. . . . If behind the front you arrange strikes . . . you are cutting your own flesh and all those who think that such means hasten peace are in awful error. . . .

. . . You must help me or you must bring about my fall.

103 **January 25.** Von Kuehlmann discussed the Brest-Litovsk negotiations before the German Reichstag. He defended

the correctness of General Hoffmann's attitude. He was certain that friendly relations would be established soon with Finland and he considered an early conclusion of peace with the Ukraine to be probable. "The greatest difficulties are in coming to a conclusion with the Petrograd Bolsheviks . . . who maintain themselves by brutal force and whose arguments are cannon and machine guns. The Bolsheviks preach beautifully, but they practice otherwise." Without denying the Trotzkian desire for peace, the Minister said he had come across more than one statement from the Maximalist side showing that "those gentlemen are indulging in another policy than that of concluding an open and honorable peace with the bourgeois Governments of the Central Powers which are hated like poison."

104 **January 25-27.** The Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets met at Petrograd to hear a report of the Brest negotiations and to determine upon the further policy of the Russian Delegation. Members of the Peasants' Assembly were also given seats.

Kamenev emphasized the new grouping in the world struggle which was ceasing to be a struggle of one imperialistic group against another, but in Europe, at any event, was a struggle of the general proletariat against the bourgeoisie.

> We welcome the rising of Austrian workmen and shall welcome their emancipation from Austro-German imperialism exactly as we shall welcome the escape of the Irish people from the imperialism of England.

He read a statement from Austrian Socialists who had at the beginning of the war supported their Government and who now realized that the Russians and Germans could not come to terms, not because they were Russians opposed to Germans, but because they were Social Democrats dealing with landowners and bourgeois.

Martov and other opponents of the Bolsheviki, while criticising details in the management of the negotiations, agreed that they had been of service in making the situation clear to democracy throughout the world. All were unanimous in refusing to accept the conditions now offered by Germany. There was less unanimity on what was to be

done, some delegates insisting upon the physical impossibility of fighting.

An exposition of the history, method, aims and results of the peace negotiations was given by Trotzky. He pointed out that the Allies had now had two and a half months in which to come in and that Kerensky's repeated efforts to move the Allies toward peace had proved fruitless. The object of the negotiations was to make the actual obstacles to peace clear. He touched on the weak point on the Russian side—the Delegation from the Ukrainian Rada. "We asked them like ourselves to hold no unpublished conversations with the enemy. They said they would consult Kiev before answering. That answer we have never received in spite of repeated requests." He read a telegram showing that Albert Thomas even to-day believed that the patriotic Rada was going to save Russia from making a separate peace, when as a matter of fact the Rada was concluding a separate peace itself. Then after mentioning three distinct tendencies in Germany he said that the main point on which the discussions hung was the refusal of Germany to name a date for the removal of troops. He sketched the line which the Germans intended to be the new frontiers and said it was so planned as to make further German aggression easy:

> The whole scheme of the German argument was based on the assumption that the Russian Government would understand but remain silent, and be grateful to the Germans for saving their faces by giving a mock democratic character to their peace. The bourgeois Governments can sign any kind of peace. The Government of the Soviets cannot. . . . Either we shall be destroyed or the power of the bourgeoisie throughout Europe will be destroyed. We have left the imperialistic war and we shall never return to it. . . . I cannot say that the Russian revolution is assured of victory over German imperialism. More than that, I declare that anyone who says that the Russian revolution will not under certain conditions be obliged to accept an unfortunate but not disgraceful peace is a demagogue and a charlatan. We cannot give you a pledge that we will not conclude separate peace. If we gave such a pledge we should make the Russian army dependent upon French and American gold.

We are strong because we are rousing the people's conscience to protest in all countries. The conversation between the Russian revolution and German imperialism is not finished yet. We shall still say our say there and we will not bend our banners.

With regard to the further negotiations, he asked to be allowed freedom of action. In any case he would not sign a non-democratic peace.

The Congress adopted a resolution approving the policy of the Brest Delegation, declaring against the German terms, but giving the Delegation a free hand.

105 **January 28.** "Peace, Bread and Liberty" strikes began in Berlin. At this time a Soviet was formed in Berlin, to which members of even the Majority Socialists adhered before the whole movement was suppressed by military force. The Berlin workmen formulated the following conditions which were to be fulfilled before the workers were to return to work:

1. Peace without annexations or indemnities, based on the right of the free action of peoples, as soon as possible.

2. Labour representatives from all countries shall participate in the peace negotiations.

3. A reorganisation of the food system so that all classes shall get the same.

4. The state of siege shall be immediately abolished, as well as the prohibition against meetings.

5. Newspapers and meetings shall be permitted free expression of opinion.

6. The military control of industry shall no longer exist.

7. All political prisoners shall be released.

8. The whole organisation of the German Empire shall be thoroughly democratised.

9. General, direct, secret suffrage for all over 20 years, men and women, shall be introduced into Prussia.

IX. THE SEPARATE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS— THE UKRAINE

106 **January 30.** The *pourparlers* at Brest-Litovsk were resumed under the presidency of the Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha. A plenary sitting was held.

The Russian Delegation consisted of the following: Trotzky, Joffe, Bizenko and Karelin as representatives of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' delegates. Two members of the Ukrainian People's Republic had been added—Medvediev, President of the Executive Committee at Kharkov, and General Shachray, Secretary of State for military affairs of the Kharkov Committee. The Russian Delegation included also the following experts: General Samoljo, Captains Lipski and Grinberget, Admiral Altvater, representing military Councils; Radek, expert in general and Polish affairs; Bobinski, Polish expert; Teriain, expert for Armenia; Stuczka and Mickiewicz, experts for Lettish and Lithuanian affairs respectively.

The Bavarian Government, by virtue of its treaty rights and after agreement with the German Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor, had appointed Count von Podewils-Duernitz as its representative in the negotiations.

The question of the competency of the Delegations from the Ukraine formed the subject of discussion at the meeting.

Trotzky gave the information that the Ukrainian Soviets were engaged throughout the Ukraine in a determined battle against the Kiev Rada. The Soviet was in possession of the whole Donetz coalfield, the entire mining region of Ekaterineslav, and the Governments of Kharkov and Poltava. The power of the Soviet was increasing while that of the Rada was declining. It was reported also that the Kiev Secretariat had resigned. What influence this would have upon the Delegation of M. Holubovich was not yet known. But it was clear that a peace concluded with the Delegation of the Kiev Rada could not be regarded as a peace concluded with the Ukraine Republic. Dissenting from Kuehlmann's representation to the Reichstag that the Russians had altered their view regarding

the competency of the Ukraine Delegation as soon as the latter would not play the rôle of auxiliary, he recalled his declaration at the first sitting that the process of developing the self-determination of the Ukraine was still going on. Now, when the Ukrainian Soviets were represented at the All-Russian Congress at Petrograd, which had established a federative basis for the Russian Republic, the inclusion of representatives of the Ukrainian Soviet in the Russian Delegation entirely corresponded to conditions obtaining in the Russian Republic. If the Delegation of M. Holubovich had as before the mandate of the Kiev Secretariat, no objection was raised to its further participation in the peace negotiations. In any case, however, only such an agreement made with the Ukraine could be recognized that secured the formal endorsement of the Government of the Federative Republic of Russia.

Levitsky of the Kiev Delegation declared that it had been agreed that until the return of the entire Delegation from Kiev the one or two members who remained behind at Brest would not act on political questions. The attitude of their Delegation was therefore reserved.

Von Kuehlmann, while undertaking to postpone the discussion until the arrival of the Kiev Delegation, complained of the absence of any hint that besides the Delegation headed by Holubovich other bodies existed, claiming to speak on behalf of the Ukraine. The Central Delegations would thoroughly examine this important question.

Trotzky replied that the question would be decided by the result of the struggle between the two organizations.

Czernin proposed, and Trotzky assented, that to avoid delay the Committee on Territorial and Political Questions should resume its work.

The plenary sitting was then closed by Talaat Pasha.

107 It was announced in Petrograd that Trotzky had addressed a letter to the Persian Minister in Petrograd declaring that the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 was directed against the liberty and independence of the Per-

sian people, and was null and void for all time. The Russian Government denounce all agreements preceding or following the said agreement which in any way restrict the rights of the Persian people to free and independent existence. The Government will do all in its power in the domain of international relations to bring about complete evacuation of Persia by Turkish and British troops.

108 A meeting was held of the Russo-Austro-Hungarian Committee on Political and Territorial Questions under the Chairmanship of Count Czernin, who pointed out that thus far the Committee had discussed the question of the regions occupied by German troops. He now proposed to attain certainty regarding the regions occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops. Before entering upon details he felt it necessary to observe that the Ukrainian Delegation held that they alone and independently were competent to discuss and decide this question.

Replying, Trotzky emphatically protested against the view of the Kiev Delegation that it could independently solve territorial questions. He pointed, in support of his view, to the participation as members of the Russian Delegation of representatives of the Kharkov Executive Committee. As to the facts themselves, he considered, on the strength of various reports, especially a telegram just received, that the participation of the Delegation of the Kiev Rada was more a question of the past than of the future.

Czernin in reply proposed that a plenary sitting be held as soon as possible to settle definitely the controversy between the Kiev and Petrograd Delegations. From his impressions at the first sittings, he did not understand that the frontiers of the Ukraine with respect to Poland, for instance, were to be the subject of special discussion with Petrograd. He asked the following question, "Does the President of the Russian Delegation intend to exclude the idea that the Ukraine can alone decide matters concerning the independent Ukrainian State, particularly with respect to its frontiers?"

Trotzky replied that the Ukraine was part of the Federative Republic of Russia and that therefore everything would have to be decided from the point of view of constituting such a Republic.

After a brief passage concerning the possibility of admitting to the negotiations the President of the existing Polish Ministry, M. Kucharczevski, the meeting was adjourned.

109 **February 1.** A plenary sitting of all the Delegations took place. The Delegation of the Kiev Rada was present. The Bulgarian Premier, Radoslavov, sat as leader of the Bulgarian Delegation.

Severjuk, who announced that he had assumed the leadership of the Kiev Delegation, referred to the Manifesto of the Ukrainian Central Rada on November 20, 1917, proclaiming the international position of the Ukrainian People's Republic, which at that time was recognized by the Council of People's Commissars as well as by the representatives of the four Allied [Central] Powers. Furthermore, inasmuch as a Federative Government of all Russian Republics had not materialized and could not be materialized, the Ukrainian Central Rada must let the formation of a Federative Government drop. In order to avoid fresh wrong interpretations from any side whatever, the Ukrainian Delegation proposed the formal recognition of the Ukrainian Republic as an entirely independent State.

Thereupon, at Trotzky's request, Medvediev, representing the Kharkov Ukrainian Executive Committee, said that the Kiev Rada had only spoken at Brest-Litovsk in the name of the Ukrainian People's Republic. The Ukrainian Soviets had not been represented. As regards occupied territories, the Ukrainian Executive Committee fully shared the Russian Delegation's standpoint, and declared that the Ukrainian people refused to recognize any agreements or treaties with the Kiev Rada.

Trotzky then stated that they had that day heard from the head of the Kiev Delegation an extraordinarily important change in the conception and principles of the Kiev Rada regarding the international legal position of the Ukraine. The Kiev Rada declined to join the Federative Russian Republic, and that very afternoon the Russian State had been recognized as a Federative Republic at the

Third Soviet Congress at Petrograd at which the Ukrainian people had been represented. Continuing, Trotzky said:

> Many quarters have overvalued the tendencies striving for secession in to-day's revolutionary Russia. In the border regions of the former Russian Empire the separatist idea is advocated by those very groups and classes which, under the old regime, were obstinate supporters of centralization. In this separatism no continuous historical tendency is perceptible. It forms merely a transient weapon of defense in the hands of those groups who feared the results for themselves of revolutionary power in Russia. The firmer the power of the Soviets is established throughout the country, the more did the propertied classes transfer their separatist tendencies to the border regions. If these classes were to get the upper hand in the present Russia they would again become the advocates of centralization. Representatives of the Central Powers could not here assume the rôle of arbiters in regard to the present situation in Russia and the Ukraine. . . . So long as the Delegation of the Kiev Rada retained its plenipotentiary powers, he did not protest against its independent participation in the negotiations. But now that the representatives of the Ukrainian Executive Committee had joined the Russian Delegation, he must repeat with redoubled emphasis that no agreements with the Kiev Rada could be recognized unless they were also recognized by the Russian Delegation.

Hereupon a member of the Kiev delegation, Lubynsky, entered upon a detailed defense of the Kiev Rada and a severe attack upon the Bolshevik Government. He laid down the principle that

> internal conflicts within the States are in no wise to be brought to the cognizance of opposing parties during official negotiations. But since the Ukrainian Rada has proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian Republic, and since that Republic has also been recognized by friendly and other powers, these questions have ceased to be internal questions for them, and their

mission now obliges them resolutely to protest against false assertions made by M. Trotzky during their absence.

The Bolsheviks' loud declarations about the complete liberty of the peoples of Russia are only coarse demagogic expedients. The Bolsheviks' Government, which broke up the Constituent Assembly and which is supported on the bayonets of the mercenaries of the Red Guard, will never resolve to apply in Russia itself the just principles of the right of self-determination. The Bolshevik Government only proclaimed the principle of self-determination in order to combat the principle in its practical application. . . .

The struggle of the Petrograd Government against the Government of the Ukrainian Republic and its manifest insincerity on the occasion of the recognition of our Delegation evoked suspicion on our part. . . . On the day we left for Kiev to get our final instructions a fresh Delegation arrived here via Petrograd and Dvinsk at the incitement and with the benevolent co-operation of the Bolsheviks, its object being to undermine our authority in the eyes of the laboring masses of Europe.

In order to establish the rights of this Delegation, we must go more closely into detail. The Ukrainian people, united by common ideals and aspirations, which incline to quiet and orderly forms of State life, zealously devoted itself from the first to the long expected possibility of State construction. As a result of this labor, which had been prepared for through long years of endeavor by Ukrainian politicians, and as the product of Ukrainian revolutionary creative power, the Ukrainian Rada came into being, composed of representatives of Ukrainian soldiers, peasants and workmen. The Ukrainian Rada, which chose as its first Government the General Secretariat last June, thereby formed the first Government in Russia which was solely composed of Socialists. The Ukrainian people thus created its own State, and the Petrograd Government has no cause for interference in its internal affairs.

Already under the Czar's regime soldiers of non-Ukrainian origin were sent by preference to the

Ukraine and adjoining fronts, and it has not been possible during the Revolution to free the Ukraine from these foreign elements. In some towns of the Ukraine these troops established their soldiers' Soviets which have no influence on the life of the surrounding districts, although frequently representatives of the local workers participate in these Soviets. Desiring to interfere in the internal life of the Ukrainians, the Petrograd Bolsheviks began to demand that the entire authority of government in the Ukraine should be transferred to these soldiers' Soviets without any regard to the demands of the Bolsheviks at the Peace Conference that foreign troops be removed from occupied regions. The Ukrainian Government could not comply with this demand.

A second ground for interference with the internal life of the Republic was furnished by the demand of the Petrograd Bolsheviks, that a new election of the Central Rada should be held. Apart from the fact that such a demand constitutes an open violation of the right of self-determination, it is also impracticable because the electors have the right to recall their representatives in the Rada and replace them. The elections for the Constituent Assembly for All Russia at the end of November led all over the Ukraine to the brilliant victory of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Over 75 per cent of the Ukrainian candidates were elected, and of the Bolsheviks less than 10 per cent. In the government of Kiev 20 of our 22 candidates were elected, in Podolia 18 out of 19, in Volhynia 9 out of 10, in Poltava 14 out of 17, etc. These are the masses on which the Ukrainian Central Rada rests and in whose name we come here to speak.

Finally the Petrograd Government, with the tacit consent of the Central Rada, convoked a Ukrainian Congress of peasants and soldiers for December 3 in Kiev. Over 2,000 delegates attended and, against the hopes of the conveners, began with a great ovation for the Kiev Central Rada and its President, Professor Gruzevski, and by an overwhelming majority expressed full confidence in the Central Rada. After this a small group of Bolsheviks about 80 strong fled to Kharkov and declared itself a new Government of the

Ukrainian Peoples' Republic. The Peoples' Commissars sent thither unorganized bands of Red Guards to plunder the population of Kharkov and to protect the Kharkov Government from the inhabitants. This Government can hardly be regarded as representing even the town of Kharkov.

Our future, our history, our descendants, and broad masses of working people on both sides of the front will decide which of us is Socialist and which counter-revolutionary, which creates and which destroys that which has been created.

Czernin then made the following statement:

In view of the altered attitude of the President of the Russian Delegation at the plenary sitting of January 30, according to which only such an agreement with the Ukraine could be recognized and put into force as was formally endorsed by the Government of a Federative Republic of Russia, the Delegations of the four Allied [Central] Powers make the following declaration respecting the standpoint of the Kiev Peoples' Ministerial Council just set forth:

"We have no reason to withdraw or restrict the recognition of the Ukrainian Delegation as an independent Delegation and as a plenipotentiary representative of the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic, which was accorded at the plenary sitting of January 12. On the contrary, we find ourselves disposed to recognize the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic as an independent, free and sovereign State which is in a position to make independent international agreements."

Trotzky briefly remarked that he had not altered the conception of the character of the Ukrainian State which he had hitherto held. He must point out that it would be difficult for the Central Powers to state the geographical frontiers of the Republic just recognized by them. At peace negotiations, however, the frontiers of a State were not a matter of no moment.

The sitting then closed.

In a Petrograd account of the sitting of February 1, Severjuk, leader of the Kiev Delegation, is quoted as follows:

By this act the Ukrainian international position is recognized by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'

Delegates as well as by the representatives of the four Allied [Central] States, and also by the French Republic and the British Government, which have appointed and sent diplomatic representatives to the Government of the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic.

110 A Finnish Deputation, issued on February 1 at Brest-Litovsk, a declaration denying that the Finnish Government had been overthrown and insisting that the revolutionaries had succeeded merely in assuming power temporarily, by forcible means, in a small section of Southern Finland. The Delegates contended that they represented the rightful Finnish Government and possessed authority to represent the country in the negotiations.

111 **February 3.** A meeting of the Committee on Political and Territorial Questions was held.

Von Kuehlmann opened the discussion by declaring that the standpoint of the Central Powers remained quite unchanged regarding the invitation or admission of the Western Border States to the negotiations.

Trotzky replied:

> We for our part recognize the independence of the Polish State to its full extent. But we cannot close our eyes to the fact that its independence is only make-believe so long as Poland is under the regime of occupation.
>
> Just because we recognize the absolute independence and autonomy of the Polish people and State, we cannot, without impugning the independence of the Polish State, regard as representatives of the Polish people those representatives who have been appointed by the will of the occupying authorities.

He added that he could only recognize a Deputation of a Polish State based on the broad masses. In not recognizing M. Kucharczevski's Government as a plenipotentiary Government of the Polish people, the Russian Delegation by no means meant that it did not recognize the independence of the State or of the people.

Von Kuehlmann said he did not know why the Chairman of the Russian Delegation to-day made an exception of Poland, inasmuch as the affairs of Poland, Lithuania and

Courland had hitherto been discussed together. He believed, however, that he could perceive a certain advance in the fact that Trotzky recognized the independence of the Polish State to its full extent. If the Chairman of the Russian Delegation would also recognize the independence of the other Western Border peoples of Russia, the negotiations would thereby make a considerable step forward.

Trotzky: "Has Germany recognized Finland?"

Von Kuehlmann: "Conditions there are still uncertain."

Trotzky continued:

> As to Finland, Russia will not interfere in the Finnish revolution. As to Poland, Russia recognizes the complete right of the Polish people to be free and independent. But the present State is occupied by foreign troops and the present Government can move only within given limits. Either the Polish State is a State: then it must have geographic boundaries. If it is a Kingdom, then it must have a King. But without either it is neither a State nor a Kingdom.

Czernin remarked:

> The Polish State is still developing. The Russian Republic is also without boundaries. The willingness of the Central Powers to deal with radical States is proved by the present negotiations. . . . I cannot admit that the question, whether the present Polish Government is entitled to represent the Polish State, should be submitted to the arbitration of a third Government.

Both Czernin and von Kuehlmann protested that they had not come to engage in an intellectual wrestling match. At the close the German Secretary of State explained that he was obliged by unavoidable duties to depart for a short time, but said that during his absence the Political and the Economic Committees could continue their negotiations.

112 The Supreme War Council of the Allies issued a statement at Versailles from which the following excerpts are taken:

> The Supreme War Council gave the most careful consideration to the recent utterances of the German

Chancellor and the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, but was unable to find in them any approximation to the moderate conditions laid down by the Allied Governments. This conviction was only deepened by the impression made by the contrast between the professed idealistic aims with which the Central Powers entered upon the present negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and their now openly disclosed plans of conquest and spoliation.

In the circumstances the Supreme War Council decided that the only immediate task before them lay in the prosecution, with the utmost vigor and in the closest and most effective co-operation of the military effort of the Allies until such time as the pressure of that effort shall have brought about in the enemy governments and peoples a change of temper which would justify the hope of the conclusion of peace on terms which would not involve the abandonment, in face of an aggressive and unrepentant militarism, of all the principles of freedom, justice and the respect for the law of nations which the Allies are resolved to vindicate. . . .

113 **February 4.** Von Kuehlmann and Czernin with their suite left for Berlin where they arrived on February 4. On that day Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Count von Wedel, German Ambassador in Vienna, also arrived in Berlin. The Bulgarian Premier Radoslavov and the Turkish Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha arrived in Berlin on February 5. All participated in important conferences with the German Emperor on the Russian and Ukrainian peace situation.

114 The leading article in the semi-official *North German Gazette* for February 4 contained the following statements:

> We have seen how the Maximalists, by long speeches about the right of self-determination, have tried to cause obstruction at Brest-Litovsk. The German people must reckon with the possibility that these tactics may be continued, and it will have to ask itself what value, if any, Germany should attach to the conclusion of peace with Northern Russia. . . . The Ukraine has not been internally deranged by social revolutions to the same extent as Northern Russia. The Central

Powers have it in their power either to satisfy to a certain extent the territorial aspirations of the Ukraine in regard to which they have already shown their sympathy, or to place obstacles in their way.

115 The German "peace, bread and liberty" strikes were finally suppressed—but not before a manifesto had been addressed to the "Soviets" in Berlin and Vienna by the Soviet of Petrograd through Zinoviev, its President.

Brothers: Across the barbed wire barriers of the trenches, through the triple barrier of the military censorship, the news has filtered through to us of your glorious fight against German and universal Imperialism. The workers and soldiers of Petrograd have welcomed the news with transports of indescribable enthusiasm. At the very time when the Austro-German landowners and bankers were making ready to strangle unhappy, martyred Poland, and the Hoffmanns, Kuehlmanns, and Hindenburgs were threatening the liberty and independence of Courland and Lithuania, you raised your voices in Vienna, Berlin, Hamburg, Kiel, Nüremburg, Leipzig, and many other cities.

Brothers and companions in arms, by your strikes and demonstrations and the creation of your Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, you have shown that the Austro-German working class will not allow the hangmen and spoilers to impose a peace of violation and annexations on the Socialist Republic of the Soviets. We have never had a moment of greater joy at the Soviet than to-day, when Comrades Liebknecht and Adler were unanimously elected as Honorary Presidents of the Soviet.

Brothers, throwing a retrospective glance back on the road which has been traversed, we say this to you: During the first months our Soviets floundered in a "social-patriotic" network, and it was only through the bitter and too costly experience of our "patriots" that the Soviets have freed themselves from a series of errors. Comrades, do not repeat this bitter experience.

At the present moment, too serious and too great a responsibility rests upon the German workers' movement. The bankruptcy of a system of society based on a demoralized patriotism which has been renounced

by the better portions of the proletariat of the world presents to your eyes an object-lesson of what the working class should avoid. Civil war in Russia is nearing its end in the complete victory of the social revolution.

In Finland, that revolution is making way towards a glorious end. The Soviets of Workers' Delegates have been born in Austria and Germany. The red spectre of communism is invading the whole of Europe, and the universal social revolution is here. Midnight has struck. We must sacrifice all for the victory of Socialism. Our Socialist generation has been allotted the great happiness of taking part in this decisive struggle.

The destined outcome of the peace *pourparlers* is being decided not at Brest-Litovsk but in the streets of Berlin and Vienna and other German and Austrian cities. It is being decided within the walls of the Council Chambers of the Soviets of Workers' Delegates in Berlin and Vienna. Brothers, we cordially believe that you will do all that is possible to insure that the peace *pourparlers* begun by the Russian Workmen's and Peasants' Government with the Government of Kuehlmann shall end in *pourparlers* between the Russian Workmen's and Peasants' Government with the German Government of Liebknecht. All that is best and heroic in the proletariat of the world is watching you.

Comrades, members of the Soviets of Workers' Delegates of Berlin and Vienna, your victory will signify the full and indisputable victory of Socialism, for two victorious revolutions in Russia and in Germany will be invincible. Long live the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates of Berlin and Vienna! Long live Communism!

By order of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Soviet of Petrograd.

(Signed) ZINOVIEV, President.

116 February 6. Germany sent an ultimatum to Roumania demanding peace within four days.

117 February 7. Von Kuehlmann and Czernin returned to Brest-Litovsk and another sitting of the Committee on

Political and Territorial Questions was held the following day.

Bodinski, the Russian Delegation's expert for Polish affairs, read a statement in Russian which his colleague Radek repeated in German. Both Delegates, who described themselves as the sole appointed representatives of the Polish people, demanded the immediate removal of the present Government organs in Poland, and criticized the independence of Poland as hitherto developed. They further declared that up to now revolutionary Russia alone had defended the true interests of Poland's freedom, and both appealed to the Poles fighting in the German and Austro-Hungarian armies.

Von Kuehlmann asked Trotzky whether this statement was to be regarded as an official communication by the Russian Delegation.

Trotzky replied that within the limits which the Russian Delegation had fixed at the beginning of the negotiations, these views were to be regarded as an official declaration, and that in so far as they exceeded those limits they were only to be considered as information.

Von Kuehlmann said that the statement appeared to be wholly addressed to the gallery, and that it was quite incomprehensible to him how Trotzky could have imagined that the negotiations could have been served by such provocative speeches. He emphatically refused to receive any declarations from the Russian Delegation which did not from the outset represent the official declarations of the entire Delegation. He feared the patience of the Allied [Central] Delegations would be put to a very hard test by occurrences such as the speeches just listened to, and a doubt must now arise, not on the part of the German press alone, whether the Russian Delegation really intended to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

118 **February 8.** The decree abolishing the Russian National Debt was published. Inasmuch as part of its purpose was said to have been the exertion of additional pressure upon the Allies to come to the aid of the Soviet Republic at Brest-Litovsk, a reproduction of the decree will not be out of place here:

1. All State loans concluded by the Governments of the Russian landlords and Russian bourgeoisie, enu-

merated in a special list, are hereby repudiated as from December 14, 1917. The December coupons of these loans are not paid.

2. In the same way are all the guarantees repudiated which the said Governments gave to loans of various concerns and bodies.

3. All foreign loans, without exception, are absolutely repudiated.

4. Short-term liabilities and Treasury bonds remain in force. Interest on them is not paid, but the bonds themselves have a currency along with credit notes.

5. Poorer citizens who hold State bonds of internal loans to an amount of not more than 10,000 roubles nominal receive in exchange certificates, made out in their names, of a new loan of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic to an amount not exceeding 10,000 roubles. The terms of the loan will be fixed later on.

6. Deposits at the State savings banks and interest on them remain intact. All debentures of the annulled loans which belong to the savings banks are replaced by a book debt on the part of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

7. Co-operative organizations, local government bodies, and other democratic bodies or institutions of common utility holding debentures of the repudiated loans are to be given certificates in accordance with rules to be drawn up by the Supreme Economic Council in conjunction with representatives of these bodies, which must prove that the debentures were acquired by them previous to the publication of the present decree. (Note.—The local organs of the Supreme Economic Council have to determine which of the local bodies can be regarded as democratic or of common utility.)

8. The general direction of the liquidation of the State loans is entrusted to the Supreme Economic Council.

9. The work in connection with the liquidation of the loans is entrusted to the State Bank, which shall immediately begin the registration of all the debentures of State loans and other interest-bearing papers

in the hands of various holders, which may or may not be subject to invalidation.

10. The Soviets, in agreement with the local economic councils, appoint committees to determine what citizens are to be regarded as poor. These committees have the right to annul all savings not acquired by personal labor, even if they do not exceed the sum of 5,000 roubles.

119 **February 8-9.** After the return of the Delegations of the Central Powers to Brest-Litovsk on February 6, the separate negotiations for a peace with the Ukraine were continued. An agreement on all points was established on February 8. Owing to technical difficulties connected with the framing of five treaty texts, it was not possible to hold the formal final sitting of the Central Delegations and the Ukrainian Delegation and affix signatures until the early morning hours of February 9. Von Kuehlmann, as President, opened the sitting shortly before two in the morning. He said:

> Gentlemen: None of you will be able to close his eyes to the historical significance of this hour at which representatives of the four Allied [Central] Powers are met in this hall with representatives of the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic to sign the first peace to be attained in this world war. That this peace is signed with a young State which has emerged from the storms of the great war gives special satisfaction to the representatives of the Allied [Central] Delegations. May this peace be the first of a series of blessed conclusions of peace, blessed both for the Allied [Central] Powers and for the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic, for the future of which we all cherish the best wishes.

The President of the Ukrainian Delegation replied:

> We state with joy that from this day peace begins between the Quadruple Alliance and the Ukraine. It is true that we came here in the hope that we should be able to achieve a general peace and make an end of the fratricidal war. The political position, however, is such that not all the powers are met together here to sign a general peace treaty. Inspired with the most ardent love of our people and recognizing that this long war has exhausted the cultural and national pow-

ers of our people, we must now direct all our strength to do our part to bring about a new era and a new birth. We are firmly persuaded that we conclude this peace in the interest of our great democratic masses, and that this peace will contribute to a general termination of the great war. We gladly state here that the long and hard labor performed at Brest-Litovsk has been crowned with success and that we have attained a democratic peace that is honorable for both parties.

From to-day the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic is born to a new life. It enters as an independent State into the circle of nations and ends the war on its front. It will see to it that all the powers that in it lie will rise to new life and flourish.

At one minute before two von Kuehlmann as the first signatory signed the copy of the peace treaty prepared for Germany and by 2:20 a. m. all the signatures were appended.

The full text of the treaty with the Ukraine, in German and with an English translation, has been published by the British Government. An official summary of its terms was issued by Germany immediately upon its conclusion. The following extracts from the official summary are given:

Article I.—The contracting parties "declare that the state of war between them is at an end. . . . They are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another."

Article II.—The borders between Austria-Hungary and the Ukraine are to be "those frontiers which existed before the outbreak of the present war." Tentative frontiers are fixed for "further north," which are to be determined "in detail by a mixed commission, according to ethnographical conditions and with a regard to the desires of the population."

Article III.—"The evacuation of occupied territories will begin immediately after the ratification of the present treaty. The manner of carrying out the evacuation and transfer of the territories will be determined by the plenipotentiaries of the interested parties."

Article IV.—Concerning the resumption of diplomatic and consular relations.

Article V.—The contracting parties renounce reimbursement of their war costs—that is to say, the state expenditure for carrying on the war as well as indemnification of damages—that is to say, those damages suffered by them and their subjects in the war as through military measures, including all requisitions made in the enemy's countries.

Article VI.—Concerning the exchange of prisoners of war.

Article VII.—"The contracting parties undertake mutually and without delay to enter into economic relations and organize an exchange for goods on the basis of the following prescriptions:"

(Then follow five lengthy sections outlining the manner in which commodities are to be exchanged between the Ukraine and Austria-Hungary and Germany.)

Article VIII.—Concerning the "restoration of public and private legal relations," interned civilians, amnesty, merchantmen in enemy hands—all of these subjects to be regulated in separate treaties.

Article IX.—"The agreements made in this peace treaty form an indivisible whole."

Article X.—The concluding part of the treaty provides: "The present peace treaty will be ratified. Ratified documents shall be exchanged as soon as possible. So far as there are no provisions to the contrary, the peace treaty shall come into force on ratification."

120 A letter purporting to have been written about this time from Brest-Litovsk by Trotzky to Lenin has had considerable currency, and, as far as known, its authenticity has not been disputed. From the developments at the final session on February 10 it would seem to give a true picture of Trotzky's attitude.

Dear Vladimir Ilyitch:

It is impossible to sign their peace. They already have agreed with fictitious Governments of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and others concerning territorial

concessions and military and customs treaties. In view of "self-determination," these provinces, according to German interpretation, are already independent States, and as independent States they already have concluded territorial and other agreements with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

To-day I put these questions squarely and received a reply leaving no room for misunderstandings. Everything is stenographed. To-morrow we shall present the same questions in writing. We cannot sign their peace. My plan is this:

We announce the termination of the war and demobilization without signing any peace. We declare we cannot participate in the looting war of the Allies nor can we sign a looting peace. Poland's, Lithuania's and Courland's fate we place upon the responsibility of the German working people.

The Germans will be unable to attack us after we declare the war ended. At any rate, it would be very difficult for Germany to attack us, because of her internal condition. The Scheidemannites adopted a formal resolution to break with the Government if it makes annexationist demands of the Russian revolution.

The Berliner Tageblatt and the Vossische Zeitung demand an understanding with Russia by all means. The Centrists favor an agreement. The internal strife is demoralizing the government. Bitter controversy is raging in the press over the struggle on the western front.

We declare we end the war but do not sign a peace. They will be unable to make an offensive against us. If they attack us, our position will be no worse than now, when they have the opportunity to proclaim and declare us agents of England and Wilson after his speech and to commence an attack.

We must have your decision. We can still drag on negotiations for one or two or three or four days. Afterward they must be broken off. I see no other solution than that proposed. I clasp your hand.

Yours,

TROTZKY.

Answer by direct wire: "I agree to your plan" or "I don't agree."

121 **February 9.** The final session of the Committee on Political and Territorial Questions was held under the chairmanship of von Kuehlmann.

Von Kuehlmann:

. . . We have reached the point where it is necessary to give an account of the negotiations. As we all know, these negotiations have been of a political character. . . . I regret to say that up to the present we have not succeeded in bringing together to any great extent the two points of view in spite of the debates. . . . Faithful to my principles during all the negotiations, I still hope that a free discussion of principles may bring us nearer to our goal. But I shall dispel all doubts, and I say that the circumstances at the moment are of such a character that we must reach a decision promptly. . . . In putting these questions again before you, I only wish to tell you that I desire to see them all connected up, the one with the other. The commissions have already discussed all the details. . . . So far as the economic questions are concerned, the preparatory work of the commissions has not at present sufficiently progressed; nevertheless I hope that in regard to these questions, during the short time which remains at our disposal, we shall reach some satisfactory agreement—satisfactory to both sides.

Czernin:

. . . I think that the past discussions have shown the different points of view qualifying the territorial changes which must take place. But they have not indicated that an agreement in these matters is impossible. Secretary of State von Kuehlmann on December 28 clearly stated what changes must take place. They concern Courland and Lithuania, parts of Livonia and Esthonia, and also Poland. Let us put aside the question as to how these proposed changes are to be characterized. Let us try and clear up the point as to whether these disputed questions would form an obstacle to the conclusion of peace.

Trotzky:

. . . The peace negotiations began with our declaration of December 22 and the reply of the Quadruple Alliance through its declaration of December 25.

These two statements formulated the object of the negotiations as being based on the principle of the self-determination of peoples. During a short interval—which could be measured by hours—it appeared that this principle, accepted by both sides, would serve as a means for the solution of the national and territorial questions arising out of the war. But after an exchange of views on December 27 it became clear that the appeal to this principle was of a character calculated only to complicate all other questions. The point of view of our side, as applied by the other side, was a direct negation of the very principle itself. Afterward, the discussions took on an entirely academic character, without any prospect of a practical settlement, because the opposite side was striving, with the aid of complicated logical manœuvres, to draw from the principle of self-determination what, in their opinion, was in accordance with the actual situation as disclosed by the military maps.

The question of the occupied territories, which was the principal theme of all the discussions, was reduced after a number of sessions to the question of the evacuation of the occupying troops. . . . The first formula of the other side, so far as we understood it—and we honestly tried to understand it—was as follows: Until the end of the war, so far as Germany and Austria-Hungary were concerned, there could be no question of the evacuation of occupied territory on any front, owing to military considerations. Our Delegation later understood that the opposite side had now the intention of evacuating these occupied regions on the conclusion of a general peace, when the above mentioned strategical considerations would have been put aside. This conclusion of ours, however, also appeared to be wrong. The German and Austro-Hungarian Delegations have refused categorically to make a declaration which would bind them to withdraw their troops from the occupied regions, with the exception of the small belt of territory which they proposed to return to Russia. The situation only then became clear. This clarity became, if possible, greater when General Hoffmann in the name of both Delegations proposed to us the frontier line which would in future separate Russia from its western

neighbors. These neighbors were actually to be Germany and Austria-Hungary, inasmuch as the separated regions were to be occupied by their troops for an indefinite period unrestricted by any treaty. . . .

The new frontier proposed by the other side is dictated by military and strategic considerations, and from this point of view must be judged not only the separation from Russia of Poland and Lithuania, but even the separation of the Lettish countries. If such had been the desire of the peoples of these regions, then no danger would arise for the safety of the Russian Republic. Friendly relations with these States, which had freely formed for themselves an independent existence, would follow as a natural consequence of their origin and their conditions. . . . But these new frontiers which the opposite side proposes appear to us in a very different light. Germany and Austria-Hungary, while maintaining their troops in the occupied regions are linking these regions to their States by railways and by other means, and for us the new frontier must thus be considered not as a frontier with Poland, Lithuania and Courland and so on, but as a frontier with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Both these are seeking military expansion, as is clearly shown by their attitude toward the occupied regions. . . . What are really the military conceptions of the other side when they ask for such a frontier? For the purpose of examining this new question from the point of view of the leading military institutions of the Republic, I shall ask for the views of our military advisers.

We have here to meet a new difficulty. We have heard nothing of that part of the new frontier which is to run to the south from Brest-Litovsk. The opposite side was of the opinion that this part of the frontier had to be established in discussion with the Delegation of the Kiev Rada. . . . We officially informed the other side that the Ukrainian Rada was deposed. Nevertheless the negotiations with a non-existent Government have been continued. We proposed to the Austro-Hungarian Delegation, in a private conversation, it is true, but formally nevertheless, that they should send their representatives to Ukrainia with the

object of seeing for themselves that the Ukrainian Rada no longer existed and that the negotiations with its Delegation could not have any practical value. We understood that so far as the Delegations of the Central Powers needed confirmation of facts they would postpone the signature of the Peace Treaty until the return of their representative from Ukrainia. We have been informed that the signature of the peace treaty could not be postponed any longer. While negotiating with the Government of the Federative Russian Republic, the Governments of the Central Empires, in spite of their former declaration, not only hurried to recognize the independence of the Ukrainian Republic on February 1, at the very moment when it declared itself to be a part of the Russian Federation, but are signing a treaty with a Government which, as we have categorically declared to the other side, does not exist any longer. Such conduct is creating doubts as to whether there is any sincerity of purpose on the side of the Central Powers for the establishment of peaceful relations with the Russian Federation. We are striving for peace now as in the beginning of the negotiations. . . . Only such a peace treaty will be binding for the Russian Federative Republic and its countries as will be signed by our Delegation. . . . We ask the opposite side to complete on our map the frontier line which was submitted to us by General Hoffmann.

Von Kuehlmann:

If I am not replying to the detailed explanation of the preceding speaker, it is as I have already stated to-day with the purpose of avoiding every controversy. Accordingly, I shall not reply to the historical review of our negotiations. They have become public; they can be studied and compared. . . .

I shall propose that the question of frontiers be first submitted to a military sub-commission. . . . This sub-commission could be formed at the present session and must prepare for our next session, to-morrow, a report concerning the results of its discussions. . . .

Our policy as regards the newly created States will always be directed toward the maintenance of friendly relations and non-intervention in their internal life, as soon as this war is satisfactorily ended.

That is all I have to say concerning the frontiers. . . .

Concerning the . . . Ukraine, the point of view of the Central Powers has been repeatedly stated here, and we are of the opinion that all further explanation is unnecessary. The Central Powers have concluded to-day a peace with the representatives of the Central Rada which they have recognized. The consequences for the Central Powers are obvious. . . . This is no hostile act against Russia. We have concluded with the Ukraine no Alliance, but only a Peace Treaty. Ukrainia has not become our Ally, but only a neutral State. If we could arrive at a peace with Russia, Russia would also become a neutral State. In such case our relations to Russia would be the same as they are now to the Ukraine. There will be a difference if we are unable to come to an agreement with the Government of the Peoples' Commissaries, because then . . . those regions, which submit themselves to the authority of the Council of People's Commissars, we shall have to consider as regions against which we are in a state of war. We are willing to avoid that by a conclusion of peace with Russia. If we had ignored the Rada, as M. Trotzky wished, that would have meant that we should have to intervene in the internal life of Russia. And we will not do it. . . . We are not arbiters in questions which concern only Russia herself. . . . We do not demand that the President of the Russian Delegation shall renounce his claim for the authority of the Soviet for the whole of former Russia. We shall avoid difficulties if we sign an eventual treaty concerning these regions which are under the authority of the Council of the Peoples' Commissars. How many regions such a treaty would concern we cannot tell at present. We realize that such a treaty would be concluded without knowing for which regions exactly it would be valid; but the situation which would be created would be more disagreeable for us than for the Government of the Russian Republic. Nevertheless we agreed to do it for the sake of peace.

Concerning the . . . fate of the occupied regions . . . I cannot give the categorical reply asked for by

the President of the Russian Delegation, but I gladly agree that a communication on this subject should be made to the sub-commission.

Czernin:

I agree completely with the preceding speaker . . . and I do not see any reasonable objection why a reply could not be given to this question afterward.

Trotzky:

. . . It seems to me that there can be no objection to the creation of a military technical sub-commission which will have to examine the question of frontiers. . . .

Von Kuehlmann:

. . . Our proposal has been known a long time. All the questions concerned have been discussed in detail, and I firmly believe that all arguments have already been used and that now we must bring them to a conclusion with a view to making a decision concerning our peace negotiations. I have already stated our proposal, which, in a certain degree, replaces Article II of the projected peace treaty. This formula is as follows:

Russia must agree to the following territorial changes which will enter into force after the ratification of the peace treaty: The regions between the frontiers of Germany and Austria-Hungary and the indicated line will not be in the future a dependency of Russia. As a result of their former adhesion to the Russian Empire no obligation will bind them to Russia. The further destiny of these regions will be settled in agreement with the peoples concerned, namely, on the basis of those agreements which have been concluded between them and Germany and Austria-Hungary.

In handing over this formula to the President of the Russian Delegation, I state that an essential part of our proposal is included in Article I [of the draft of the projected treaty] which we have already sufficiently discussed. . . .

I will give my point of view in a few words. It is as follows: The evacuation of certain territories was

promised by us under the condition that at the same time the evacuation of regions taken from our Allies should be carried out. At that time we considered, as the nearest date when the evacuation was to begin, the date of the complete demobilization of the Russian army. I state that concerning this date we are ready to compromise and I must repeat what I have already stated. I declare that we cannot accept a peace treaty in which it is not diplomatically promised to evacuate the provinces taken from our Allies. In accordance with the explanation given by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, I think there is no ground for doubt that the troops which are in occupation of Turkish provinces are under the authority of the Petrograd Government. I shall touch here also the second clause, which has been discussed by us many times, namely, the question of the Aland Islands. I must point out that the peace treaty must give us at least the same rights as we had before the beginning of the war. I shall also recall to you the most passionate wish of the Swedish people to reunite with these islands where they have, aside from geographical and ethnographical considerations, the most vital interests.

Trotzky:

Concerning the evacuation of the Turkish provinces, we find in our principles sufficiently weighty considerations for our declarations, that the evacuation of the Armenian territories could not be considered simply as exchange for the evacuation of the one or the other portions of the occupied Russian territories. As we are withdrawing our troops from Persia, we shall also withdraw them—we have already begun it—from Armenia. It is beyond doubt that we shall establish that clearly in our peace treaty with Turkey, if our negotiations should advance so far. Concerning the Aland Islands, I must say that I did not understand of what minimum of rights the Secretary of State was speaking. If he had in view the obligation of Russia not to fortify these islands, . . . we have, as is known, in our possession documents which prove that in 1907 von Schoen for Germany and Gubastov for Czarist Russia signed a treaty, which cannot be published, in which von Schoen declared that Germany would not

consider it a breach of the treaty of Paris if Russia fortified the Aland Islands. Before the question can be discussed, my opinion is that it should be prepared from a technical point of view by the military commission.

Von Kuehlmann:

In remaining faithful to my statement at the beginning of the session, I will not discuss the importance of the document which the preceding speaker refers to. I shall once again express my opinion in a few words, that the Peace Treaty must return us all the rights which we possessed before the war. As far as these Islands are concerned, it is a demand of principle. If in the opinion of the President of the commission we did not possess any rights before the war then such a demand must appear to him as one which can be easily agreed upon. I used the word minimum with the object of expressing exactly that our demand is for us a demand of principle. If some one asked me of what I was thinking in using the word maximum, then I should reply, as I have suggested several times previously, that it means the neutralization of these Islands by the consent of the peoples on the borders of the Baltic Sea.

For the further discussion we need some preparatory work by the sub-commission. . . . In any case I propose to have our next session at six o'clock p. m. We shall discuss the report of the sub-commission. . . .

After remarks concerning the personnel of the sub-commission, von Kuehlmann declared the session closed.

122 **February 10.** Before the final plenary session took place the military sub-commission held two sittings, under the chairmanship of Dr. Gratz. The Russian military experts attempted to demonstrate the strategical disadvantages to which Russia would be exposed by the new frontier line, while the Germans denied this contention, adding that it was not a matter of the Russo-German frontier, but of the frontier between Russia and the new border States. The sub-commission could not reach an agreement.

123 The final plenary sitting of all the Delegations was held on the same day.

Dr. Gratz having reported that no agreement could be reached in the military sub-commission as to frontiers, von Kuehlmann asked Trotzky whether he had any communication to make which might contribute to a satisfactory solution. This question led to the final rupture.

Trotzky, replying, said his Delegation considered that the decisive hour had arrived. After an attack on imperialism, he declared that,

> while Russia was desisting from signing a formal Peace Treaty, it declared the state of war to be ended with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, simultaneously giving orders for the complete demobilization of Russian forces on all fronts.

This announcement, he said, had been made by wireless to all peoples and their Governments.

To this statement von Kuehlmann rejoined that, if he analyzed the present situation correctly, the Quadruple [Central] Alliance was still at war with the Russian Government. Acts of war had been ended when Russia and the Allies had signed the armistice, but on the lapse of the armistice warfare would automatically revive. The fact that one of the two contracting parties had demobolized its armies would in no wise alter this situation. The existence of the customary international relations between States was the mark of a state of peace. He therefore requested Trotzky to say where the frontiers of Russia ran and whether Russia was willing to resume diplomatic, legal and commercial relations with the Central Powers. It was essential to determine these questions in order to judge whether or not the Quadruple [Central] Alliance was still at war. Von Kuehlmann then proposed a sitting for the next day, at which the attitude of the Central Powers to the latest statement of the Russian Delegation might be made known.

Trotzky replied that his Delegation had now exhausted its powers and considered it necessary to return to Petrograd. The Central Powers might communicate with Petrograd by wireless or through the Commissions of the Central Powers then in Petrograd.

The sitting then closed.

X. NO WAR AND NO PEACE

124 A wireless addressed "To All Whom It May Concern," dated at Brest-Litovsk, Feb. 10, 1918, and signed by the entire Russian Delegation, reads:

> The peace negotiations are at an end. German capitalists, bankers and landlords, supported by the silent coöperation of the English and French bourgeoisie, submitted to our comrades, the members of the Peace Delegation at Brest-Litovsk, conditions such as could not be subscribed to by the Russian Revolution.
>
> The Governments of Germany and Austria desire to possess countries and peoples vanquished by force of arms. . . . We could not sign a peace which would bring with it sadness, oppression and suffering to millions of workmen and peasants. But we also cannot, will not, and must not continue a war which was begun by Tsars and capitalists. We will not and we must not continue to be at war with Germans and Austrians—workmen and peasants like ourselves. . . .
>
> Our Delegation, fully conscious of its responsibility before the Russian people and the oppressed workers and peasants of other peoples declared on February 10 . . . that it refuses to sign an annexationist treaty.
>
> Russia for her part declares the present war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria at an end. . . .

125 February 11. President Wilson, in replying to the addresses of January 24 of the German Chancellor and the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs made one direct reference to the Brest negotiations: "Count Hertling's reply . . . confirms I am sorry to say rather than removes the unfortunate impression made by what we had learned of the conferences at Brest-Litovsk."

126 **February 12.** An official announcement was made in London that "the British do not consider themselves bound to recognize the peace concluded between the Austro-Germans and those who have signed it on behalf of the Ukraine."

127 Lloyd George in the House of Commons said:

> The action of Germany in reference to Russia proves that all her declarations about no annexations and no indemnities have no real meaning. . . . In spite of the undertaking given by the Germans to the Russians that during the period of the armistice no troops would be moved from the East to the West, they are moving them as speedily as railway and transport arrangements will allow. That has to be kept in mind when we discuss terms of peace, because it has a real bearing upon guarantees.

128 **February 14.** Trotzky reported on the course and results of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations before the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. An official statement issued at the close of the session declares that "a resolution was passed which approves the whole of the policy of the Brest-Litovsk Delegation of the Council of the People's Commissaries."

Trotzky reviewed the history of the peace negotiations as follows:

> "When history put before the Russian Revolution the question of the peace negotiations, we had no doubt that in these negotiations, and so long as the decisive power of the revolutionary proletariat of the world had not interfered, we should be compelled to stand the bill of three and a half years of war. There was no doubt in our minds that in the person of German imperialism we were dealing with an opponent who was saturated with the consciousness of his immense power, which was strikingly revealed during the present war.

All the arguments made by bourgeois cliques that we might have been incomparably stronger if we had conducted these negotiations together with our Allies are absolutely without foundation. In order that we might at an indefinite future date conduct negotiations together with our Allies, we should first of all have had to continue the war together with them. And if our country was weakened and exhausted, the continuation of the war, a failure to bring it to a conclusion, would have still further weakened and exhausted it. We should have had to settle the war under conditions still more unfavorable to us. In the case even that the combination of which Russia, owing to international intrigues of Czarism and the bourgeoisie, had become a part—the combination headed by Great Britain—in the case even that this combination had come out of the war completely victorious—let us for a moment admit the possibility of such a not very probable issue—even in that case, comrades, it does not mean that our country would also have come out victorious. For during further continuation of this protracted war, Russia would have become even more exhausted and plundered than now. The masters of that combination, who would concentrate in their hands the fruits of the victory, that is, Great Britain and America, would have displayed toward our country the same methods which were displayed by Germany during the peace negotiations. It would be absurd and childish to appraise the politics of the imperialistic countries from the point of view of any considerations other than those considerations of naked interests and material power. Consequently, if we, as a nation, are at present weakened before the imperialism of the world, we are weakened, not because of extricating ourselves from the fiery ring of the war, having already previously extricated ourselves from the shackles of international military obligations: no! we are weakened by that very policy of the Czarists and the bourgeois classes, which we, as a revolutionary party, have always fought against before this war and during this war.

You remember, comrades, under what conditions our delegation went to Brest-Litovsk last time, right after one of the sessions of the Third All-Russian Congress of the Soviets. At that session, we reported on the state of the negotiations, and the demands of our opponents. These demands, as you remember, were really no more than masked, or, rather, half-masked annexationist aspirations at the expense of Lithuania, Courland, a part of Livonia, the Isles of Moon Sound, as well as a half-masked demand for a punitive war indemnity which we then estimated would amount to six, eight or even ten milliards of rubles. During the interruption of the sessions, which continued for about ten days, a considerable disturbance took place in Austria-Hungary; strikes of masses of workers broke out, and these strikes were the first recognition of our methods of conducting peace negotiations that we met with from the proletariat of the Central Empires, as against the annexationist demands of German militarism. We promised here no miracles, but we did say that the road we were pursuing was the only road remaining to the revolutionary democracy for securing the possibility of its further development.

There is room for complaint that the proletariat of the other countries, and particularly of the Central Empires, is too slow to enter the road of open revolutionary struggle, yes, it must be admitted that the pace of its development is all to slow—nevertheless, there could be observed a movement in Austria-Hungary which swept the entire country and which was a direct echo of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations.

Leaving for Brest-Litovsk, it was our common opinion that there was no ground to believe that just this wave would sweep away Austro-German militarism. If we had been convinced that this could be expected, we would gladly have given the promise that several persons demanded from us, namely, that under no circumstances would we sign a separate peace with Germany. I said at that very time, that we could not make such a promise, for it would amount to taking

upon ourselves the obligation of vanquishing German militarism. The secret of attaining such a victory was not in our possession. And inasmuch as we would not undertake the obligation to change the balance of the world powers at a moment's notice, we frankly and openly declared that revolutionary power may under certain conditions be compelled to agree to an annexationist peace. A revolutionary power would fall short of its high principles only in the event that it should attempt to conceal from its own people the predatory character of the peace, but by no means, however, in the event that the course of the struggle should compel it to adopt such a peace.

At the same time, we indicated that we were leaving to continue negotiations under conditions which were seemingly improving for us and becoming worse for our enemies. We observed the movement in Austria-Hungary, and there were signs indicating (this was made the basis for statements by representatives of the German Social Democracy in the Reichstag) that Germany was on the eve of similar events. We went with this hope. During the first days of this visit to Brest-Litovsk the wireless brought us from Vilna the first news that in Berlin an enormous strike movement was developing; this movement as well as that of Austria-Hungary was directly connected with the course of negotiations in Brest. However, as is often the case, by reason of the dialectic of the class struggle, just this conspicuous beginning of the proletarian rising, which surpassed anything Germany had ever seen, was bound to push the property classes to a closer consolidation and to greater hostility against the proletariat. The German dominating classes are saturated with a sufficiently strong instinct of self-preservation to understand that concessions in such an exigency as they were in, under the pressure of the masses of their own people—concessions however small—would amount to capitulation before the idea of the revolution. That is why, after the first moment of perplexity and panic, the time when Kuehlmann deliberately dragged out the negotiations by minor and formal questions, had passed—as soon as the strikes were disposed of, as soon as he came to the conclusion that for the time being

no imminent danger threatened his masters, he again changed front and adopted a tone of unlimited self-confidence and aggression.

Our negotiations were complicated by the participation of the Kiev Rada. We called attention to this last time, too. The delegation from the Kiev Rada appeared at a time when the Rada represented a fairly strong organization in the Ukraine and when the way out of the war had not yet been predetermined. Just at that time, we made the Rada an official offer to conclude a definite treaty with us, making as one of the conditions of such a treaty the following demand: that the Rada declare Kaledin and Kornilov to be counter-revolutionists and put no hindrance in the way of our waging war on these two leaders. The delegation from the Kiev Rada arrived, just when we hoped to reach an understanding with it on these matters. We declared that as long as the people of the Ukraine recognized the Rada, we considered its independent participation in these negotiations permissible. But with the further development of events in Russian territory and in the Ukraine, and the more the antagonism between the Ukrainian masses and the Rada increased, the greater became the Rada's readiness to conclude any kind of treaty with the governments of the Central Empires, and, if need be, to drag German imperialism into the internal affairs of the Russian Republic, in order to support the Rada against the Russian revolution.

On the 9th day of February we learned that the peace negotiations carried on behind our backs between the Rada and the Central Powers, had been signed. The 9th of February happened to be the birthday of Leopold of Bavaria, and, as is the custom in monarchical countries, the triumphant historical act was timed—with or without the consent of the Kiev Rada for this festive day. General Hoffmann had a salute fired in honor of Leopold of Bavaria, having previously asked permission to do so of the Kiev Delegation, since by the treaty of peace Brest-Litovsk had been ceded to the Ukraine.

Events had taken such a turn, however, that at the time General Hoffmann was asking permission for a

military salute, the Kiev Rada had but very little territory left outside of Brest-Litovsk. On the strength of the telegrams we had received from Petrograd, we officially made it known to the Central Powers' Delegation that the Kiev Rada no longer existed, a circumstance which certainly had some bearing on the course of the peace negotiations. We suggested to Count Czernin that his representatives accompany our officers into Ukrainian territory to ascertain whether the Kiev Rada existed or not. Czernin seemed to welcome this suggestion, but when we asked him if this meant that the treaty made with the Kiev Delegation would not be signed before the return of his own mission, he hesitated and promised to ask Kuehlmann about it. Having inquired, he sent us an answer in the negative.

This was on February 8th. By the 9th, they had to sign the treaty. This could not be delayed, not only on account of Leopold's birthday, but for a more important reason, which Kuehlmann undoubtedly explained to Czernin: "If we should send our representatives into the Ukraine just now, they might really convince themselves that the Rada does not exist; and then we shall have to face a single All-Russian delegation which would spoil our prospects in the negotiations." . . . By the Austro-Hungarian Delegation we were advised to put principle aside and to place the question on a more practical plane. Then the German Delegation would be disposed to concessions. . . . It was unthinkable that the Germans should decide to continue the war over, say, the Moon Islands, if you put this demand in concrete form.

We replied that we were ready to look into such concessions as their German colleagues were prepared to make. "So far we have been contending for the self-determination of the Lithuanians, Poles, Livonians, Letts, Esthonians, and other peoples; and on all these issues you have told us that such self-determination is out of the question. Now let us see what your plans are in regard to the self-determination of another people—the Russians; what designs and plans of a military strategic nature are behind your seizure of the Moon Islands. For these islands, as an integral part of an independent Esthonian Republic, or as a possession of the Federative Russian Republic would have only a

defensive military importance, while in the hands of Germany they would assume offensive significance, menacing the most vital centers of our country, and especially Petrograd."

But, of course, Hoffmann would make no concessions whatsoever. Then the hour for reaching a decision had come. We could not declare war, for we were too weak. The army had lost all of its internal ties. In order to save our country, to overcome this disorganization, it was imperative to establish the internal coherence of the toilers. This psychological tie can only be created by constructive work in factory, field and workshop. We had to return the masses of laborers, who had been subjected to great and intense suffering—who had experienced catastrophes in the war —to the fields and factories, where they must find themselves again and get a footing in the labor world, and rebuild internal discipline. This was the only way to save the country, which was now atoning for the sins of Czarism and the bourgeoisie. We had to get out of the war and withdraw the army from the slaughter house. Nevertheless, we threw this in the face of the German militarism: The peace you are forcing down our throats is a peace of aggression and robbery. We cannot permit you, Messrs. Diplomats, to say to the German workingmen: "You have characterized our demands as avaricious, as annexationist. But look, under these very demands we have brought you the signature of the Russian revolution." Yes, we are weak, we cannot fight at present. But we have sufficient revolutionary courage to say that we shall not willingly affix our signature to the treaty which you are writing with the sword on the body of living peoples. We refused to affix our signature. I believe we acted properly, comrades.

I do not mean to say, friends, that a German advance upon Russia is out of the question. It were too rash to make such an assertion in view of the great strength of the German imperialistic party. But I do believe that the stand we have taken in the matter has rendered it far more difficult for German militarism to advance upon us. What would happen if it should advance? To this there is but one thing to say: If it is possible in our country, a country completely ex-

hausted and in a state of desperation, to raise the spirits of the more revolutionary energetic elements; if a struggle in defence of our Revolution and the territory comprised within it is still possible, then this is the case only as a result of our abandoning the war and refusing to sign the peace treaty."

* During the first few days following the breaking off of negotiations the German Government hesitated, not knowing what course to pursue. The politicians and diplomats evidently thought that the principal objects had been accomplished and that there was no reason for coveting our signatures. The military men were ready, in any event, to break through the lines drawn by the German Government at Brest-Litovsk. Professor Krigge, the advisor of the German Delegation, told a member of our Delegation that a German invasion of Russia under the existing conditions was out of the question. Count Mirbach, then at the head of the German missions at Petrograd, went to Berlin with the assurance that an agreement concerning the exchange of prisoners of war had been satisfactorily reached. But all this did not in the least prevent General Hoffmann from declaring on the fifth day after the Brest-Litovsk negotiations had been broken off—that the armistice was over, antedating the seven-day period from the time of the last Brest-Litovsk session. It were really out of place to dilate here on the moral indignation caused by this piece of dishonesty. It fits in perfectly with the general state of diplomatic and military morality of the ruling classes.

The new German invasion developed under circumstances most fatal for Russia. Instead of the week's notice agreed upon, we received notice only two days in advance. This circumstance intensified the panic in the army which was already in a state of chronic dissolution. Resistance was almost unthinkable. The soldiers could not believe that the Germans would advance after we had declared the state of war at an end. The panicky retreat paralyzed the will even of such individual detachments as were ready to make a stand. In the workingmen's quarters of Petrograd and Mos-

* The remainder of this item is not a part of Trotzky's speech, but is a further extract from his book "From October to Brest-Litovsk."

cow, the indignation against the treacherous and truly murderous German invasion reached a pitch of greatest intensity. In these alarming days and nights, the workers were ready to enlist in the army by the ten thousand. But the matter of organizing lagged far behind. Isolated tenacious detachments full of enthusiasm became convinced themselves of their instability in their first serious clashes with German regulars. This still further lowered the country's spirits. The old army had long ago been hopelessly defeated and was going to pieces, blocking all the roads and byways. The new army, owing to the country's general exhaustion, the fearful disorganization of industries and the means of transportation, was being got together too slowly. Distance was the only serious obstacle in the way of the German invasion.

The chief attention of the Austro-Hungarian government was centered on the Ukraine. The Rada, through its Delegation, had appealed to the Governments of the Central Empires for direct military aid against the Soviets, which had by that time completely defeated the Ukrainians. Thus did the petty-bourgeois democracy of the Ukraine, in its struggle against the working class and the destitute peasants, voluntarily open the gates to foreign invasion.

At the same time, the Svinhufvud government was seeking the aid of German bayonets against the Finnish proletariat. German militarism, openly and before the whole world, assumed the rôle of executioner of the peasant and proletarian revolution in Russia.

In the ranks of our party hot debates were being carried on as to whether or not we should, under these circumstances, yield to the German ultimatum and sign a new treaty, which—and this no one doubted—would include conditions incomparably more onerous than those announced at Brest-Litovsk. The representatives of the one view held that just now, with the German intervention in the internal war of the Russian Republic, it was impossible to establish peace for one part of Russia and remain passive, while in the South and in the North, German forces would be establishing a regime of bourgeois dictatorship. Another view, championed chiefly by Lenin, was that every delay, even the briefest breathing spell, would greatly help the

internal stabilization and increase the Russian powers of resistance. After the whole country and the whole world had come to know of our absolute helplessness against foreign invasion at this time, the conclusion of peace would everywhere be understood as an act forced upon us by the cruel law of disproportionate forces. It would be childish to argue from the standpoint of abstract revolutionary ethics. The point is not to die with honor but to achieve ultimate victory. The Russian Revolution wants to survive, must survive, and must by every means at its disposal avoid fighting an uneven battle and gain time, in the hope that the Western revolutionary movement will come to its aid.

German imperialism is still engaged in a fierce annexationist struggle with English and American militarism. Only because of this is the conclusion of peace between Russia and Germany at all possible. We must fully avail ourselves of this situation. The welfare of the Revolution is the highest law. We should accept the peace which we are unable to reject; we must secure a breathing spell to be utilized for intensive work within the country and, especially, for the creation of an army.

At the conference of the Communist party as well as at the Fourth Conference of the Soviet, the peace partisans triumphed. They were joined by many of those who in January considered it impossible to sign the Brest-Litovsk treaty. "Then," said they, "our signature would have been looked upon by the English and French workingmen as a shameful capitulation, without an attempt to fight. Even the base insinuations of the Anglo-French chauvinists as to a secret compact between the Soviet Government and the Germans, might in case that treaty had been signed find credence in certain circles of European laborers. But after we had refused to sign the treaty, after a new German invasion, after our attempt to resist it, and after our military weakness had become painfully obvious to the whole world, after all this, no one dare to reproach us for surrendering without a fight.

The Brest-Litovsk treaty, in its second enlarged edition, was signed and ratified.

In the meantime, the executioners were doing their work in Finland and the Ukraine, menacing more and

more the most vital centers of Great Russia. Thus the question of Russia's very existence as an independent country is henceforth inseparably connected with the question of the European revolution.

When our party took over the government, we knew in advance what difficulties we had to contend with. Economically the country had been exhausted by the war to the very utmost. The revolution had destroyed the old administrative machinery and could not yet create anything to take its place. Millions of workers had been wrested from their normal nooks in the national economy of things, declassified, and physically shattered by the three years' war. The colossal war industries, carried on on an inadequately prepared national foundation, had drained all the lifeblood of the people; and their demobilization was attended with extreme difficulties. The phenomena of economic and political anarchy spread throughout the country. The Russian peasantry had for centuries been held together by barbarian national discipline from below and iron-Czarist rule from above. Economic development had undermined the former, the revolution destroyed the latter. Psychologically, the revolution meant the awakening of a sense of human personality among the peasantry. The anarchic manifestations of this awakening are but the inevitable results of the preceding oppression. A new order of things, an order based on the workers' own control of industry, can come only through gradual and internal elimination of the anarchic manifestations of the revolution.

On the other hand, the propertied classes, even though deprived of political power, will not relinquish their advantages without a fight. The Revolution has brought to a head the question of private property in land and the tools of production—that is, the question of vital significance to the exploiting classes. Politically this means ceaseless, secret or open civil war. In its turn, civil war inevitably nourishes anarchical tendencies within the workingmen's movement. With the disorganization of industries, of national finances, of the transportation and provisioning systems, prolonged civil strife thus sets up tremendous difficulties in the way of constructive organizing work. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government can look the future in the face

with perfect confidence. Only a careful inventory of all the country's resources; only a rational organization of industries—an organization born of one general plan; only wise and careful distribution of all the products, can save the country. And this is Socialism. Either a complete descent to colonial status or a Socialist resurrection—these are the alternatives before which our country finds itself.

The war has undermined the soil of the entire capitalistic world. Herein lies our unconquerable strength. The imperialistic ring that is pressing around us will be burst asunder by the proletarian revolution. We do not doubt this for a minute, any more than we doubted during our decades of underground struggle the inevitableness of the downfall of Czarism.

To struggle, to unite our forces, to establish industrial discipline and a Socialist regime, to increase the productivity of labor, and to press on in the face of all obstacles—this is our mission. History is working in our favor. The proletarian revolution will flare up, sooner or later, both in Europe and America, and will bring emancipation not only to the Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Finland, but also to all suffering humanity.

129 Kaiser Karl of Austria-Hungary issued a manifesto "To My Peoples," regarding the peace with the Ukraine:

Thanks to God's gracious aid we have concluded peace with Ukrainia. Our victorious arms and the sincere peace policy which we have pursued with indefatigable perseverance have shown the first fruits of a defensive war waged for our preservation. . . .

Under the impression of this peace with Ukrainia, our glance turns with full sympathy to that aspiring young people in whose heart first among our opponents the feeling of neighborly love has become operative. . . . It thus has been the first to leave the camp of our enemies, in order, in the interest of the speediest possible attainment of a new and great common aim, to unite its efforts with our strength. . . .

May the Almighty bless us further with strength and endurance that not only for ourselves and our

faithful allies, but also for all humanity we may attain a final peace.

130 When the terms of the Brest Treaty with the Ukraine were made public, there was great excitement throughout Poland because the Province of Kholm had been ceded to the Ukrainian People's Republic.

A manifesto was issued by the Polish Regency Council, which had been set up in accordance with the independence granted Poland by the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments in November, 1916, and which consisted of Archbishop Kakovski, Count Ostrovski, and Prince Lubomirski.

> . . . But when the Czar's reign in Russia came to an end, and Russia's new rulers began peace negotiations with the Central Powers, Poland was not admitted to these negotiations. We demanded our participation in these negotiations earnestly and incessantly. We were promised this participation. Then the answer was delayed, and we were deluded until the plenipotentiaries of Germany and Austria-Hungary decided alone about our frontiers, contrary to our rights. We were not admitted in order that peace might be made at our cost, and in order that the desired security in the East might be obtained. At the price of our nation's living body, a piece of Polish land was carved out and given to the Ukrainians. . . .

The Polish Club also issued a manifesto signed by six Polish political parties:

> The reports of the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk published in the press show that the German Delegates have formed ideas in regard to the territories occupied by them, that is to say, in regard to the Kingdom of Poland, which Polish public opinion cannot accept. The German Delegates hold among other things the theory that "the various political bodies authorized to represent the various nationalities in the occupied territories can express the will of the nation," and that for this reason they are "from henceforth competent to conclude conventions." This theory proceeds evidently from a serious and dangerous misunderstanding. . . . Any engagement made in

the name of the nation, any conclusion of facts of any kind by provisional bodies, would certainly call forth throughout Poland a unanimous protest. . . .

XI. THE NEW GERMAN WAR

131 **February 15.** It was announced that Germany had resolved to resume military operations against Russia. The decision had been reached at a conference of German military and political leaders, including the Kaiser. Russia's action of February 10, in refusing to sign a Treaty of Peace, was declared to be equivalent to a denunciation of the armistice signed on December 15. Accordingly, German Army Headquarters announced that the armistice on the Russian front would expire at noon on Monday, February 18.

132 **February 17.** The Ukrainian Government addressed a declaration "To the German People":

> On February 9 we signed, in the deep and ardent desire to live in peace and friendship with our neighbors, a peace treaty with the States of the Quadruple Alliance. . . . The joyful news of February 9, however, for which the working masses of our people so greatly longed, has brought us no peace in our land. . . . The Russian Maximalists who a month ago dispersed the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Petrograd, consisting almost solely of Socialists, have now undertaken, as they call it, a holy war against the Socialists of the Ukraine. . . . Before the whole world we declare that the Petrograd Commissars of the People lie when they talk about a rising of the people in the Ukraine. . . . The Petrograd Commissars who, with words only, have stubbornly defended the weal of the Ukraine, Poland, Courland and other peoples, have made use of a fine pose at Brest-Litovsk to recall from the front the remnants of the Russian army for the purpose of secretly throwing them against the Ukraine to rob us, to send our stocks of corn to the north and to subjugate the country. . . .
>
> In this hard struggle for our existence, we look around for help. We are firmly convinced that the peaceful and order-loving German people will not remain indifferent when it learns of our distress. The German army that stands on the flank of our northern enemy possesses the power to help us, and by its in-

tervention to protect the northern frontiers against further invasion by the enemy.

133 **February 18.** Two hours after the armistice came to an end, the German army crossed the Dvina and entered Dvinsk in the north with the immediate objective of seizing Livonia and Esthonia. The Germans declared that it was their aim to rescue the population of these provinces from the Bolshevist rule of murder and looting. Simultaneously, the town of Lutsk in Volhynia was occupied without fighting, in response, according to the official German statement, to an appeal of the Ukrainians. In an army order, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, Commander-in-Chief on the Russian front, declared that the aim of the advance was not annexation, but restoration of order and suppression of the anarchy threatening to infect Europe. "Russia is sick and is trying to contaminate all the countries of the world with a moral infection. We must fight against the disorder inoculated by Trotzky, and defend outraged liberty. Germany is fortunate in being the incarnation of the sentiments of other order-loving peoples."

134 On the same day it was announced in Vienna that "an agreement had been reached between Germany and Austria-Hungary whereby in the event of military action being necessary, the German troops would be confined to the frontier of Great Russia and the Austrians to the Ukraine only."

135 **February 19.** Von Seydler, the Austrian Premier, announced in the Reichsrat the signing of a supplementary treaty by representatives of the Ukrainian Rada and the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the Province of Kholm. The Polish, Czech, Slav and Socialist Deputies had threatened to unite in voting against any further credits unless the Brest treaty was changed on that point. The passage in the supplementary treaty reads:

> For the purpose of avoiding all misunderstandings in the interpretation of Clause 2, Article II, of the Peace Treaty concluded at Brest-Litovsk on February 9, 1918, . . . it is hereby declared that the mixed commission provided for in Paragraph 2 of this Article of the Treaty shall, in fixing the frontier, not be bound to draw the frontier line through the places of Bielgorag . . . Sarnaki, but shall have the right on

the ground of Article II, Clause 2, of this Peace Treaty, to draw the frontier which may result from ethnographical conditions and from the desires of the local populations east of the line named.

136 Von Seydler stated that the mixed commission to determine the new boundary would be composed of representatives of the contracting parties and representatives of Poland, each sending an equal number of delegates to the commission.

At 5:30 in the morning, after an all-night meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, a proclamation of protest was addressed by wireless to the Berlin Government:

> The Council of People's Commissars protests against the fact that the German Government has directed its troops against the Russian Soviet Republic, which has declared the war as at an end and which is demobilizing its army on all fronts.
>
> The Workmen's and Peasants' Government of Russia could not anticipate such a step because neither directly nor indirectly has any one of the parties which concluded the armistice given the seven days' notice required in accordance with the treaty of December 15 for terminating it.
>
> The Council of People's Commissars in the present circumstances regards itself as forced formally to declare its willingness to sign a peace upon the conditions which had been dictated by the Delegations of the Quadruple Alliance at Brest-Litovsk.
>
> The Council of People's Commissars further declares that a detailed reply will be given without delay to the conditions of peace as proposed by the German Government.
>
> (Signed) For the Council of People's Commissars,
>
> LENIN,
> TROTZKY.

137 On the same day, the People's Commissar of War, Krylenko, addressed the following message to headquarters on all fronts:

> The Council of People's Commissars has offered to the Germans to sign peace immediately. I order that, in all cases where Germans are encountered, massed *pourparlers* with the German soldiers should be organized and the proposal to refrain from fighting made

to them. If Germans refuse, then you must offer to them every possible resistance.

138 On the same day Trotzky forwarded a wireless message to Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister:

> The German Government having re-established a state of war with Russia without even giving the seven days' previous notice, I have the honor to ask you to inform me whether the Austro-Hungarian Government also considers itself in a state of war with Russia, and if not, whether it believes it possible to reach a practical realization of the agreements worked out at Petrograd.

139 The German reply came late in the afternoon of the same day. It was signed by General Hoffmann:

> To the Council of People's Commissars:
>
> A wireless message signed by Nicolai Lenin and L. Trotzky from Tsarskoe-Selo was today received at König Wusterhausen at 9:12 a. m. It has been handed over to the Royal Government, although a wireless message cannot be regarded as an official document because the original signatures are absent. I am authorized to request from the People's Commissars authentication in writing of the wireless message which must be sent to the German Command at Dvinsk.

To this message, the Council of the People's Commissars made the following reply:

> We are sending today from Petrograd a messenger to Dvinsk with the wireless message containing the original signatures of Lenin and Trotzky. We beg you to give us an acknowledgment of this message and inform us if it has been received promptly. We also beg you to reply in writing.

140 Speaking on the same day before the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, Lenin defended the Council of Commissars by pointing out that the country was completely unable to offer resistance, and that peace was indispensable for the completion of the social revolution in Russia. He also argued that the imperialist governments then at war would sooner or later unite for the purpose of crushing the Socialist commonwealth of Russia, and that it was therefore imperative to make peace while Russia's enemies were divided.

141 **February 20.** Von Kuehlmann, at the opening session of the Reichstag, delivered an address dealing at length with the peace treaty signed by the Central Powers with the Ukraine and the collapse of the peace negotiations with Russia. He asserted that the pacific intentions of Russia could no longer be credited, but that even today Germany was prepared to conclude a peace "which corresponds to our interests." He instanced the peace agreement with the Ukraine as an indication of the readiness of the Central Powers for peace. "Ukraine is a rich country, and the decisive factor for the conclusion of peace was economic." When it came to the fixing of the frontiers, Ukraine claimed Kholm. There was danger that negotiations might be wrecked if this demand were not taken into account. The frontiers of Kholm have not yet been fixed definitely. They will be established by a commission, including representatives of the Ukraine and Poland.

He then read a wireless despatch from Lenin and Trotzky announcing that they found it necessary to sign a peace agreement on the terms dictated by the Central Powers. He warned the members of the Reichstag that peace with Russia will have been arrived at only when the signatures on the treaty are dry. He said that the conduct of the Russian Delegates at Brest-Litovsk and in particular that of Leon Trotzky was without precedent in history. With his final declaration Trotzky had attempted to extricate himself from a position that had become untenable, and he was not really desirous of concluding peace. Von Kuehlmann expressed the conviction that if anything could induce Trotzky to sign a satisfactory peace, it would be the Ukrainian Treaty which he considered an important means for arriving at a settlement tolerable for both Germany and Russia. He defended the "new war" against Russia as necessary to enforce peace.

142 Meanwhile, the German and Austrian advance continued almost unopposed. On February 21, German detachments were 70 miles northeast of Riga, and their cavalry was pushing toward Mohilev, the former Russian General Headquarters. On February 23, the Turkish army began an offensive in the Caucasus.

143 **February 21.** Two proclamations were issued by the People's Commissars calling the Russian soldiers, workmen and peasants to arms "for the defense of the Republic

against the masses of bourgeoisie and imperialists of Germany." They declared that "the German Generals desire to establish their own order in Petrograd and Kiev. . . . German militarism wishes to smother the working classes and the Ukrainian masses, to give back the land to the land owners, factories and workshops to the bankers, and power to a monarchy." The proclamation then enumerates eight paragraphs containing instructions to "all the forces in the country in their entirety," as to how they are to "place themselves at the service of the defense of the revolution." Each position must be defended to the last drop of blood. Railways, rolling stock, corn and provisions in general are if necessary to be destroyed. Petrograd and Kiev and all towns and villages on the line of the new front must be defended by battalions "under the direction of the military Socialists," and members of the bourgeois class, women as well as men, must enter these battalions under the surveillance of Red Guards. All institutions resisting the defense of the revolution or profiting "by the invasion of the imperialistic masses in order to overthrow the authority of the Soviets must be closed. Directors of and collaborators with these institutions who are capable of work must mobilize themselves to dig trenches and engage in other defensive works. Foreign agents and speculators are regarded as counter-revolutionary agitators, and German spies must be shot on sight. The Socialist Fatherland is in danger! Long live the People's Social Revolution!"

In the appeal to the workmen and peasants the People's Commissars say:

> We agreed to sign peace terms at the cost of enormous concessions in order to save the country from final exhaustion and the ruin of the revolution. Once more the German working class, in this threatening hour, has shown itself insufficiently determined to stay the strong criminal hand of its own militarism. We had no other choice but to accept the conditions of German militarism until a revolution changes or cancels them.
>
> The German Government is not hastening to reply to us, evidently aiming to seize as many important positions in our territory as possible. . . . We even now are convinced that the German working classes will rise against the attempts of the ruling classes to stifle the revolution. But we cannot predict with cer-

tainty when this will occur. . . . The Commissars call upon all loyal Soviets and army organizations to use all efforts to recreate the army. Perverted elements of hooligans, marauders, and cowards should be expelled from the ranks, and in the event of resistance, wiped off the face of the earth. . . .

144 **February 23.** The Russian Government received by courier from Dvinsk a new offer of peace from Germany, signed by von Kuehlmann and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The document reads:

Germany will renew the peace negotiations and will conclude peace on the following conditions:

Both to declare the war ended.

All regions west of the line indicated at Brest-Litovsk to the Russian Delegation, which formerly belonged to Russia, to be no longer under the territorial protection of Russia. In the region of Dvinsk this line must be advanced to the eastern frontier of Courland.

The former attachment of these regions to the Russian State must in no case involve for them obligations toward Russia. Russia renounces every claim to intervene in the internal affairs of those regions. Germany and Austria-Hungary have the intention to define further the fate of these regions, in agreement with their population.

Germany is ready, after the completion of Russian demobilization, to evacuate the regions which are east of the above line. So far as it is not stated otherwise, Livonia and Esthonia must immediately be cleared of Russian troops and Red Guards.

Livonia and Esthonia will be occupied by German police until the date when the constitution of the respective countries shall guarantee their social security and political order. All inhabitants who were arrested for political reasons must be released immediately.

Russia will conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic. Ukraine and Finland will be immediately evacuated by Russian troops and Red Guards.

Russia will do all in its power to secure for Turkey the orderly return of its Anatolian frontiers. Russia

recognizes the annulment of the Turkish Capitulations.

The complete demobilization of the Russian Army, inclusive of the detachments newly formed by the present Government, must be carried out immediately.

Russian warships in the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic Ocean must immediately either be sent to Russian harbors and kept there until the conclusion of peace or be disarmed. Warships of the Entente which are in the sphere of Russian authority must be regarded as Russian ships.

Merchant navigation of the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea must be renewed, as stated in the armistice treaty. The clearing away of mines is to begin immediately. The blockade of the Arctic Ocean is to remain in force until the conclusion of a general peace.

The Russo-German commercial treaty of 1914 must be put into force again. In addition, there must be a guarantee for the free export, without tariff, of ores, and the immediate commencement of negotiations for the conclusion of a new commercial treaty, with a guarantee of the most favored nation treatment, at least until 1925, even in the case of the termination of the provisorium, and, finally, the sanctioning of all clauses corresponding to paragraph 11, of classes 3, 4, and 15 of the Ukrainian peace treaty.

Legal and political relations are to be regulated in accordance with the decision of the first version of the Germano-Russian convention. So far as action on that decision has not yet been taken, especially with respect to indemnities for civilian damages, this must be in accordance with the German proposal. And there must be indemnification with expenses for war prisoners, in accordance with the Russian proposal.

Russia will permit and support, so far as she can, German commissions for war prisoners and war refugees.

Russia promises to put an end to every propaganda and agitation, either on the part of the Government or on the part of persons supported by the Government, against members of the Quadruple Alliance and their political and military institutions, even in localities occupied by the Central Powers.

> The above conditions must be accepted within forty-eight hours. The Russian plenipotentiaries must start immediately for Brest-Litovsk and sign at that place within three days a peace treaty which must be ratified within two weeks.

145 **February 24.** The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets met all night to consider the German offer with the result that a message was sent to the Berlin Government, announcing that a representative had left Petrograd at noon for Dvinsk for the purpose of transmitting to the German High Command at Dvinsk Russia's official reply to Germany's peace conditions. Another wireless addressed "TO ALL" announced that the following message had been sent to the German Government:

> According to the decision of the Central Executive of the Soviets taken at 4:30 Sunday morning, the Soviets and People's Commissars have decided to accept Germany's peace conditions, and will send a Delegation to Brest-Litovsk.

This decision was taken at the meeting by a vote of 126 to 85, twenty-six members not being present, among them Trotzky. It was decided that an entirely new Delegation, with the exception of Secretary Karakhan, should go to Brest, and the following were chosen: Zinoviev, President of the Petrograd Soviet; Alexiev, Acting Commissary for Agriculture, and Sokolkokov. These were to be accompanied by naval and military representatives and were to leave for Brest that evening.

The Bolshevik majority at the meeting were convinced by Lenin of the correctness of his own policy as against that of Trotzky. He differed from Trotzky on two points: First, he was sure no effective resistance could be offered to the Germans, and second, he did not believe in the immanence of the proletarian revolt in Germany and Austria. At the Bolshevik party caucus Radek, Volodarsky and Bronsky were the advocates of resistance to the bitter end and of a refusal to sign the peace treaty. Martov was the spokesman of the Mensheviks at the general meeting. They were in favor of resistance. Lenin's attitude was outlined by him in two articles in the *Pravda* which appeared before the meeting of the Central Executive took place. He writes:

I am absolutely convinced that to refuse to sign these terms is only possible to those who are intoxicated by revolutionary phrases. Up till now I have tried to impress upon the members of the party the necessity of clearing their minds of revolutionary cant. Now I must do this openly, for unfortunately my worst forebodings have been justified.

Party workers in January declared war on revolutionary phrases and said that a policy of refusal to sign a peace would perhaps satisfy the craving for effectiveness—and brilliance—but would leave out of account the objective correlation of class forces and material factors in the present initial moment of the Socialist revolution. They further said that if we refused to sign the peace then proposed, more crushing defeats would compel Russia to conclude a still more disadvantageous separate peace.

The event proved even worse than I anticipated, for our retreating army seems demoralized and absolutely refuses to fight. Only unrestrained phrase-making can impel Russia at this moment and in these conditions to continue the war, and of course I personally should not remain one second either in the Government or in the Central Committee of our party if the policy of phrase-making were to prevail.

This bitter new truth has revealed itself with such terrible distinctness that it is impossible not to see it. All the bourgeoisie in Russia is jubilant at the approach of the Germans. Only a blind man or a man infatuated with phrases can fail to see that the policy of a revolutionary war without an army is water on the bourgeois mill. In the bourgeois papers there is already exulting in view of the impending overthrow of the Soviet Government by the Germans.

We are compelled to submit to a distressing peace. It will not stop revolution in Germany and Europe. We shall now begin to prepare a revolutionary army, not by phrases and exclamations, as did those who after February 10 did nothing even to attempt to stop our fleeing troops, but by organized work, by the mighty creation of a serious, national, mighty army.

In his address before the meeting Lenin added:

> Their knees are upon our chest and our position is hopeless. This peace must be accepted as a respite, enabling us to prepare a decisive resistance to the bourgeois and imperialism. The proletariat of the whole world will come to our aid. Then we shall renew the fight.

146 On the same day the Petrograd Soviet passed a resolution approving the action of the Government and at the same time, faced with the plain intention of German imperialism to refuse peace on any conditions, summoning the working class and garrison of Petrograd to the defense of Socialist Russia and the revolutionary capitol.

147 **February 25.** Chancellor Hertling addressed the German Reichstag, taking up in detail the four principles of President Wilson's address of February 11. As to Russia and the prospects of peace at Brest-Litovsk, he said:

> Our war aims from the beginning were the defense of the Fatherland, the maintenance of our territorial integrity, and the freedom of our economic development. Our warfare, even where it must be aggressive in action, is defensive in aim. I lay especial stress upon that just now in order that no misunderstandings shall arise about our operations in the east.
>
> After the breaking off of peace negotiations by the Russian Delegation on February 10 we had a free hand as against Russia. The sole aim of the advance of our troops, which was begun seven days after the rupture, was to safeguard the fruits of our peace with the Ukraine. Aims of conquest were in no way a determining factor. We were strengthened in this by the Ukrainians' appeal for support in bringing about order in their young State against the disturbances carried on by the Bolsheviki.
>
> If further military operations in other regions have taken place, the same applies to them. They in no way aim at conquest. They are taking place solely upon the urgent appeals and representations of the populations for protection against atrocities and devastation by Red Guards and other bands. They have therefore, been undertaken in the name of humanity.

They are measures of assistance, and have no other character. It is a question of creating peace and order in the interest of peaceable populations.

We do not intend to establish ourselves, for example, in Esthonia or Livonia. In Courland and Lithuania our chief object is to create organs of self-determination and self-administration. Our military action, however, has produced a success far exceeding the original aim.

You already know from the announcement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that M. Trotzky had by a wireless message, which was speedily followed by a written confirmation, declared his readiness to resume the peace negotiations which had been broken off. We replied immediately by transmitting our peace conditions in the form of an ultimatum. Yesterday—and this is a very gratifying communication which I have to make to you—news arrived that the Petrograd Government accepted our peace conditions and had sent representatives to Brest-Litovsk for further negotiations.

It is possible that there will still be dispute about the details, but the main thing has been achieved. The will to peace has been expressly announced from the Russian side, while the conditions have been accepted, and the conclusion of peace must ensue within a very short time.

To safeguard the fruits of our peace with the Ukraine, our army command drew the sword. Peace with Russia will be the happy result.

Peace negotiations with Rumania began at Bucharest yesterday. It appeared necessary that Secretary von Kuehlmann should be present there during the first days when the foundations were laid. Now, however, he will presumably soon go to Brest-Litovsk. It is to be remembered regarding negotiations with Rumania that we are not taking part in them alone, and are under obligations to champion the interests of our allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, and to see to it that a compromise is arranged there regarding any divergent desires that will possibly give rise to difficulties. But these difficulties will be overcome.

With regard to Rumania, too, the guiding principle will be that we must, and we desire to, convert into friends the States with which on the basis of the success of our army we now conclude peace.

I will say a word regarding Poland, in behalf of which the Entente and President Wilson have recently appeared specially to interest themselves, a country liberated from oppressive dependence on Czarist Russia by the united forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary, for the purpose of establishing an independent State, which, in unrestricted development of its national culture, shall at the same time become a pillar of peace in Europe. The constitutional problem —in the narrower sense the question what constitution the new State shall receive—could not, as is easily understood, be immediately decided, and is still in the stage of exhaustive discussions between the three countries concerned. A fresh difficulty has been added to the many difficulties which have in this connection to be overcome, difficulties especially in the economic domain in consequence of the collapse of old Russia. This difficulty results from the delimitation of the frontier between the new State and the adjacent Russian territory. For this reason the news of peace with the Ukraine at first evoked great uneasiness in Poland. I hope, however, that with good-will and proper regard to the ethnographical conditions a compromise on the claims will be reached. The announced intention to make a serious attempt in this direction has greatly calmed Polish circles.

In the regulation of the frontier question only what is indispensable on military grounds will be demanded on Germany's part.

148 **February 26.** In the Reichstag debate on the Brest-Litovsk treaty, Philip Scheidemann, the Majority Socialist leader, took issue with the Government:

We fought for the defense of the Fatherland against barbarism and against the Entente's plans of conquest. We did not, however, fight for the dismemberment of Russia or the subjugation of Belgium. The Government's policy toward Russia is not ours.

True the Bolsheviks played into the hands of all the disintegrating tendencies of Russia, but we do not

desire a peace with the Entente like that which is being concluded with Russia. The Government must remain ready for a real peace by understanding.

At the same time, Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, informed the Russian Government that Austria-Hungary was ready jointly with her allies to bring the peace negotiations to the desired end.

Despite these announcements, a Russian wireless of February 25, signed by Lenin and Trotzky and addressed "TO ALL" and to Berlin, Dvinsk, Sofia and Constantinople, declared that no formal reply had been received either from the German Government or German Headquarters to the communication of Krylenko on February 24, asking if an armistice would automatically ensue upon the same basis as previously, and that meanwhile the Germans were still advancing. A reply was asked for.

149 February 27. It was announced from Petrograd that General Hoffmann had replied to Krylenko's inquiry by saying that the German advance would be continued until a treaty of peace, as laid down in the German peace terms, had been signed.

The answer to General Hoffmann's reply was resistance by the Russian troops both around Pskov and Vitebsk and Orsha in the North, as well as near Zhitomir in the Ukraine.

A Russian proclamation calling upon the people for "resistance to the German hordes" was issued on the same day:

> A Peace Delegation is now on the way to Brest-Litovsk. We expect any moment news that it has arrived at the place appointed for peace negotiations, but there is no armistice. The German Government has formally refused an armistice, and German detachments continue to advance.
>
> We are prepared to sign their peace of usurpation. We have already declared this, but there are many indications that the German imperialists do not desire peace at the present moment, but rather an immediate strangling of the Workmen's and Peasants' Revolution.
>
> Brave, heroic, obstinate and pitiless resistance thus becomes the principal task of the Revolution. . . .

> Every possible obstacle must be put in the way of the enemy. . . . Should the threat to Petrograd increase, the Government will remove to Moscow or any other city of Russia. . . . Even if they think they can reach Petrograd by a mere military promenade, we will prove to them that they will have to disperse themselves all over Russia before they can reach and crush the authority of the Soviets. . . . However deeply they penetrate Russia, then the more surely will they bring about the outbreak of a revolution in Germany. . . . If peace with the revolution is not the aim of the German imperialists, they will see that the revolution knows how to defend itself.

In another proclamation, the Council of People's Commissars declares that the German invaders are arresting the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, shooting captured Red Guards, and arming German and Austrian prisoners in the Ukraine. The proclamation concludes: "May the blood spilled in this unequal struggle fall on the heads of the German Socialists, who are allowing the German workmen to be ranked among the Cains and Judases."

150 The British Foreign Secretary Balfour replied to Chancellor Hertling in an address in the House of Commons:

> Von Hertling tells us that the recent invasion of Russia was solely taking place on urgent appeals from populations for protection against the atrocities and devastations by the Red Guard and other bands, and has, therefore, been undertaken in the name of humanity. We all know—of course we all know—the poet has told us so—"That East is East and West is West," but I cannot, even with that aphorism ringing in my ears, quite follow the distinction between German policy on the East and German policy on the West. German policy on the East it appears has been recently entirely directed towards preventing atrocities and devastation and carrying out military operations in the name of humanity. German policy on the West is entirely occupied in performing atrocities and devastations and in trampling under foot not only the letter and spirit of treaties, but the very spirit of humanity itself. Why is there this difference of treatment of Belgium on the one side and of the Baltic

Provinces on the other? Why this humanity appeal, with such an overmastering force, of Count Hertling when he talks about Russia, and why is it brushed aside as a neglible quantity by him and his associates when he is talking of Belgium? I know of no explanation except one, which is, that Germany pursues her methods with remorseless insistency. All that varies is the excuse that she gives for her policy. If she wishes to invade Belgium, it is a military necessity; if she wishes to invade Courland, it is the dictates of humanity and the desire to prevent outrages and devastations. . . . I am unable to understand how anybody can get up in the Reichstag and say, as Count Hertling said, that the war Germany has been waging is a defensive war.

On the same day, Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade, said regarding Hertling's speech:

It would be foolish to enter into negotiations unless there were a reasonable prospect of success. We do not desire to repeat the experiment of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations.

51 **February 28.** The German military communication contained the following passage:

Eastern Theatre—Operations are taking their regular course. In Esthonia, the Fourth Esthonian Regiment also has placed itself under our command to clear the country of bands overrunning it.

52 **March 1.** The Petrograd Government received a message from Brest-Litovsk signed by Karakhan, Secretary of the Russian Peace Delegation, as follows:

Send us a train to Toroshaets near Pskov, escorted by sufficiently large forces. Communicate with Krylenko concerning the bodyguard.

This message was interpreted by Lenin in a message "To all the Soviets" as follows:

This message most probably signifies that the peace negotiations have been broken off by the Germans. We must be ready for an immediate German advance on Petrograd and on all fronts. It is necessary that all the people rise and strengthen the measures for defense.

153 In addition to making preparations for the defense of Petrograd, the Extraordinary General Staff, which was formed for the defense of the revolution, announced the capture by Bolshevik forces of Rostov-on-Don and Novocherkask after battles with troops of Generals Kaledin and Kornilov and Alexiev.

154 March 2. The German General Staff announced that "Kiev, capital of the Ukraine, has been liberated by Ukrainian and Saxon troops."

XII. THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK—"A TILSIT PEACE"

55 **March 3.** The Russian Delegation signed the treaty of peace with the Central Powers, without in any way discussing its contents. They had asked Lenin for a special train because they were convinced that further deliberations might make matters worse, in view of the German refusal to cease military operations until the treaty was signed. Before signing the treaty they issued the following statement:

> The Workmen's and Peasants' Government of the Russian Republic, which has announced the cessation of war and has demobilized its army, is compelled by the attack of the German troops to accept the ultimatum presented by Germany by announcement on the twenty-fourth of February and has delegated us to sign these terms which are being imposed on us by violence.
>
> The negotiations which previously took place in Brest-Litovsk between Russia on one side and Germany and her allies on the other made it evident to all that the so-called (by the German representatives) "Peace of Agreement" is in reality a peace definitely annexational and imperialistic. Now the Brest terms are made a great deal worse. The peace which now is being concluded here, in Brest-Litovsk, is not a peace based on free agreement of the people of Russian, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. It is a peace which is being dictated at the point of the gun. It is a peace which Revolutionary Russia is compelled to accept with its teeth clenched. It is a peace which, under the pretext of "liberation" of the frontier districts of Russia, in reality turns them into German provinces, and denies them the right of free definition which was granted to them by the Workmen's and Peasants' Government of Revolutionary Russia. It is a peace which under the pretext of re-establishing order in these districts, gives armed assistance to the oppressing classes against the working class, and helps to put back on the laboring masses the yoke of oppression, which was thrown off by the Russian Revolution. It is a peace which

imposes, for a long time, on the laboring people of Russia the old commercial treaty of 1904, which was made in the interests of the German agrarians, and which is now made even worse; and at the same time it assures the payment of interest to the German and Austro-Hungarian bourgeoisie on the obligations of the Czar's Government, which were repudiated by Revolutionary Russia. Finally, as if to emphasize clearly the real class character of the German armed raid, the German ultimatum attempts to stop the mouth of the Russian Revolution by prohibiting agitation directed against the governments of the Quadruple Alliance and their military authorities.

But not only all that. Under the same pretext of re-establishing order, Germany by force of arms occupies districts with a purely Russian population and establishes there a regime of military occupation and a return to the pre-Revolutionary order. In the Ukraine and in Finland Germany demands non-interference of Revolutionary Russia, and at the same time actively assists the counter-Revolutionary forces against Revolutionary workmen and peasants. In the Caucasus, in direct violation of the terms formulated by Germany itself in the ultimatum of February 21, Germany tears away for the benefit of Turkey the districts of Erivan, Kars, and Batum, which were not conquered even once by the Turkish armies, without any consideration whatsoever of the real will of the population of these districts.

The most brazen forcible annexational seizures and possession of the most important strategic points, which can have only one purpose; the preparation of further invasion of Russia; and the defense of capitalistic interests against the workmen's and peasants' revolution—these are the real aims that are served by the offensive of the German troops, undertaken on the eighteenth of February, without the seven days' notice which was assured by the armistice treaty made between Russia and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance on the fifteenth of December 1917.

This invasion was not stopped, in spite of the statement of the Council of People's Commissars of its acceptance of terms formulated in the German ultimatum of February 21. This invasion was not stop-

ped, in spite of the resumption of the work of the Peace Conference in Brest-Litovsk and in spite of the official protest of the Russian Delegation. By all this all the peace terms offered by Germany and her allies are reduced entirely to an ultimatum presented to Russia and supported from the side of the framers of this peace treaty by threat of direct armed violence.

But in the situation thus created Russia has no possibility of choice. By demobilizing its armies the Russian Revolution had placed its fate in the hands of the German people.

The Russian Delegation in Brest-Litovsk had openly stated, in due time, that not a single honest man would believe that a war against Russia now might be a defensive war. Germany has undertaken the offensive. Under the slogan of establishing order, but in reality for the purposes of strangling the Russian Workmen's and Peasants' Revolution in the interests of the world's imperialism, German militarism has now succeeded in moving its troops against the workingmen and peasant masses of the Russian Socialist Republic. The German proletariat has not as yet proved to be sufficiently strong to stop this attack. We do not doubt for a single minute that this triumph of imperialism and militarism over the international proletarian revolution will prove to be only temporary and transitory.

Under the present conditions the Soviet Government of the Russian Republic, which is left only to its own resources, cannot resist the armed offensive of German imperialism, and in the name of the preservation of Revolutionary Russia is compelled to accept the demands presented to it.

We are authorized by our Government to sign the peace treaty. Compelled, in spite of our protests, to carry on negotiations under the very exceptional conditions of continuing military operations, which are not meeting with resistance from the Russian side, we cannot subject to any further butchery the Russian workmen and peasants, who have refused to continue the war any longer.

We openly state before the face of workmen, peasants, and soldiers of Russia and Germany, before the

face of the laboring and exploited classes of the whole world, that we are compelled to accept the ultimatum dictated by the side which is at the present time more powerful, and are signing immediately the peace treaty presented to us by ultimatum, desisting from any deliberation upon it whatsoever.

156 The following are the terms of the Treaty signed between Russia and the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918.

Article 1.—The Central Powers and Russia declare the state of war between them to be terminated and are resolved henceforth to live in peace and friendship with one another.

Article 2.—The contracting nations will refrain from all agitation or provocation against other signatory Governments, and undertake to spare the populations of the regions occupied by the powers of the Quadruple Entente.

Article 3.—The regions lying west of the line agreed upon by the contracting parties, and formerly belonging to Russia, shall no longer be under Russian sovereignty. It is agreed that the line appears from the appended map, No. 1, which, as agreed upon, forms an essential part of the peace treaty. The fixing of the line in the west will be settled in the German-Russian Mixed Commission. The regions in question will have no obligation whatever toward Russia, arising from their former relations thereto. Russia undertakes to refrain from all interference in the internal affairs of these territories and to let Germany and Austria determine the future fate of these territories in agreement with their populations.

Article 4.—Germany and Austria agree, when a general peace is concluded and Russian demobilization is fully completed, to evacuate the regions east of the line designated in Article 3, No. 1, in so far as Article 6 does not stipulate otherwise. Russia will do everything in her power to complete as soon as possible the evacuation of the Anatolian provinces and their orderly return to Turkey. The districts of Erivan, Kars, and Batum will likewise without delay be evacuated by the Russian troops. Russia will not in-

terfere in the reorganization of the constitutional or international conditions of these districts, but leave it to the populations of the districts to carry out the reorganization, in agreement with the neighboring States, particularly Turkey.

Article 5.—Russia will without delay carry out the complete demobilization of her army, including the forces newly formed by the present Government. Russia will further transfer her warships to Russian harbors and leave them there until a general peace or immediately disarm. Warships of States continuing in a state of war with the Quadruple Alliance will be treated as Russian warships in so far as they are within Russian control. The barred zone in the article continues in force until the conclusion of peace. An immediate beginning will be made of the removal of mines in the Baltic and in so far as Russian power extends in the Black Sea. Commercial shipping is free in these waters, and will be resumed immediately. A mixed commission will be appointed to fix further regulations, especially for the announcement of routes for merchant ships. Shipping routes are to be kept permanently free from floating mines.

Article 6.—Russia undertakes immediately to conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic and to recognize the peace treaty between this State and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance. Ukrainian territory will be immediately evacuated by the Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. Russia will cease all agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Esthonia and Livonia will likewise be evacuated without delay by the Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern frontier of Esthonia follows in general the line of the Narova River. The eastern frontier of Livonia runs in general through Peipus Lake and Pskov Lake to the southwesterly corner of the latter, then over Lubahner (Luban) Lake in the direction of Lievenhof on the Dvina. Esthonia and Livonia will be occupied by a German police force until security is guaranteed by their own national institutions and order in the State is restored. Russia will forthwith release all arrested or deported inhabitants of Esthonia and Livonia and guarantee

the safe return of deported Esthonians and Livonians. Finland and the Aland Islands will also forthwith be evacuated by the Russian troops and the Red Guard, and Finnish ports by the Russian fleet and Russian naval forces. So long as the ice excludes the bringing of Russian warships to Russian ports only small detachments will remain behind on the warships. Russia is to cease all agitation or propaganda against the Government or the public institutions in Finland. The fortifications erected on the Aland Islands are to be removed with all possible dispatch. A special agreement is to be made between Germany, Russia, Finland, and Sweden regarding the permanent non-fortification of these islands, as well as regarding their treatment in military, shipping, and technical respects. It is agreed that at Germany's desire the other States bordering on the Baltic are also to have a voice in the matter.

Article 7.—Starting from the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent States, the contracting parties undertake to respect their political and economic independence and territorial integrity.

Article 8.—Prisoners of war of both sides will be sent home.

Article 9.—The contracting parties mutually renounce indemnification of their war costs, that is to say, State expenditure for carrying on the war, as well as indemnification for war damages, that is to say, those damages which have arisen for them and their subjects in the war regions through military measures, inclusive of all requisitions undertaken in the enemy country.

Article 10.—Diplomatic and Consular relations between the contracting parties will be resumed immediately after ratification of the peace treaty. Special agreements are reserved relative to the admittance of the respective Consuls.

Article 11.—The prescriptions contained in appendices 2 to 5 shall govern the economic relations between the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance and Russia, namely: Appendix 2 for German-Russian, Appendix 3 for Austro-Hungarian-Russian, Appendix 4 for Bulgarian-Russian, and Appendix 5 for Turkish-Russian relations.

Article 12.—The restoration of public and private relations, the exchange of prisoners of war, interned civilians, the amnesty question, as well as the treatment of merchant ships which are in enemy hands, will be regulated by separate treaties with Russia which shall form an essential part of the present peace treaty and as far as is feasible shall enter into force at the same time.

Article 13.—For the interpretation of this treaty the German and Russian text is authoritative for the relations between Germany and Russia; for the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the German, Hungarian, and Russian text; for the relations between Bulgaria and Russia, the Bulgarian and Russian text; for the relations between Turkey and Russia, the Turkish and Russian text.

Article 14.—The present peace treaty will be ratified. Instruments of ratification must be exchanged as soon as possible in Berlin. The Russian Government undertakes at the desire of one of the Quadruple Alliance powers to exchange ratifications within two weeks. The peace treaty enters into force on its ratification, in so far as its articles, appendices, or supplementary treaties do not prescribe otherwise.

The German semi-official Wolff Bureau stated that the trade and political questions referred to in Article 11 are to be regulated according to the demands of the German ultimatum and analogously to the Ukrainian treaty.

157 **March 4.** The German General Staff issued the following statement: "The military operations in Great Russia stopped yesterday in consequence of the signing of a Peace Treaty with Russia."

158 Emperor William sent the following telegram to Chancellor von Hertling:

> The German sword wielded by great army leaders has brought peace with Russia. With deep gratitude to God, Who has been with us, I am filled with proud joy at the deeds of my army and the tenacious perseverance of my people. It is of especial satisfaction to me that German blood and German kultur have been saved. Accept my warmest thanks for your faithful and strong coöperation in the great work.

159 March 5. Announcement was made that Moscow was to become the capitol of Russia in place of Petrograd, and that State institutions were to be transferred to Moscow, Nizhni-Novgorod and Kazan.

160 A preliminary peace treaty was signed between Roumania and the Central Powers at Bucharest.

161 March 6. Between March 4 and 6 the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, the Moscow Soviet and the Petrograd Soviet had all voted to instruct their Delegates to the forthcoming All-Russian Congress of Soviets to support the ratification of the peace terms. In the Central Executive there were 26 dissenting votes. The German peace terms were those of "political bandits." But ratification was necessary in view of the lack of a strong army and the weakness of the German working class movement. The Russian people would never be reconciled to the peace terms and would accept them in order to afford the social revolution "an absolutely necessary respite."

At the meeting of the Moscow Soviet, Pokrovski of the Peace Delegation explained all the disadvantages of the treaty. The new frontiers constituted a ring of iron around revolutionary Russia. The Germans were trying to stifle the Revolution, the conquests of which were reduced to nothing by the economic demands of Berlin. The decree nationalizing the banks had fallen into abeyance because the German terms had the effect of converting the banks into German concerns.

At the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, Zinoviev, Sverdlov and others said the Russian Delegates were compelled to sign the treaty at Brest-Litovsk as a tactical measure, owing to the situation brought about by the Ukraine in agreeing to ignominious terms.

162 March 7. A peace treaty was signed between the Svinhufvud Government of Finland and Germany. The treaty provided that the contracting parties were resolved to live in peace and friendship and that Germany would exert herself to secure recognition by all the Powers of Finland's autonomy and independence. Finland, on the other hand, would cede no portion of her territory to a foreign power, without previously coming to an understanding with Germany on the subject. Each party re-

nounces compensation for war costs and indemnities. Those treaties between Germany and Russia which had ceased to be operative were to be replaced by new treaties, particularly by a new commercial treaty. A commission was to meet in Berlin for the purpose of fixing civil damages. It was to be composed of representatives of both parties and of neutral members, each to have a one-third representation. The President of Switzerland was to be requested to nominate neutral members, including the Chairman. The treaty contains stipulations for the exchange of prisoners of war, and of interned civilians, for amnesty, compensation for merchant ships, etc., and for the settlement of questions concerning the Aland Islands, the fortifications on these islands to be removed as speedily as possible, and the permanent non-fortification of the islands regulated by special agreement.

163 **March 9.** Ambassador Francis sent the following cable to the Secretary of State at Washington, according to a document laid before a sub-committee of the U. S. Senate Committee on Judiciary investigating propaganda on March 10, 1919, by Colonel Robins:

> Colonel Robins arrived at midnight. He returned from Petrograd after an important conference with Trotzky on the fifth. The result of that conference he wired to me in the code of the military mission, but as the mission had left for Petrograd, of which fact you were advised, with the code, I did not learn of the conference until the arrival of Robins an hour ago.
>
> Since R. left Petrograd, the Moscow and Petrograd Soviets have both instructed their delegates to the conference of March 12 to support the ratification of the peace terms. I fear that such action is the result of a threatened Japanese invasion of Siberia, which I have anticipated by sending Wright eastward. Trotzky told Robins that he had heard that such invasion was countenanced by the Allies and especially by America, and it would not only force the Government to advocate the ratification of the humiliating peace, but would so completely estrange all factions in Russia that further resistance to Germany would be absolutely impossible.

Trotzky furthermore asserted that neither his Government nor the Russian people would object to the supervision by America of all shipments from Vladivostok in Russia and a virtual control of the operations of the Siberian Railway, but a Japanese invasion would result in non-resistance and eventually make Russia a German province. In my judgment a Japanese advance now would be exceedingly unwise and this midnight cable is sent for the purpose of asking that our influence may be exerted to prevent same.

164 **March 11.** The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, together with the Council of the People's Commissars, established themselves at Moscow as the capitol.

165 **March 14-16.** The Fourth All-Russian Congress of Soviets met at Moscow. 1164 delegates were present. The treaty of peace with Germany was ratified by a vote of 704 to 261. Lenin made the principal speech for ratification:

> . . . And in a few days an imperialistic brigand knocked us down, attacking those who had no arms. He forced us to sign an incredibly oppressive and humiliating peace—a penalty for our daring to break away, even for as short a time as possible, from the iron grip of the imperialistic war. And the more threateningly the spectre of a working class revolution in his own country rises before the brigand, the more furiously he oppresses and strangles and tears Russia to pieces.
>
> We were compelled to sign a Tilsit peace. We must not deceive ourselves. We must have courage to face the unadorned, bitter truth. We must measure in full, to the very bottom, the abyss of defeat, partition, enslavement, humiliation, into which we have been thrown. The clearer we understand this, the firmer, the more hardened and inflexible will become our will for liberation our desire to arise anew from enslavement to independence, our firm determination to see at all costs that Russia shall cease to be poor and weak, that she may become truly powerful and prosperous.
>
> She can become such, for we still have left sufficient expanse and natural resources to supply all and

every one, if not with abundance, at least with sufficient means of subsistence. . . . Russia will become such provided she frees herself of all dejection and phrase-mongering, provided she strains her every nerve and every muscle, provided she comes to understand that salvation is possible only on the road of the international socialist revolution which we have chosen. To move forward along this road, not becoming dejected in the face of defeat, to lay stone upon stone, the firm foundation of a Socialist society, to work tirelessly, to create discipline and self-discipline, to strengthen everywhere organization, order, efficiency, the harmonious coöperation of all the people's forces, universal accounting and control over the production and distribution of products—such is the road towards the creation of military power and socialist power.

It is unworthy of a true Socialist if badly defeated, either to deny that fact or to become despondent. It is not true that we have no way out, that we can only choose between a "disgraceful" (from the point of view of a feudal knight) death, which an oppressive peace is, and a "glorious" death in a hopeless battle. It is not true that we have betrayed our ideals or our friends, when we signed the Tilsit peace. We have betrayed nothing and nobody. We have not sanctioned or covered any lie. We have not refused to aid any friend or comrade in misfortune in any way we could, or by every means at our disposal. A commander who leads into the interior the remnants of an army which is defeated or disorganized by a disorderly flight and who, if necessary, protects this retreat by a most humiliating and oppressive peace, is not betraying those parts of the army which he cannot help and which are cut off by the enemy. Such a commander is only doing his duty. He is choosing the only way to save what can still be saved. He is scorning adventures, telling the people the bitter truth, "yielding territory in order to win time," utilizing any, even the shortest, respite in order to gather again his forces and to give the army which is affected by disintegration and demoralization a chance to rest and recover.

We have signed a Tilsit peace. When Napoleon I. forced Prussia in 1807 to accept the Tilsit peace, the conqueror had defeated all the German armies, occupied the capitol and all the large cities, established his police, compelled the conquered to give him auxiliary corps in order to wage new wars of plunder by the conquerors, and he dismembered Germany, forming an alliance with some German states against other German states. And, nevertheless, even after such a peace, the German people were not subdued. They managed to recover, to rise, and to win the right to freedom and independence.

To any person able and willing to think, the example of the Tilsit peace (which was only one of the many oppressive and humiliating treaties forced upon the Germans in that epoch) shows clearly how childishly naïve is the thought that an oppressive peace is, under all circumstances, ruinous, and that war is the road of valor and salvation. The war epochs teach us that peace has in many cases in history served as a respite to gather strength for new battles. The peace of Tilsit was the great humiliation of Germany, and at the same time a turning point to the greatest national awakening. At that time the historical environment offered only one outlet for this awakening—a bourgeois state. At that time, over a hundred years ago, history was made by a handful of noblemen and small groups of bourgeois intellectuals, while the mass of workers and peasants were inactive and inert. Owing to this, history at that time could crawl only with awful slowness.

Now capitalism has considerably raised the level of culture in general and of the culture of the masses in particular. The war aroused the masses, awakened them by its unheard of horrors and sufferings. The war has given impetus to history and now she is speeding along with the speed of a locomotive. History is now being independently made by millions and tens of millions of people. Capitalism has now become ripe for Socialism.

Thus, if Russia now moves—and it cannot be denied that she does move—from a Tilsit peace to a national awakening and to a great war for the fatherland—

the outlet of such an awakening leads not to the bourgeois state but to an international Socialist revolution. We are "resistants" since November 7, 1917. We are for the "defense of our fatherland." But the war for the fatherland towards which we are moving is a war for a Socialist fatherland, for Socialism, as a part of the universal army of Socialism.

A new Central Executive Committee was elected. Chicherin was made Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Trotzky was made Chairman of the newly created Government of Petrograd, known as the Petrograd Labor Commune. It was asserted that the full provisions of the treaty had not been made public, and that Germany had exacted an indemnity of 9,000,000,000 roubles, and that secret economic provisions gave Germany complete mastery of Russia. At this Congress, the Bolsheviks changed the name of their party to the Communist Party.

At the opening of the Congress on March 14, Sverdlov, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, who presided, said in presenting a telegram from President Wilson, dated Washington, March 11:

> Comrades, I shall have difficulty in reading all the telegrams received here. We have received a vast number. One telegram stands out among them, which I shall submit to your attention. It is the telegram from President Wilson. The telegram is as follows:
>
> May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purposes of the people of Russia? Although the Government of the United States is unhappily not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration to her great rôle in the life of Europe and the modern world. The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to

free themselves forever from autocratic government and become masters of their own life.

[Signed] WOODROW WILSON.

[Applause.]

Comrades, allow me, in the name of the Congress, to express my firm belief that the wide masses of the proletariat and the semi-proletariat of Western Europe, as well as of America and Australia, are with us with all their hearts. Allow me to express my firm belief that these masses are watching with the closest attention the struggle which we are carrying on here in Russia, and I will permit myself to submit to your attention the resolution which was adopted by the presiding body of the Central Executive Committee in answer to President Wilson's address to the Congress.

The resolution reads as follows: The Congress expresses its gratitude to the American people, above all to the laboring and exploited classes of the United States, for the sympathy expressed to the Russian people by President Wilson through the Congress of Soviets in the days of severe trials.

The Russian Socialist Federative Republic of Soviets takes advantage of President Wilson's communication to express to all peoples perishing and suffering from the horrors of imperialistic war its warm sympathy and firm belief that the happy time is not far distant when the laboring masses of all countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a Socialist state of society, which alone is capable of securing a just and lasting peace as well as the culture and well being of all laboring people. [Applause.]

Comrades, allow me to consider this applause a sufficient answer that you all join in this resolution.

XIII. AFTER BREST-LITOVSK

March 18. The Supreme War Council of the Allies, issued a statement in London on the Russian and Roumanian Treaties, which they called "political crimes which, under the name of a German peace, have been committed against the Russian people." The statement continues:

> Russia was unarmed forgetting that for four years Germany had been fighting against the independence of nations and the rights of mankind. The Russian Government, in a mood of singular credulity, expected to obtain by persuasion that "democratic peace" which it had failed to obtain by war.
>
> The results were that the immediate armistice had not expired before the German Command, though pledged not to alter the disposition of its troops, transferred them en masse to the Western front and so weak did Russia find herself that she dared to raise no protest against this flagrant violation of Germany's plighted word.
>
> What followed was of like character. When "the German peace" was translated into action, it was found to involve the invasion of Russian territory, the destruction or capture of all Russia's means of defense and the organization of Russian lands for Germany's profit—a proceeding which did not differ from "annexation" because the word itself was carefully avoided.
>
> Meanwhile, those very Russians who had made military operations impossible, found diplomacy impotent. Their representatives were compelled to proclaim that while they refused to read the Treaty presented to them, they had no choice but to sign it; so they signed it, not knowing whether in its true significance it meant peace or war, not measuring the degree to which Russian national life was reduced by it to a shadow. . . .

Von Hertling on the first reading in the Reichstag of the Peace Treaty with Russia, declared that he did not wish to discuss the opinions of Germany's enemies regarding the Treaty. He continued:

> Hypocrisy has become second nature to the enemy, whose untruthfulness is made worse by its brutality. . . . The treaty with Russia contains no conditions disgraceful to Russia if the provinces breaking away from Russia say it is in accordance with their own wish, and the wish is accepted by Russia. . . . If the Reichstag adopts the Peace Treaty, peace on the whole Eastern front will be restored.

The Chancellor referred to Russia's proposal that all the belligerents enter into the peace negotiations, and added:

> We and our allies accepted the proposals and sent Delegates to Brest-Litovsk. The Powers until then allied with Russia remained aloof. The course of the negotiations is known to you. You remember the endless speeches which were intended, not so much for the Delegates there assembled as for the public-at-large, and which caused the desired goal of an understanding to recede into the distance. You remember the repeated interruptions, the rupture and the resumption of the negotiations. The point had been reached where yes or no had to be said, and on March 3 peace was concluded at Brest-Litovsk. On March 16 it was ratified by a competent assembly in Moscow. If, in the telegram from Washington, it was thought fit to express to the Congress assembled at Moscow the sympathy of the United States at a moment when, as it says, the German power obtruded itself in order to bring success for the battle for freedom, then I put that calmly aside with the rest. We have not for a moment contemplated, and do not contemplate, opposing the justified wishes and endeavor of Russia to be liberated. . . . The Russian treaty contains no conditions whatever which dishonor Russia, no mention of oppressive war indemnities, no forcible appropriations of Russian territory. A number of the border States have severed their connection with the Russian State in accordance with their own will, which was recognized by Russia. In regard to these States, we adopt the standpoint formerly expressed by me, that under the mighty protection of the German Empire, they can give themselves political form corresponding with their situation, and the tendency of

their kultur, while at the same time, of course, we are safeguarding our own interests.

168 **March 20.** Meanwhile the Austro-German advance in the Ukraine continued. The invaders held Kiev, Odessa and most of the principal cities of the Ukraine. The Turks had recovered Trebizond and Erzerum and were in possession of Trans-Caucasia, thus giving the Central Powers full control of the Black Sea.

169 Trotzky is reported to have approached the American Military Mission in Moscow, asking for aid in organizing a volunteer army and improving transportation. A dispatch of that date says: "There has been a marked change in the attitude of the Allies toward the Soviet Government. . . . There are many signs of renewed coöperation between Russia and the Allies." It was also reported at about the same time that Trotzky had asked the French to help him in organizing his military forces. A leading article in Premier Clemenceau's *L'Homme Libre* declared: "The Entente as long as the war lasts will regard Russia, the one and indivisible Russia which signed the pact of London, as an Ally."

170 **March 21.** The Trans-Caucasian Constituent Assembly at Tiflis refused to ratify the Peace Treaty with Germany and urged immediate war.

171 **March 22.** The Main Committee of the Reichstag approved the Russo-German Peace Treaty.

172 **March 29.** The Caucasus Diet approved the basis of a Peace Agreement with Turkey, including autonomy for Armenia and the restoration of old frontiers.

173 **April 2.** Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, replied to President Wilson's address of Feb. 11, in a speech to a deputation of the Vienna City Council. He said:

> Three Treaties of Peace have been signed—with Petrograd, Ukraine and Rumania. One principal section of the war is thus ended. . . .
>
> We first gave international recognition to the separation of the Ukraine from Russia, which had to be accomplished as an internal affair of Russia. Profiting from resultant circumstances which were favor-

able to our aims, we concluded with the Ukraine the peace sought by that country.

This gave the lead to peace with Petrograd, whereby Rumania was left standing alone, so that she also had to conclude peace. So one peace brought another; and the desired success, namely, the end of the war in the East was achieved. . . .

In concluding peace with the Ukraine and Rumania, it has been my first thought to furnish the monarchy with foodstuffs and raw materials. Russia did not come into consideration in this connection owing to the disorganization there. . . .

An immediate general peace would not give us further advantages, as all Europe is to-day suffering from lack of foodstuffs. . . .

The forcible annexation of foreign peoples would place difficulties in the way of a general peace. . . . What we require are not territorial annexations, but economic safeguards for the future.

We wish to do everything to create in the Balkans a situation of lasting calm. Not until the collapse of Russia did there cease to exist the factor which hitherto made it impossible for us to bring about a definite state of internal peace in the Balkans.

We know that the desire for peace in Serbia is very great, but Serbia has been prevented by the Entente Powers from concluding it. . . .

It is a distortion of fact to assert that Germany has made conquests in the East. Lenin's anarchy drove the border peoples into the arms of Germany. Is Germany to refuse this involuntary choice of foreign border peoples? . . .

A general, honorable peace is nearer than the public imagines. But no one has the right to remain aside in this last decisive struggle.

174 Lord Robert Cecil replied to Czernin. He said:

. . . I must confess I prefer Prussian brutality to Austrian hypocrisy. . . .

Count Czernin claims with the greatest audacity that he and his allies have just made proposals that are moderate, and even guided by the principles of self-determination, no annexations, and no indemnities.

As far as self-determination is concerned, in every one of the new States they have set up they have done so without the slightest regard to the wishes of the peoples and no serious attempt was made even to follow racial boundaries or racial antecedents. The province of Dobrudja which has been handed over to Bulgaria has only 18 per cent Bulgarians and 50 per cent Roumanians, and Southern Bessarabia, which is apparently offered to Roumania, is the part of Bessarabia having the fewest Roumanians.

As for no annexations . . . what he really has done is to take an important part of the Danube and all the passes between Austria-Hungary and Roumania. Not only that, he has driven back the Carpathian frontier eight or ten miles.

But the most hypocritical part . . . is the fact that they have imposed one of the heaviest war indemnities ever levied. It is a curious provision which applies to the new States, that they are to be under no obligation toward Russia arising from former relations with her. The result is to concentrate on Russia [Soviet Russia] the debt which was hitherto spread over the whole of Russia. . . .

175 **April 6.** On "the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight," President Wilson delivered an address in which he said:

At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates spoke in similar terms; professed their desire to conclude a fair peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiances. But action accompanied and followed the profession. Their military masters, the men who act for Germany and exhibit her purpose in execution, proclaimed a very different conclusion. We cannot mistake what they have done—in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Roumania. The real test of their justice and fair play has come. From this we may judge the rest.

They are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride. A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the time at their mercy. Their fair professions are for-

gotten. They nowhere set up justice, but everywhere impose their power and exploit everything for their own use and aggrandizement, and the peoples of conquered provinces are invited to be free under their dominion!

Are we not justified in believing that they would do the same things at their western front if they were not there face to face with armies whom even their countless divisions cannot overcome? If, when they have felt their check to be final, they should propose favorable and equitable terms with regard to Belgium and France and Italy, could they blame us if we concluded that they did so only to assure themselves of a free hand in Russia and the East?

Their purpose is, undoubtedly, to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Balkan Peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition, and build upon that dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can then erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy—an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India and the peoples of the Far East. . . .

What then are we to do? For myself, I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely purposed—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer. . . .

176 April 7. The Peoples' Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, signified to the German Government his willingness to open peace negotiations with the Ukrainian Rada.

177 April 10. The Commissar of Commerce announced that under the Brest-Litovsk treaty Russia had suffered the following losses:

Seven hundred and eighty thousand square kilometers (301,000 square miles) of territory.

Fifty-six million inhabitants, constituting 32 per cent of the entire population of the country.

One-third of Russia's total mileage of railways, amounting to 21,530 kilometers (13,350 miles).

Seventy-three per cent of the total iron production.

Eighty-nine per cent of the total coal production.

Two hundred and sixty-eight sugar refineries, 918 textile factories, 574 breweries, 133 tobacco factories, 1,685 distilleries, 244 chemical factories, 615 paper mills, 1,073 machine factories.

These territories which now become German formerly brought in annual revenue amounting to 845,-238 (?) roubles, and had 1,800 savings banks.

Trotzky was appointed Peoples' Commissar of War and the Marine. He insisted upon the necessity of having a strictly disciplined army. It was reported that the Soviet Government was hoping to have a Red Army of 500,000 by the Fall. In adopting the red banner with the inscription, "Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic" on April 9, the Chairman had said:

> The Russian flag will have to wave over the embassies in Berlin and Vienna and we cannot have the old tricolor, so I think it most proper to adopt the red flag under which we fought and gained victory.

And in proposing a strictly disciplined army Trotzky had said:

> We cannot preserve the illusion that European capital will patiently suffer the fact that in Russia the power is in the hands of the working class. . . . We are surrounded by enemies on all sides. If it were proposed to France to return Alsace, the French Bourse would sell Russia tomorrow.

178 **September 6.** New agreements supplementary to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty were ratified in Berlin between the German Imperial and Russian Soviet Governments. These supplementary treaties are divided into three parts: (a) political; (b) financial; and (c) relating to exchange, patents and arbitration.

(a) *Supplementary Political Treaty*

Article I.—Deals mainly with frontier problems. It provides above all for the establishment of "neutral zones between the respective fronts" of Germany and Russia, from which the troops of both parties are to be excluded.

Article II.—A special commission is appointed for the demarcation of the Eastern frontiers of Esthonia and Livonia, and as soon as it reaches a decision, German troops are to be withdrawn from the country lying further to the East.

Article III.—The evacuation of the territory east of Beresina is, however, made contingent upon the cash payments by Russia provided for in the special financial treaty, and is to take place in five stages according to the five money installments. This evacuation is to take place before the conclusion of general peace.

Articles V and VI.—Russia undertakes to "employ at once all the means at her disposal to expel the Entente forces from North Russian territory in observance of her neutrality;" and in return for this Germany guarantees that "during these operations there shall be no Finnish attack of any kind on Russian territory, particularly on Petrograd." The Germans also undertake that after the ejection of the Allies, the restrictions of the barred zone shall be relaxed in favor of Russia for coastal shipping and fishing boats always subject to German control of contraband.

Articles VII-X.—Russia renounces, also, sovereignty over Esthonia and Livonia, as she had already done in Courland and Lithuania, and undertakes to refrain from all interference in their internal affairs and to leave their future fate to be "decided in agreement with their inhabitants." Russia, however, obtains the right of free through transit for her goods to Reval, Riga and Windau, which become free ports, with free Russian zones immune from local customs control. Special provisions are made for railway and waterway tariffs, in particular on the River Dvina: for the maintenance of Lake Peipus, for Petrograd interest in the water power of the River Narova, as a source of electric supply, and for the transference of nationals and their property between Russia and the newly formed States.

Articles XIII-XIV.—Germany undertakes to evacuate the districts bordering on the Black Sea (with the exception of the Caucasus) as soon as peace shall have been concluded between Russia and the Ukraine. The Rostov-Voronez railway will be evacuated when the Government

of Moscow requests it. With regard to the Don coal basin, an arrangement is made by which Russia is to receive three tons of coal for every ton of oil which Germany receives from Baku, and it is laid down that Germany is to obtain at least one-quarter of Baku's total output of oil. The minimum monthly amount to be supplied and the scale of prices to be followed are left to be settled later. Russia consents to German recognition of Georgian independence, while Germany in return undertakes to prevent "the forces of a third Power" crossing a frontier line, running from the mouth of the Kura River through Petropavlovskoje and Agriova, along the north boundary of the Baku District to the Caspian.

Article XV.—The Germans undertake to restore Russian shipping after the conclusion of the general peace.

(b) *Supplementary Financial Treaty*

This treaty assigns to Germany a sum of 6,000,000,000 marks, due (a) for the war losses of German subjects on Russian territory or through Russian occupation, and (b) for the expenses incurred by Germany in housing and feeding her Russian prisoners. Stipulations for payment are made under four distinct heads:

1. 2,500,000,000 to be floated as a 6 per cent Russian loan.

2. 1,000,000,000 to be delivered in goods, not later than March 31, 1920 (the cash payment being correspondingly increased in the event of failure to comply).

3. 1,500,000,000 in cash. This again falls into two sections:

(a) 545,000,000 roubles of Czarist paper money, valued at the rate of 1½ marks to 1 rouble.

(b) 245,564 kilograms of fine gold, which is valued at 683,000,000 marks in gold. The first installment, 42,860 kilograms in gold, and 90,900,000 roubles in paper was to be paid, and actually was paid, on September 10; the second installment on September 30, and three more at intervals of a month.

4. The balance of 1,000,000,000 falls to Finland and the Ukraine.

According to the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the Soviet Government itself offered gold because they considered that under their new system they will not require gold as an international medium.

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